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ABSTRACT  
We often use language to refer to items within our immediate 
proximity whereby the constraints of the visual context serves to 
restrict the number of possible referents, making it easier to 
anticipate which item will most likely be referred to next. However, we 
also use language to refer to past, future, or even imagined events. 
In such cases, anticipation is no longer restricted by the visual 
context and may now be influenced by real-world knowledge. In a set 
of eye-tracking experiments we explored the mapping of language 
onto internal representations of visually available scenes, as well as 
previously viewed scenes. Firstly, we were interested in how event-
plausibility is able to influence our internal representations of 
described events and secondly, how these representations might be 
modulated by the nature of the visual context (as present or absent). 
Our findings showed that when describing events in the context of a 
concurrent scene the eye movement patterns during the unfolding 
language indicated that participants anticipated both plausible and 
implausible items. However, when the visual scene was removed 
immediately before the onset of spoken language participants 
anticipated plausible items, but not implausible items – only by 
providing a more constraining linguistic context did we find 
anticipatory looks to the implausible items. This suggests that in the 
absence of a visual context we require a more constraining linguistic 
context to achieve the same degree of constraint provided by a 
concurrent visual scene. We conclude that the conceptual 
representations activated during language processing in a concurrent 
visual context are quantitatively different from those activated when 
the visual context to which that language applies is absent. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We are all aware that some events and actions are more likely to 
occur than others. For example, we know from experience that 
people are much more likely to place a glass on a table, than on a 
lamp. But how do we process and mentally represent such plausible 
and implausible events when we are not actually performing the 
actions ourselves, but instead listening to descriptions of other 
people’s actions? When reading a story we are often able to visualise 
described events as they unfold – imagining what the characters look 
like, feel like and even the environment in which the story takes 
place. By relating a story to our knowledge and experience about 
similar actions and events, we are also able to make inferences, or 
anticipate upcoming events before they unfold within the narrative.                          
     In everyday life we regularly use language to refer to items and 
people within our immediate proximity. For example, you may be 
having dinner with a friend, notice a pot of salt at the other end of the 
table and ask him if he would mind passing you the salt. In this 
scenario, both the item you refer to and the person to which the 
question is directed are right there in front of you. Thus, assuming 
that you and your friend are the only people in the room he will 
automatically be inclined to think that the question is directed to him 
and upon hearing ‘would you mind passing me the...’, he is further 
likely to infer that the item you are requesting is; a) something 
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‘passable’, and b) something within his reach. When inferring the 
upcoming item in this scenario, language combined with a visual 
context allows us to restrict the number of possible outcomes, 
thereby making it easier to anticipate which item will most likely be 
referred to next (e.g. Altmann & Mirkovic, 2009, Rayner, Warren, 
Juhasz & Liversedge, 2004).  
     However, we don’t use language exclusively to refer to items 
within a visual context. Indeed, one of the great features of language 
is that it allows us to convey discourse regardless of visual context, 
time and probability. Going back to the previous example of ‘passing 
the salt’ we can then ask what would happen if rather than 
experiencing the situation ourselves, we are merely hearing about for 
instance, Peter having dinner with a friend. When hearing Peter 
asking his friend if he would mind ‘passing the...’ our anticipation of 
the upcoming item is no longer restricted by the visual context and 
while we would still infer that the upcoming item is something 
‘passable’, without a visual context any number of ‘passable’ items 
could be within Peter’s friend’s reach. In this case our anticipation 
about the upcoming item is no longer bound by a visual context, but 
instead restricted only by language.           
     The aim of my PhD research is to explore the mapping of 
language onto internal representations of visually available scenes, 
as well as previously viewed scenes – more specifically, we were 
interested in how event-plausibility may influence our internal 
representations of described events and further how this might be 
modulated by the nature of the visual context (as present or absent). 
Previous studies have shown that issues such as temporal and 
spatial distance can affect representational accessibility (e.g. Kelter, 
Claus & Kaup, 2004; Morrow, Bower & Greenspan, 1989; Morrow, 
Greenspan & Bower, 1987; Rinck, Williams, Bower & Becker, 1996; 
Zwaan, Madden & Whitten, 2000). In contrast, the research 
presented in this thesis investigated the extent to which plausibility of 
context and location is able to influence the accessibility of objects 
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within event-representations.   
 
1.1.     Mental representations of language 
A full understanding of discourse often relies on factors beyond a 
simple understanding of spoken words. It has been proposed that 
people construct a mental model (Garnham, 1996; Glenberg & 
Langston, 1992; Johnson-Laird, 1981, 1983), or a situation model 
(Kintsch, 1988, 1992; Morrow, Bower & Greenspan, 1990; van Dijk & 
Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), forming an internal 
representation that to some extent mirrors the described events. 
Johnson-Laird (1983) proposed that these models enable us to 
create a mental representation of the situation described by the 
language we encounter by relating discourse to the world through 
perception and conception. When constructing a mental model we 
integrate linguistic information with our knowledge and experience 
about similar situations and this allows us to go beyond the linguistic 
input of discourse in order to provide a rich and more complete 
representation of described events. This integration of language and 
knowledge further enables us to form a rich and dynamic mental 
representation of the situation described – as opposed to a mental 
representation of language itself (Glenberg, Meyer & Lindem, 1987; 
Zwaan, 1999). For example, when we hear a sentence such as “on 
her way home from work Anna realised that she had forgotten her 
umbrella, so she used a newspaper instead” we draw on general 
knowledge and personal experience, which makes us assume that; 
a) it must be raining, and b) since Anna did not have her umbrella 
with her she must instead have used a newspaper to protect her from 
the rain. Even though the sentence does not explicitly state what 
Anna used the newspaper for, by relating our knowledge and 
experience to the language we hear, we are able to form a more 
complete mental representation of the described situation. This in 
turn gives us a rich and detailed understanding of the described 
event. As such, mental representations play an important role in our 
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understanding of discourse, since our personal knowledge and 
experience are able to influence how we process and interpret 
language.  
     The idea of mental/situational models becomes particular 
important for the comprehension of several sentences, since longer 
narratives rarely describe static and unchanging scenarios. Often 
during descriptive events the location of the characters may change 
regularly, objects are moved to new locations, different events occur, 
new characters are introduced and so on (Zwaan, Magliano & 
Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Madden, 2004). Such changes require us 
to continuously update our mental representations of the described 
situation as it unfolds, in order to gain an up-to-date full 
representation and comprehension of the described event. One of 
the questions we consider in this thesis is on what basis, or in other 
words, what kind of knowledge is recruited when we update 
representations of events.   
 
1.2.     Dimensions of situation models – space  
Researchers have identified several dimensions of situation models 
such as causation, intentionality, protagonist, time and space (e.g. 
Chafe, 1979; Gernsbacher, 1990; Graesser, Singer & Trabasso, 
1994; Sundermeier, van den Broek & Zwaan, 2005; Zwaan, 
Langston & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Zwaan, 
Radvansky, Hilliard & Curiel, 1998) that we use in order to 
successfully construct a mental representation of a described event. 
A number of studies have investigated how language can evoke 
elaborate mental representations of the spatial properties of an event 
(e.g. Denis & Cocude, 1989; Erlich & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Haenggi, 
Kintsch & Gernsbacher, 1995; Morrow, 1994; Morrow & Clark, 1989; 
O’Brien & Albrecht, 1992; Rinck, Hähnel, Bower & Glowalla, 1997; 
Tversky, 1991). Since mental representations rely on personal 
knowledge and experience, it may be assumed that internal 
representations of space are likewise influenced by people’s actual 
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experience and knowledge of the spatial world and several studies 
have shown that representations of space and motion are highly 
influenced by people’s knowledge and previous experiences with 
similar situations (e.g. Clark, 1973; Freyd, 1983; Kaschak et al., 
2005; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Mishra & Singh, 2010; Shepard 
& Hurwits, 1984; Tversky, 1991, Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley & Aveyard, 
2004) whereby an integration of language and knowledge serves to 
mentally recreate the spatial elements of a described situation.  
     A study by Glenberg et al. (1987) showed that spatial information 
about distance is able to influence accessibility. Participants read 
short stories that included a target word. The target word was either 
spatially associated with the character, or in other words, in close 
proximity to the character of the story (for example, “after doing a few 
warm-up exercises John put on his sweatshirt and went jogging”), or 
spatially dissociated (“after doing a few warm-up exercises John took 
off his sweatshirt and went jogging”). Afterwards participants read a 
filler sentence (always referring to the character, but never to the 
target word) and then they made a recognition response to the target 
word. Glenberg et al. found that participants’ response and reading 
times were longer after reading the spatially dissociated sentences, 
compared to the spatially associated sentences. This suggests that 
the spatial properties between the character and the target object 
were included in participants’ representation of the event. As such, 
the spatial proximity between “John” and “his sweatshirt” was able to 
influence comprehension, since a small spatial distance made the 
sweatshirt more prominent in the representation of the event and 
therefore more accessible.  
     Later research by Rinck and Bower (2000) extended these 
findings. They examined the effects of spatial proximity on 
accessibility by manipulating spatial distances in narratives. For the 
first part of the experiment participants were required to study and 
learn the layout of a fictitious building with a number of rooms, each 
containing certain critical objects. Afterwards, they read a series of 
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narratives describing the character’s actions and (critically) 
whereabouts in the building (for example, Calvin walked from the 
repair shop into the experiment room). Spatial distance was 
determined by the objects’ proximity to the location of the character. 
After the narrative participants read one to six intervening sentences 
and were then presented with a probe question inquiring whether an 
object was located in a specific room inside the building (for example, 
is the bed located in the lounge?). The findings showed that 
participants were faster to respond to the probe questions when the 
described location was situated near the current location of the 
character, as opposed to a previously entered room, or an 
unmentioned room. As such, spatial distance influenced response 
times, making the objects and rooms more accessible when these 
were located close to the whereabouts of the character. This shows 
that internal representations are able to contain complex spatial 
layouts, as well as continuously keeping track of a character’s 
whereabouts within the narrative. Zwaan (1999) suggests that such 
findings may be related to our everyday interactions with the 
environment, whereby ‘close at hand’ objects are often more relevant 
to us, compared to objects that are further away, or out of reach.            
     Matlock (2004) provided further evidence suggesting that people’s 
experience of both space and motion influences how language is 
processed. In this study participants read short stories about travel, 
which included either a fictive motion sentence (a sentence that 
included a motion verb, but did not describe any explicit movement or 
change of state, for example, “the road runs through the valley”), or a 
non-fictive motion sentence (in which no movement is implied, for 
example, “the road is in the valley”). Her findings showed that after 
reading fictive motions sentences, which described slow travel, 
difficult terrain and long distances, participants took longer to decide 
if a subsequent test sentence was related to the story, compared to 
when they read sentences that described fast travel, easy terrain and 
short distances. Importantly, these differences were not found for 
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non-fictive motion sentences, which suggest that when reading the 
fictive motion sentences participants formed an internal 
representation that mentally simulated the movement described and 
this influenced language processing. A subsequent eye tracking 
study by Richardson and Matlock (2007) provided further evidence 
for this point, demonstrating that differences in described terrain were 
also reflected in participants’ inspection times and eye movements 
towards visual displays depicting the described scenes. They found 
that when listening to fictive motion sentences, participants’ 
inspection times and eye movements (scanning) along the road were 
longer when the terrain was described as difficult, compared to when 
it was described as easy. As in the previous study by Matlock there 
were no differences when listening to non-fictive motion sentences. 
This indicates that mental simulations of fictive motion integrated 
themselves with visual processing, thereby allowing language to 
influence visual perception.       
     In a related experiment Zwaan et al. (2004) examined the extent 
to which language comprehension is able to activate representations 
of visual motion. In this experiment participants listened to sentences 
that described either the motion of a ball in a direction towards the 
participants (for example, the shortstop hurled the softball at you), or 
in a direction away from the participants (for example, you hurled the 
softball at the shortstop). After hearing the sentences two visual 
displays were presented in quick succession, showing the image of a 
ball either getting gradually larger (as if coming towards the 
participants), or gradually smaller (suggesting movement away from 
the participants). After each trial participants were required to judge if 
the two pictures displayed were of the same object. Zwaan et al. 
found that participants responded faster when the pictures matched 
the direction of the ball, as it had been described by the sentences. 
For example, if the sentence described the ball as moving towards 
you, participants responded faster when the pictures showed the ball 
getting bigger (suggesting movement towards the participant), 
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compared to pictures showing the ball getting smaller (suggesting 
movements away from the participant). A number of related studies 
support these findings (e.g. Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kaschak, 
Zwaan, Aveyard & Yaxley, 2006; Meteyard, Bahrami & Vigliocco, 
2007; Yaxley & Zwaan, 2007; Winter & Bergen, 2009), showing that 
participants’ mental representations involve a perceptual simulation 
of the event described in the sentence, whereby a match between 
the perceived motion (generated by language) and actual perception 
results in faster judgements of similarity. Together, these studies 
illustrate how real experience and knowledge of distance and spatial 
relations are not only able to influence our internal representations of 
space, but also that language can affect how we view visual images.  
 
1.3.     Interactions between vision and language 
Several studies have demonstrated how previous experience is 
reflected in our visual representations of objects and events (e.g. 
Borghi, Glenberg & Kaschak, 2004; Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2002; 
Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003). Such 
representations are generally believed to be experiential in nature, or 
in other words, grounded in our knowledge and experience about 
similar situations (e.g. Barsalou, 1999; Marmolejo-Ramos, Elosu´a 
de Juan, Gygax, Madden, Mosquera, 2009; Zwaan, 2004). A study 
by Zwaan, Stanfield and Yaxley (2002) explored how perceptual 
representations are influenced by previous experience of similar 
events. In this experiment participants read sentences in which the 
shape of the described objects would differ according to where the 
objects were located. For example, participants would read either 
“the ranger saw the eagle in the sky” or “the ranger saw the eagle in 
its nest”. While these sentences are very similar, our experiential 
knowledge of the shape of the eagle differs depending on its location, 
since real world knowledge informs us that in order to fly an eagle 
must have its wings outstretched, whereas an eagle in a nest is 
much more likely to have its wings folded against the body. After 
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reading each sentence participants were shown a picture that either 
matched the shape of the eagle with its described location, or 
mismatched. When asked to decide if the depicted object had been 
mentioned in the sentence, participants responded faster when the 
picture (an eagle with outstretched wings) matched the described 
location (in the sky). This suggests that participants relied on 
experiential knowledge to infer the implied shape of the described 
objects, which in turn allowed them to mentally represent the object’s 
most appropriate shape (according to its location).       
     In a similar experiment, Richter and Zwaan (2009) explored the 
extent to which words describing different colours are able to activate 
perceptual representations of colour. Participants were first shown a 
coloured square, then a word describing a colour and finally the 
same coloured square. They were slower to decide if the colour word 
described the same colour as shown in the square when there was a 
mismatch, compared to when the depicted colour matched the word. 
This suggests that participants had formed a perceptual 
representation of the colour of the word whilst reading it. Recent 
research by Huettig and Altmann (2011) provides further support for 
this notion, showing that when hearing a word (for example, pea) that 
is typically related to a certain colour (green) participants looked 
more to the perceptually related objects (a green blouse), compared 
to unrelated distractors (a yellow trumpet). Importantly, since blouses 
are not typically green, but come in a variety of colours, participants’ 
looks to the green blouse appear to be guided by a representation of 
colour that had been activated moments earlier upon hearing the 
word “pea”. A subsequent study by Richter and Zwaan (2010) 
expanded these findings by showing that participants also are able to 
represent several perceptual dimensions simultaneously (shape and 
colour) when presented with words implying a prototypical shape and 
colour (for example, a tomato being round and red). Such perceptual 
representations of colour and shape support the idea of mental 
representations being experiential in nature.  
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     This notion of experiential knowledge being able to influence 
perceptual representations of shape may be further extended to see 
how our knowledge of actions and object-based affordances are able 
to mediate eye movements. As noted earlier, several dimensions are 
often used to successfully construct a mental representation. 
Theories of situation models often assume that people’s internal 
representations of events occur in a shared spatial-temporal 
framework (e.g. Zwaan et al., 1995a, 1995b), since temporal 
information alongside spatial information creates an important 
integrated dimension that is necessary for people to fully 
comprehend and interpret described situations. Furthermore, 
language is rarely used to describe static and unchanging events. 
Just as in real life, objects are moved to different locations, actions 
are initiated and completed, and time passes while events take 
place. In order for unfolding language to remain coherent in such 
circumstances it becomes necessary to either incorporate these 
changes into our current situation model (Zwaan & Madden, 2004), 
or alternatively create a new situation model with which to represent 
these new developments of events (Radvansky, Zwaan, Federico, & 
Franklin, 1998). For example, when relating a described event to a 
static visual scene we must interpret whether the scene corresponds 
to the beginning, the middle, or the end of that event. As such, it may 
be argued that (in certain circumstances) a complete representation 
also relies on the temporal properties of the event structure and 
several studies have shown how language can evoke elaborate 
mental representations of the temporal properties of events (e.g. 
Anderson, Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; Carreiras, Carriedo, Alonso, & 
Fernandez, 1997; Coll-Florit & Gennari, 2011; Zwaan, 1996).  
     In everyday life we regularly use language to refer to items and 
people within our immediate proximity and in such circumstances eye 
movements to objects within a specific visual context allows us to 
explore the interaction between a concurrent visual environment and 
language as it unfolds. In the following section we present some of 
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the early studies, which helped to establish this particular 
methodology.      
 
1.4.     The visual world paradigm 
The common goal of research within the ‘visual world paradigm’ is to 
explore how language interacts with the external environment. The 
general structure of these types of studies consists of recording 
peoples’ eye movements while they are looking at visual scenes and 
listening to either a set of instructions, or descriptions that are related 
to those scenes (e.g. Allopenna, Magnuson & Tanenhaus 1998; 
Cooper, 1974; Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy & Tanenhaus, 
1995; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1995). This 
methodology allows us to observe the underlying processes that we 
use during discourse comprehension and precisely when language 
becomes integrated with the visual world. Studying the time course of 
people’s eye movements towards certain items within a visual display 
also allows us to make certain inferences about language 
comprehension – for example, how and when language is able to 
direct our visual attention towards either named, related, or 
anticipated objects.  
     Initial research by Cooper (1974) showed that eye movements 
tend to be rapidly directed towards items when these are directly 
referred to by spoken language. In this study participants would view 
a visual scene consisting of nine different items while they listened to 
short stories containing words that were either directly or 
semantically related to the depicted items. The findings showed that 
when hearing the name of one of the depicted items (for example, a 
zebra) participants looked more toward that item, compared to the 
unnamed items. Interestingly, a similar pattern occurred when 
participants heard a semantically related word (for example, Africa). 
In this case they would look more towards the zebra than the other 
unrelated items. This suggests that there is a tight integration 
between linguistic and visual processing, whereby eye movements 
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are able to reflect our continuous on-line understanding and semantic 
interpretation of language.   
     More recent research by Tanenhaus et al. (1995) further 
demonstrated that during language comprehension we are able to 
very rapidly establish reference to objects within our visual 
environment. In one study participants were placed in front of a visual 
display and asked to perform a set of instructions. For example, 
participants would be presented with a visual display containing four 
items differing in colour, shape and marking and be asked to “touch 
the starred yellow square”. Upon hearing these instructions, 
participants looked to the target square approximately 250 
milliseconds after the offset of the word that uniquely determined 
which of the four items was referred to. When hearing a more 
complicated set of instructions that could refer to several of the 
displayed items, participants looked sequentially to each potential 
item until more specific information was given allowing them to 
determine which of the four items was the target. As soon as 
participants had enough information to identify which item was 
referred to, they would look to the target and then carry out the 
instruction. These studies show a rapid and sequential integration 
between language comprehension and eye movements. In other 
words, as each word unfolds, we look to whichever items in our 
visual environment that language (at each of these moments in time) 
might refer to. This sequential interaction between language and the 
external environment consequently allows us to explore the 
underlying mental processes that are employed during language 
comprehension.  
 
1.5.     Visual world – experiential knowledge 
While language often occurs in conjunction with a visual context, 
modular theories of language comprehension (e.g. Coltheart, 1999; 
Fodor, 1983) assume that early stages of language processing are 
guided solely by syntactic constraints, whereby a single grammatical 
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interpretation is selected or ranked on the basis of the features of the 
unfolding linguistic composition (Frazier, 1987; Frazier & Clifton, 
1996).  According to this approach non-linguistic constraints such as 
real-world knowledge and visual information are not employed until 
later stages of processing. In contrast, constraint-based approaches 
(e.g. MacDonald, Pearlmutter & Seidenberg, 1994; Tanenhaus, 
Spivey-Knowlton & Hanna, 2000; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995) 
assume that people continuously evaluate multiple syntactic options, 
employing a range of constraints, which may be derived from both 
linguistic and non-linguistic sources of information. According to 
these accounts, any available and relevant information is 
continuously assimilated in order to determine the most suitable 
interpretation of language as it unfolds. In this way constraints 
derived from both syntactic, as well as visual/non-linguistic 
information, are able to influence language comprehension from the 
earliest stages of processing. 
     More recently, Knoeferle and Crocker (2006) proposed an 
account, which emphasised the coordinated interplay of information 
derived from the visual scene, linguistic information and real-world 
knowledge during language comprehension. According to this 
account language comprehension occurs in an incremental fashion, 
whereby we interpret and anticipate upcoming language gradually as 
each word unfolds. As such, unfolding language guides eye 
movements to named and anticipated items, or events within a visual 
scene, which is then able to influence comprehension. According to 
this account, online comprehension relies on multiple sources of 
available information, which each serves to constrain our 
interpretation of upcoming language. Furthermore, in the context of a 
concurrent visual context this tight temporal interaction between 
different types of information leads us to visually inspect named 
items/events at the earliest possible moment (during anticipation 
before the item is named). This early inspection increases item-
salience, thereby leading to a greater reliance on information derived 
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from a visual scene, compared to experiential knowledge associated 
with the described event. 
     In line with constraint-based theories and the coordinated 
interplay account Altmann and Kamide (2007) explored the 
representational basis for anticipatory eye movements, specifically 
the extent to which a combination of the temporal aspects of a verb 
and the affordances of depicted objects are able to guide anticipatory 
eye movements towards the most suitable object within a visual 
scene. They showed participants images depicting for example, a 
man, a table with a full glass of beer, an empty wine glass, some 
cheese, and some Christmas crackers on the floor (see figure 1.1.). 
Participants would then hear either “the man will drink all of the beer”, 
or “the man has drunk all of the wine”. Upon hearing “the man will 
drink all of...” participants looked more towards the full glass of beer. 
In contrast, when hearing “the man has drunk all of...” there were 
more anticipatory eye movements to the empty wine glass.  
 
         
               Figure 1.1. Example scene from Altmann and Kamide 2007. 
 
This suggests that participants’ knowledge about past and future 
events activated the objects’ affordances (i.e. the full glass afforded a 
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future drinking event, whereas the empty glass could only afford a 
past drinking event), which then guided anticipatory eye movements 
toward the most plausible object in the visual scene. These 
experiments show that the combination of temporal information with 
the intended action is able to restrict anticipatory looks to the most 
affordable item within the visual scene.    
     But what happens if we are told that the affordable item has 
suddenly been moved to a new location within the visual scene? Will 
eye movements reflect the (original) location of the object as 
depicted in the visual scene, or the new location of the object as 
described by language? Using a blank screen paradigm, Altmann 
and Kamide (2009) explored the mapping between language and 
internal representations of previously viewed visual scenes (the 
methodology of the ‘blank screen paradigm’ is similar to that of the 
‘visual world paradigm’, except that in these types of experiments the 
visual scene is removed before the onset of the spoken language). 
Participants viewed visual scenes – for example, an image depicting 
a woman, a wine glass and bottle on the floor, an empty table, and a 
bookshelf (see figure 1.2.).     
               
    
Figure 1.2. Example scene from Altmann and Kamide 2009.  
 	  
30	  
 
After five seconds the scene was removed and replaced by a grey 
screen. A moment later participants would hear either;  
 
1. The woman will put the glass onto the table. Then, she will 
pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass.  
 
(Moved condition) 
 
Or 
 
2. The woman is too lazy to put the glass onto the table. Instead, 
she will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the 
glass. 
 
(Unmoved condition) 
 
 During the sentence-final “the glass” participants who had heard “the 
woman will put the glass onto the table…” looked more towards the 
new location of the glass, or in other words, the region corresponding 
to the previous location of the table. In contrast, participants who had 
heard “the woman is too lazy to put the glass onto the table…” 
looked more towards the original location of the glass (previously 
depicted on the floor). As such, participants’ eye movements in the 
moved condition reflected the location of the glass as conveyed by 
the spoken language (table), as opposed to the visual image 
(depicting the glass on the floor). A similar pattern of eye movements 
was observed for the anticipatory eye movements during “the wine 
carefully into”. In this case, participants’ knowledge of the described 
action led to certain expectations of the upcoming item, which 
consequently guided eye movements toward the location of the glass 
as conveyed by the spoken language in both the ‘moved’ and the 
‘unmoved’ conditions.      
     These results demonstrate that participants mapped the 
sentences onto an internal representation of the previously presented 
scene and further show that language is able to mediate a dynamic 
updating of this mental representation as the described event 
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unfolds. This suggests that both anticipatory and concurrent eye 
movements reflect language as it is processed online, whereby our 
internal representations are continuously updated as we interpret an 
unfolding event. Altmann and Kamide speculated that the eye 
movements toward the language-mediated location of the glass were 
grounded in event-representations based on experiential knowledge 
and prior experience about similar situations. According to this 
theory, participants anticipated and looked towards the previous 
location of the table when hearing “the wine carefully into” as 
experiential knowledge informed them that the table not only 
provided an affordable location on which to place the glass, but 
further because the sentence described the table as a future location 
for the glass. In other words, it is the interaction between the 
affordances of the table and participants’ knowledge of the future 
location of the glass that lead them to anticipate the table. In the 
context of the described event it matters that the woman moved the 
glass onto the table, since according to our experiential knowledge a 
table constitutes both a plausible and affordable location for the 
placement of a glass. If eye movements are to some extent guided 
by experientially based event-representations we could further 
speculate that the eyes would not move so readily to the location of 
the glass, if that location was implausible (for example, the woman 
will put the glass onto the lamp...). The plausibility of an object’s 
future location would be important, since object-representations that 
are part of implausible event-representations should be less 
accessible than those that are part of more plausible events. 
Consequently, we would expect to see a different pattern of eye 
movements when an object is described as being moved to an 
implausible location, as opposed to when that same object is being 
moved to a plausible location. This hypothesis provided the starting 
point for my research and further allowed us to explore the extent to 
which we rely solely on syntactic information (in line with modulate 
theories of language processing), or multiple sources of visual, 
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linguistic and experiential information (in line with constraint-based 
theories and the coordinated interplay account) to constrain our 
interpretation of upcoming language. More specifically, we were 
interested in the weighting of constraints provided by a concurrent, or 
recently encountered visual context and the extent to which visual 
information is able to influence comprehension.       
  
1.6.     Thesis overview    
The following chapter will begin with a review of the literature 
concerning anticipatory eye movements, the blank screen paradigm 
and plausibility, followed by a description of two eye-tracking 
experiments that extend the findings of the previous experiment by 
Altmann and Kamide (2009). In these experiments items were either 
moved to a plausible or an implausible location within the visual 
scene, or not moved at all. When the scene was removed before the 
auditory input we found anticipatory looks to the plausible location, 
but not the implausible location. In contrast, when the scene 
remained onscreen there were anticipatory looks to both locations.  
For both experiments there was no difference in looks during the 
sentence-final noun. As such, plausibility only influenced anticipatory 
eye movements after we removed the visual scene.  
     In chapter 3 we present two more studies (one in which we 
remove the visual scene before the auditory input and another in 
which the visual scene remains onscreen), which manipulated the 
plausibility of objects within a specific context (for example, a cat, or 
a penguin in a kitchen). We found a similar pattern of eye 
movements to that observed in experiments 1 and 2, suggesting that 
the effect is not exclusively related to the plausibility of location.    
     In chapter 4 we attempted to uncover why we anticipate 
implausible locations when the visual scene is available, but not 
when the scene has been removed before the auditory onset. The 
fifth experiment investigated the extent to which a higher proportion 
of initial eye movements to the plausible locations (observed in 
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experiment 1) could have enhanced the accessibility of those 
locations during later anticipation. The findings showed that the 
proportion of initial looks made the implausible regions more 
accessible later in the narrative, but not the plausible regions. This 
makes it difficult to explain the pattern of eye movements observed in 
experiment 1 in terms of enhanced accessibility due to the higher 
proportion of ‘initial’ eye movements to the region of the table.  
     In chapter 5 we explored the implications of introducing an item 
purely through language (for example, the woman will move a glass 
onto the table/lamp). The results showed a similar pattern of eye 
movements to experiment 1 (where the glass was first presented in 
the visual scene and then referred to by spoken language), 
suggesting that a purely linguistic representation of the glass did not 
increase the proportion of anticipatory eye movements to the 
implausible locations.  
     In chapter 6 we propose an alternative account explaining why 
plausibility affects anticipatory eye movements in the context of a 
blank screen, but not in the context of a concurrent visual scene. Our 
explanation is based on the assumption that there is a quantitative 
difference in how we process and anticipate upcoming discourse 
when language refers to something outside our visual environment, 
as opposed to when language refers to entities within our immediate 
visual proximity. During language comprehension we assume that 
participants in an event will be drawn from our visual environment. In 
the visual scene the referred target is the only item that affords the 
described action and this is why we anticipate its location regardless 
of plausibility. However, when we have to rely on our 
memory/internal representation of a visual scene, anticipation is no 
longer bound exclusively to the visual context, but may now be 
further influenced by real-world knowledge. When this is the case we 
might anticipate a variety of affordable items.  
     In chapter 7 we present two experiments, which aimed to explore 
the extent to which both visual and linguistic constraints are able to 
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guide anticipatory eye movements to appropriate (yet implausible) 
locations. In experiment 8 we manipulated the number of affordable 
items within the context of a concurrent visual scene. The findings 
showed that the inclusion of a second (affordable) glass did not 
weaken affordance-based constraints sufficiently to show an 
influence of plausibility. In experiment 9 we linguistically restricted the 
number of affordable items within the context of a blank screen (e.g. 
the woman really wanted some wine, but she could only find one 
glass…). In contrast to experiments 1 and 7, there were no more 
anticipatory eye movements to the plausible locations than there 
were looks to the implausible locations. This shows that when 
spoken language unambiguously restricts the number of affordable 
items the linguistic context is able to guide anticipatory eye 
movements to the appropriate, yet implausible location of the glass. 
Thereby, we require a more constraining linguistic context in the 
absence of a visual context in order to achieve the same degree of 
constraints provided by a concurrent visual scene.  
     Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by providing an overview of the 
experimental findings and discussing the implications of how 
differently weighted constraints are able to influence our anticipation 
of upcoming events.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
MANIPULATING PLAUSIBILITY OF LOCATION 
 
The following two experiments explored how event-plausibility might 
affect our internal representations of described events – specifically 
the extent to which plausibility of location is able to influence the 
accessibility of objects within these event-representations. Secondly, 
we investigated how this may be modulated by the nature of the 
visual context (as present or absent). 
 
2.1. Visual world – anticipatory eye movements 
During language comprehension we often rely on experiential 
knowledge in order to predict which upcoming objects and events will 
be referred to next (e.g. Kamide, 2008; Matsuki, Chow, Hare, Elman, 
Scheepers & McRae, 2011; McRae & Matsuki, 2009; Van Berkum, 
Brown, Zwitserlood, Kooijman & Hagoort, 2005). For example, when 
reading a sentence such as “as it started to rain Anna searched her 
handbag and hoped that she had remembered to bring her…” we 
can combine our knowledge of rainy weather with knowledge about 
which items might be useful in such situations. This, in turn, provides 
us with certain constraints and expectations about the nature of the 
upcoming word – for instance, we know that most people don’t like 
getting too wet when it rains. As such, it is likely that Anna is looking 
for something that will be able to prevent her from getting wet. 
Furthermore, since Anna is searching through her handbag, the item 
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in question must be something that is small enough in size to fit into 
a handbag. By combining this knowledge most people would 
probably predict that Anna was looking for her umbrella.  
     A study by Altmann and Kamide (1999) looked at how language 
(as it unfolds) is able to rapidly direct our attention towards 
anticipated objects and more specifically, the extent to which 
semantic information derived from a verb is able to direct eye 
movements towards the most suitable item within a specific visual 
context. In this experiment participants were presented with a scene 
depicting for example, a boy sitting on the floor surrounded by a toy 
train set, a toy car, a balloon, and a birthday cake (see figure 2.1.). 
Whilst viewing the scene participants would hear either “the boy will 
move the cake”, or “the boy will eat the cake”. It is important to note 
that while the verb ‘move’ could refer to any of the items within the 
visual scene, the verb ‘eat’ could only refer to one of the items (the 
cake).  
                 
 
              Figure 2.1. Example scene from Altmann and Kamide 1999.  
  
The findings showed that participants looked more towards the cake 
upon hearing the verb ‘eat’, compared to when they heard the verb 
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“‘move’. This suggests that participants used verb-related information 
(i.e. the verb eat implied that the upcoming referent must be 
something edible) in order to anticipate which item would most likely 
be referred to next. This demonstrates that verb-related information 
is able to direct eye movements to the most appropriate item within a 
visual context, and that these ‘anticipatory’ eye movements occur 
even before the onset of the target word.  
     As such, anticipatory eye movements can be used to explore how 
we process and interpret language as it unfolds. For example, if we 
assume that participants construct an internal representation of an 
event using a combination of the visual context and the linguistic 
input, we may further assume that this representation is continuously 
updated as upcoming language is being processed. Thereby, the 
semantic information derived from the verb is rapidly integrated with 
the features and affordances of the items presented in the visual 
context. This in turn, allows participants to instantly restrict the 
number of possible upcoming referents, resulting in anticipatory eye 
movements towards the most appropriate item. 
     Kamide, Altmann and Haywood (2003) extended this research by 
investigating whether anticipatory eye movements are exclusively 
related to semantic information derived from the verb, or alternatively 
if we rely further on information derived from a combination of both 
the action that is being carried out (the verb), the person performing 
this action (the agent), and the item onto which the action is being 
performed (the goal object). Participants viewed a visual scene, for 
instance, depicting a man, a young girl, a motorbike and a carousel 
(see figure 2.2.). They then heard either “the man will ride the 
motorbike” or “the girl will ride the carousel”. As in the previous 
experiment the motorbike and the carousel were the only items that 
fulfilled the selectional restrictions of the verb ‘ride’, or in other words, 
they were the only items that could afford to be ridden. Similarly, the 
man and the girl were the only depicted agents that could perform 
the described action (ride).   
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       Figure 2.2. Example scene from Kamide, Altmann and Haywood 2003.  
 
As such, both the verb and the agents were restricted in terms of 
which items could afford ‘riding on’ and ‘who’ could perform the 
action of riding. However, one might also argue that experiential 
knowledge could imply further restrictions, specifically in terms of 
plausibility. Real world knowledge and experience informs us that a 
man would be much more likely to ride a motorbike, compared to a 
carousel and likewise, that a young girl would be more likely to ride a 
carousel than a motorbike. If anticipatory eye movements are guided 
solely by verb-related information we would expect to see a similar 
proportion of looks to the motorbike and the carousel, regardless of 
who is performing the action. However, if anticipatory eye 
movements rely on a combination of linguistic information and 
experiential knowledge we would expect to see a difference in the 
proportion of looks to the motorbike and the carousel, depending on 
who is performing the action. Kamide et al. found that upon hearing 
“the man will ride the...” participants made more anticipatory eye 
movements toward the motorbike. In contrast, when hearing “the girl 
will ride the...” there were more anticipatory looks toward the 
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carousel. This shows that when anticipating the most appropriate 
outcome, participants integrated verb-related information with 
experiential knowledge (in this case plausibility) about the subject 
performing the action, as well as the item on which the action was 
performed. Thereby anticipatory eye movements were not simply 
mediated by selectional restrictions derived from the verb, or the 
subject. Rather, it is the combination of linguistic information with 
experiential knowledge, which guided anticipatory eye movements 
toward the most appropriate goal. This suggests that while visual and 
linguistic information allowed participants to construct a mental 
representation of the situation described, as language unfolded they 
made further use of relevant background knowledge and 
stereotypical information. In other words, participants’ experiential 
knowledge provided additional information about the plausibility of 
possible actions and outcomes, consequently facilitating the update 
of event-representations as language unfolded. 
 
2.2. Plausibility 
In the following two experiments we explored how event-plausibility 
might influence our internal representations of described events. 
More specifically, we were interested in whether the plausibility of an 
object’s location is able to affect its accessibility within these event-
representations. During comprehension we often rely on real-world 
knowledge and experience in order to correctly anticipate upcoming 
events before they unfold within a narrative and while language most 
often has a plausible outcome, real-world knowledge provides 
additional information which allows us to further constrain the number 
of possible outcomes in terms of their graded status of likelihood 
(e.g. Kamide et al., 2003). In other words, as language unfolds we 
often have to rely on the likelihood, or plausibility of events in order to 
anticipate the most probable outcome and this occurs regardless of 
whether the outcome of the unfolding event turns out to be plausible, 
or implausible. For example, we know from experience that people 
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are more likely to eat a tub of ice cream than a tub of butter, even 
though both options are perfectly edible.  
     As mentioned earlier, during comprehension people integrate 
language with real-world knowledge and this integration allows us to 
construct a rich and dynamic mental model of described events, 
rather than a mental representation of the linguistic information itself 
(Glenberg et al., 1987; Zwaan, 1999). As such, mental models play 
an important role in discourse comprehension, since real-world 
knowledge and experience are able to influence how we process and 
interpret language. If it is the case that our mental representations 
are influenced by experiential knowledge we may speculate that the 
likelihood of described events occurring in real life would be of further 
importance, since mental representations of unlikely events will be 
less anticipated and consequently less accessible, compared to more 
plausible events. By manipulating the likelihood of events, we can 
use plausibility as a tool to further explore the processes by which we 
construct event representations during language comprehension. In 
the remainder of this section, we briefly review different approaches 
to plausibility, in order to motivate the operational definition that will 
be used in the empirical studies described later in this and 
subsequent chapters. We will, after this section, review the empirical 
techniques that will be used in these studies. 
     Several event-related potential (ERP) studies have shown that 
people use experiential knowledge when anticipating upcoming 
words, or events (e.g. Camblin, Gordon & Swaab, 2007; Federmeier 
& Kutas, 1999; Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen & Petersson, 2004; 
Kuperberg et al. 2003; Otten & Van Berkum 2007; Urbach & Kutas, 
2010; Van Berkum, et al., 2005), demonstrating that comprehension 
to some extent is driven by expectations derived from real-world 
knowledge and experience about similar situations. In a study by 
DeLong, Urbach and Kutas (2005) participants read sentences such 
as “the day was breezy so the boy went outside to fly...”. Prior to the 
experiment DeLong et al. normed the cloze probability of a number of 
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words in terms of their likelihood of completing the target sentence 
(see also Kutas & Hillyard, 1984). The most likely continuation of the 
sentence above was judged to be “a kite”, while a less likely 
continuation was “an airplane”. A number of previous ERP studies 
have shown that very likely and therefore expected upcoming words 
such as “kite” tend to elicit a small N400 effect, whereas relatively 
unexpected words such as airplane normally elicits a large N400 
effect (e.g. Kutas & Hillyard, 1984). Using the example above, 
DeLong et al. argued that the difference in N400 in response to “kite” 
and “airplane” could simply be due to the difference in meaning 
between the two words, whereby the word “kite” might be easier to 
integrate into the unfolding sentence due to people’s schematic 
associations of the event. In order to remove the difference in word 
meaning, DeLong et al. decided to focus on the preceding indefinite 
articles as in, ‘a’ kite and ‘an’ airplane, since these only differ in 
phonological form. Thereby, any N400 difference between these two 
indefinite articles would provide evidence of people’s early and highly 
specific expectations of upcoming words. Their findings supported 
this idea, showing a larger N400 during ‘an’ and a smaller N400 
during ‘a’. This suggests that there is a rapid and incremental 
integration of upcoming words and further that upcoming words are 
constrained by contextual probability. In other words, our experiential 
knowledge of the event as it unfolds is able to determine the 
probability of upcoming words and thereby constrain the number of 
alternative options.              
     In the following studies we define plausibility in terms of 
probability, or in other words, event likelihood. Coming back to the 
earlier example, we propose that eating a tub of ice cream is more 
plausible than eating a tub of butter, because experiential knowledge 
informs us that in real life people are much more likely to eat a whole 
tub of ice cream, compared to a whole tub of butter. Thereby, we 
consider actions, or events to be plausible in terms of their 
compatibility with our previous knowledge and experience about such 
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actions and events (e.g. Collins & Michalski, 1989; Connell & Keane, 
2004; Johnson-Laird, 1983).  
     In contrast, other studies have applied somewhat different 
operational definitions of implausibility. Below we provide different 
definitions of implausibility and anomaly. Murray (2006) argued that 
“there is nothing in the empirical literature to suggest a functional 
distinction between implausibility and anomaly” (p. 80). Rather, he 
agrees with McCawley (1971) who suggests that when considering 
imaginary beliefs, dreams and cartoons, selectional and semantic 
restrictions differ little from implausibility. However, in order to think 
along those terms, an appropriate (and imaginary) context should 
arguably be provided. Studies have shown that people initially 
evaluate language against real-world knowledge and that this occurs 
even in a counterfactual context (Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; 
Ferguson, Scheepers & Sanford, 2010) – if this weren’t the case we 
would happily believe it if someone told us that they had built a car 
out of cucumbers and driven it to the moon. Only by adding an 
appropriate context such as “I had a dream last night that I...” does 
the described event become believable, and more importantly 
possible in the context that it occurred (e.g. Filik, 2008; Nieuwland & 
Van Berkum, 2006). 
     On the other hand, several studies have distinguished between 
anomaly/impossibility and implausibility (e.g. Joseph et al., 2008; 
Warren & McConnell, 2007), as well as syntactic and semantic 
anomaly (e.g. Braze, Shankweiler, Ni, & Palumbo, 2002; Ni, Fodor, 
Crain & Shankweiler, 1998; Yang, Wang, Chen & Rayner, 2009). 
One such study, by Rayner et al. (2004) investigated the effects of 
reading plausible (a), implausible (b), or anomalous (c) sentences 
such as these below (p.1292).          
a. John used a knife to chop the large carrots for dinner. 
b. John used an axe to chop the large carrots for dinner. 
c. John used a pump to inflate the large carrots for dinner. 
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The first sentence is plausible since we would normally use a knife to 
chop carrots. In contrast, using an axe to chop carrots is quite 
unlikely, but nonetheless affordable. The third sentence however, is 
impossible (in a real world context) since carrots do not afford 
inflating. Rayner et al. found an earlier pattern of disruption when 
reading the anomalous sentences, compared to the implausible 
sentences. They proposed that this might be because the anomalous 
sentences provided an instant cue to violation between the verb 
(inflate) and the noun (carrots)1. In comparison, the implausible 
sentences required a complete semantic evaluation of the event in 
order to detect any violations. These results show the importance of 
separating implausible and anomalous/impossible events since it 
appears that each elicits a different type of disruption to processing 
narrative events.  
     We now turn to the empirical methods that will be used in the 
experiments described below. In these experiments we explored the 
extent to which plausibility is able to influence the accessibility of 
objects within our internal representations of described events and 
further how this accessibility may be modulated by the presence, or 
absence of a visual context.            
 
2.3. Visual world – the blank screen paradigm 
Previous eye tracking studies have shown that a combination of 
linguistic information and experiential knowledge allows us to 
anticipate the most likely upcoming item within a concurrent visual 
scene. While language is often used to refer to items within our visual 
proximity, we may also use language to refer to items, people, and 
events when these are absent from our visual context. As such, we 
can distinguish between ‘embedded language use’, where language 
                                                
1	  But see Matsuki et al. (2011) who found immediate processing difficulty in 
response to implausible/atypical sentences that did not violate selectional 
restrictions (e.g. Donna used the hose to wash her filthy hair). This suggests that 
processing difficulties either due to a violation of selectional restrictions, or atypical 
event-knowledge is not necessarily distinct from each other.   
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refers to the current communicative situation (Spivey & Richardson, 
2009) and ‘displaced language use’, where language refers to past, 
distant, or even imagined events (e.g. Zwaan, 2009). For example, 
you might meet a friend in the street and tell him about the car you 
just bought, or the restaurant you went to the previous weekend. 
What happens to our mental representations when spoken language 
refers to items, or events that are no longer within our visual context? 
Will language on its own provide enough information to form a 
coherent representation of the described event? The ‘blank screen 
paradigm’ allow us to further look into questions such as these. The 
method behind the blank screen paradigm is essentially the same as 
the method used in the ‘visual world paradigm’, except that in these 
experiments the visual scene is removed before the onset of the 
spoken language. This manipulation allows us to explore how we 
map language onto our internal representations of previously 
encountered visual scenes and various studies have shown that 
people tend to look at the previous region of an object when asked to 
imagine, or recall information related to that item (e.g. Bourlon, 
Oliviero, Wattiez, Pouget & Bartolomeo, 2011; Brandt & Stark, 1997; 
Johansson, Holsanova & Holmqvist, 2005; Laeng & Theodorecu, 
2002; Spivey & Geng, 2001). 
     A study by Richardson and Spivey (2000), showed participants a 
sequence of visual scenes divided into four equally sized quadrants. 
Each scene depicted a different face in a different quadrant and each 
face would deliver a fact of general knowledge (e.g. “the Pyrenees is 
a mountain range separating France and Spain”) whereafter it would 
disappear from the screen. Next, participants heard a second 
statement, which was related to one of the four previously provided 
facts (e.g. “the Pyrenees is a mountain range”) and were required to 
say if the statement was either true or false. The findings showed 
that when participants were formulating their answers, they were 
more likely to look at the quadrant that had previously contained the 
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person who delivered the fact in question and that this occurred even 
though the spatial information was irrelevant to the task.  
     In a similar study by Hoover and Richardson (2008) participants 
watched animals burrowing underground and then emerging from a 
molehill. For example, in one condition a rabbit would first emerge in 
one location during which the participants would hear a piece of 
information, for example about Cleopatra. The rabbit would then 
descend the molehill and a moment later an identical rabbit would 
emerge from a different location (this time no information was given) 
and descend shortly afterwards. Participants were then asked a 
(yes/no) question about the previous information. The second 
condition was similar to the first, except this time the rabbit would 
descend the molehill whereafter burrowing would begin in a different 
off-screen location. This presentation sequence suggested that the 
rabbit associated with the provided information was different from the 
second rabbit to emerge. In contrast, the on-screen burrowing in the 
first condition connected the appearances of the rabbit, suggesting 
that the second rabbit to emerge was the same as the first. When 
answering the questions participants looked at both locations when 
the rabbit appeared to be the same. However, when there appeared 
to be two separate rabbits, participants only looked to the first 
location. As in the previous study by Richardson and Spivey (2000) 
participants associated the spoken information with certain locations 
on the screen and used this as a spatial cue when later recalling the 
information. When what appeared to be the same rabbit emerged in 
two different locations, participants kept track of these locations and 
relied on (and looked to) both locations when answering questions. In 
contrast, when what appeared to be two different rabbits emerged in 
two locations participants only relied on the location that had been 
associated with the spoken information. In this case, participants 
were able to keep track of each individual rabbit as it moved around 
the screen and as such constrain the spatial cues to those 
exclusively associated with the spoken information. Being able to 
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associate visual objects with spoken information and further keeping 
track of these spatial cues is particularly useful in a dynamic visual 
environment where people and objects regularly move from place to 
place.    
     Another study by Altmann (2004), explored when, and to what 
extent eye movements would be directed to the previous location of 
an anticipated or named item within a scene, when that scene had 
been removed before the onset of the spoken language. Participants 
were shown a visual image (e.g. depicting a man, a woman, a 
newspaper and a cake) (see figure 2.3.). After five seconds the 
image was removed and replaced with plain white screen.  
A moment later participants would hear either “the man will eat the 
cake”, or “the woman will read the newspaper”.  
               
 
                        Figure 2.3. Example scene from Altmann 2004.  
 
Upon hearing “the man will eat...” participants looked more towards 
the previous region of cake, compared to when they heard “the 
woman will read...” and likewise there were more anticipatory looks 
toward the previous region of the newspaper when hearing the verb 
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‘read’, compared to when hearing the verb ‘eat’. By removing the 
visual image participants were required to hold an internal 
representation of the scene in order to keep track of any descriptive 
changes that might occur in the event. Thereby, participants were 
essentially required to map the sentence onto a mental 
representation of the previously presented scene – as opposed to the 
visual scene itself. The increase in looks to the prior location of the 
cake/newspaper shows that anticipatory eye movements are not 
necessarily dependent on seeing a concurrent visual scene. In the 
absence of a visual context, language is simply mapped onto an 
internal representation of the previously encountered scene. 
Furthermore, the higher proportion of eye movements to the previous 
region of the appropriate target demonstrates that the spatial layout 
of the scene had been incorporated into participants’ mental 
representations of the described event (see also Altmann & Kamide, 
2004, for a review). 
 
2.4. Comparing presentation types – blank vs. concurrent 
When comparing the effects of plausibility on presentation type it 
might be useful to look at other studies which have looked at the 
importance between visual and linguistic information and how the two 
interact. An interesting experiment by Magliano, Miller and Zwaan 
(2001) explored the extent to which people monitor and indicate (via 
button press) changes in time and space when viewing a movie. 
They compared these findings with results from previous reading 
studies and found that viewing a movie elicited a similar pattern in 
participants’ perception of changes in time and space to when 
reading narrative texts (e.g. Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). This 
suggests that participants construct similar situational models in 
terms of temporal and spatial dimensions regardless of whether they 
are watching a movie, or reading a narrative text.  
     Another study by Wassenburg and Zwaan (2010) investigated the 
extent to which prior exposure to visual images is able to influence 
 	  
48	  
language processing at a later point in time. In the first part of the 
experiment participants were asked to perform a picture-verification 
task (always depicting the target item in a horizontal or vertical 
position). The second part consisted of a 15-minute filler task. Finally, 
participants’ eye movements were monitored as they read sentences 
which described objects in certain locations, implying specific 
orientations of those objects that either matched or mismatched the 
position of the previously seen object (e.g. “he pounded the nail into 
the wall” – implies a horizontal position of the nail, whereas “he 
pounded the nail into the floor” implies a vertical position of the nail). 
They found that participants were faster to read sentences that 
matched the orientation of the previously viewed object, suggesting 
that the visual memory of an object is able to influence language 
processing and that this can occur even after a certain amount of 
time has passed between the two events.  
     A recent ERP study by Knoeferle, Urbach and Kutas (2011) 
showed participants visual images (e.g. depicting a journalist and a 
gymnast – the gymnast either clapping her hands, or extending one 
hand wearing a boxing glove). Participants viewed the image for at 
least three seconds whereafter they read “the gymnast 
applauds/punches the journalist”. The data showed an effect of prior 
visual context on language comprehension. During the verb there 
was a larger N400 effect when the sentence mismatched the 
previously presented image, than when the sentence matched the 
image. This interplay between prior visual information and language 
processing might suggest that participants’ visual memory of 
previously viewed scenes would have a considerable influence on 
how they (shortly after) process spoken sentences related to those 
scenes. As such, prior visual information can arguably play an 
important role in comprehension and language processing, 
suggesting that concurrent visual information is further likely to have 
a considerable amount of influence on how we anticipate and 
process language.    
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     Knoeferle and Crocker (2006) investigated the importance and 
interaction between language-mediated world knowledge and visual 
information by measuring participants’ eye movements as they 
listened to descriptions of accompanying visual scenes. In this study 
participants were shown images, depicting for instance a pilot, a 
wizard and a detective (see figure 2.4. taken from Knoeferle and 
Crocker, p. 503). While the pilot was always depicted as a patient 
(not performing an action), the wizard and the detective were 
depicted in different agent roles, which importantly defied 
stereotypical knowledge about the actions they would normally 
perform. For example, the detective was depicted serving a plate of 
food to the pilot. In contrast, the wizard was depicted spying on the 
pilot, this action stereotypically being associated with the detective, 
rather than the wizard. Whilst viewing the scenes participants heard 
sentences such as “the detective /wizard will soon spy on the pilot” 
(however in the original German sentences the pilot was mentioned 
first marked in the accusative case, whereas the detective/wizard 
was mentioned last marked in the nominative case – “den piloten 
bespitzelt gleich der detective/zauberer”). This structure allowed 
Knoeferle and Crocker to explore the extent to which anticipatory eye 
movements are driven by stereotypical knowledge associated with 
the verb (detectives typically spy), or in contrast, whether eye 
movements are predominately guided by knowledge associated with 
the concurrent visual information (depicting the wizard performing the 
action of spying). In other words, when anticipating the upcoming 
agent participants were forced to choose between the spying (non-
stereotypical) wizard and the serving (stereotypical) detective.  
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             Figure 2.4. Example scene from Knoeferle and Crocker 2006.  
 
The findings showed that participants looked more towards the 
wizard after hearing “spies on” than they looked to the detective. As 
such, participants relied more on the information associated with the 
depicted event, than knowledge associated with the description of 
the event. However, a different pattern of eye movements emerged 
when the wizard’s telescope was replaced by non-related item, such 
as a roll of toilet paper. When this was the case participants did rely 
on verb-based knowledge, looking more towards the detective than 
the wizard. In a subsequent study (using the same stimuli) Knoeferle 
and Crocker (2007) removed the visual scene before the onset of the 
spoken language. Their findings replicated the previous results, 
showing a predominant reliance on prior visual information over verb-
based information, but only in cases where the non-stereotypical 
agent was depicted performing the action usually associated with the 
stereotypical agent. As in the previous experiment, when neither 
agents were depicted performing the described action participants 
relied more on real-world knowledge derived from language.                  
     The experiments mentioned above show that even when visual 
information has been removed before encountering language, the 
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visual memory, or internal representation of the image appears to 
influence how we anticipate and process language. Moreover, this 
influence seems to differ little depending on whether we are viewing 
a concurrent visual scene, or the scene is no longer available. This 
seems to suggest that we should see a similar pattern of eye 
movements regardless of whether we present spoken language in 
the context of a concurrent visual scene, or in the context of a blank 
screen.  
     In terms of plausibility however, one might argue that the removal 
of the visual scene before the onset of the spoken sentence might 
encourage participants to use their imagination more when 
constructing a mental model of the described events. The element of 
imagination may be especially relevant when forming representations 
of implausible events. Barsalou and Prinz (1997) argue that 
productivity in imagination leads to greater creativity, allowing people 
to simulate never before encountered objects such as pink bananas, 
or talking flowers. Our imagination even allows us to simulate all 
types of implausible and even impossible events by combining 
existing concepts in novel and infinite ways (e.g. Barsalou, 1999). 
Taking this into account we might expect people to more readily 
accept implausible scenarios when they have to rely more on their 
imagination, as is the case when having removed the visual scene. In 
contrast, we might find implausible events more difficult to process 
when having to relate them to a static and concurrent image of the 
event.  
     This highlights the importance of potential differences in how we 
process and anticipate upcoming discourse when language refers to 
something outside our visual environment, as opposed to when 
language refers to entities within our immediate visual proximity. 
Coming back to the earlier example of being asked to ‘pass the salt’ 
it matters that the referred item is located within the a concurrent 
visual context – upon hearing the request e.g. “would you mind 
passing me the...” the linguistic information allows us to infer that the 
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upcoming item is something ‘passable’ and therefore also likely to be 
located within the concurrent visual context. Assuming that we don’t 
normally ask a person to pass us something that isn’t within a 
reachable distance, we can also use the concurrent visual context to 
restrict the number of possible outcomes, which in turn makes it 
easier to anticipate which item will most likely be referred to next. As 
such, both the properties of language, as well as the concurrent 
visual context are able to restrict the number of upcoming references, 
thus making it easier to anticipate the most plausible role-fillers within 
a described event (e.g. Altmann & Mirkovic, 2009; Rayner et al., 
2004). In contrast, when language refers to something outside our 
visual environment our anticipation of the upcoming item is no longer 
restricted by the visual context, but now constrained purely by 
language. While language allows us infer that the upcoming item is 
something ‘passable’, without a visual context any number of 
‘passable’ items might be referred to. According to this account, we 
would expect a difference in eye movements depending on the 
absence/presence of a visual context, whereby a concurrent visual 
scene will provide a stronger degree of constraint, possibly making 
implausible object-representations more accessible and therefore 
easier to anticipate.  
 
2.5. EXPERIMENT 1 
In the studies described below we define plausibility in terms of event 
likelihood. The intention was to construct the implausible events as 
being very unlikely, but not impossible, since this would require 
participants to evaluate the described events against real-world 
knowledge, rather than simply detecting semantic or syntactic 
violations. By doing so we hoped to explore the properties of the 
mental representations that are formed during language 
comprehension and the extent to which experiential knowledge is 
able to make representations of plausible events (and the object-
representations they contain) more accessible than those of 
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implausible events. In other words, is a representation of a fish more 
accessible when the fish is in an aquarium, as opposed to in a toilet 
bowl? Secondly, we investigated how the accessibility of plausible 
and implausible object-representation may be modulated by the 
nature of the visual context. In experiment 1 we removed the visual 
scene before the onset of spoken language, whereas in experiment 2 
the visual scene remained available throughout the duration of the 
experimental trials. These two measures allowed us to explore how 
differently weighted constraints (visual and linguistic) are able to 
influence how we process plausible and implausible events.     
     We expanded the stimuli used in Altmann and Kamide (2009) to 
include a third condition where items were described as being moved 
to implausible locations (as opposed to items being moved to 
plausible locations or not moved at all). On the basis of their (2009) 
data Altmann and Kamide speculated that eye movements towards 
the language-mediated locations were grounded in event-
representations based on experiential knowledge and prior 
experience about similar situations (see chapter 1 for further details 
about this study). If this is the case we would expect the plausibility of 
an object’s future location to influence accessibility, consequently 
eliciting a different pattern of eye movements when an object is 
described as being moved to an implausible location, as opposed to 
when that same object is being moved to a plausible location.    
 
2.5.1. Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £3. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
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Linguistic stimuli 
Twenty-four experimental scenes (see figure 2.5. for an example) 
were matched with three conditions: 
 
1. The woman will move the glass onto the table. Then, she will 
pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
 
(Plausible moved) 
 
2. The woman will move the glass onto the lamp. Then, she will 
pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
 
(Implausible moved) 
 
3. The woman is too lazy to move the glass onto the table. 
Instead, she will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully 
into the glass. 
 
        (Unmoved) 
              
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Example of one of the visual scenes paired with sentences: 1), 2), or 
3). 
 
In conditions (1) and (2), the first sentence always described the 
agent moving the target object to a new location. In condition (1) the 
target object would be moved to a plausible location, whereas in 
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condition (2) the target object would be moved to an implausible 
location. In contrast to condition (1) and (2), the first sentence in 
condition (3) described the target object as staying in its original 
location. The second (target) sentence was always the same for all 
three conditions (see appendix 1 for a full list of the experimental 
sentences). In addition to the 24 experimental trials, 24 sentence-
picture pairs were included as fillers (see appendix 2 for an example 
of the filler items).  
 
Norming for plausibility of location 
In order to ensure that the plausible and implausible locations were 
perceived as intended we normed the experimental stimuli for 
likelihood of location. We presented 91 participants with the 24 
experimental sentences and asked them to rate the likelihood of the 
target items being moved to either plausible or implausible locations. 
The likelihood was rated on a scale from 1-7 (1 being “very likely” 
and 7 being “not very likely”). Two lists were created, ensuring that 
participants rated either the plausible or the implausible version of 
each event. Thereby list (a) presented 50% of the plausible events 
and 50% of the implausible events, whereas list (b) presented the 
opposite versions of the plausible and implausible events. The 
presentation order of the sentences was randomised across both 
lists. The mean rating for the plausible locations was 3.06 (SD = 
0.96) and 6.47 (SD = 0.28) for the implausible locations. The 
difference in likelihood between the plausible and implausible 
locations differed significantly t (23) = -17.735, p < .001, the plausible 
locations consistently judged to be more likely than the implausible 
locations.  
 
Visual Stimuli 
The visual stimuli were created using commercially available ClipArt 
packages and presented at a resolution of 800 x 600 pixels (see 
appendix 3 for a full set of experimental pictures). The positions of 
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the items representing the plausible locations (e.g. the table), the 
implausible locations (e.g. the lamp), the original locations (e.g. the 
glass), and the distractor locations (e.g. the bookcase) were 
counterbalanced to ensure that the location of each item varied 
across the full set of experimental scenes. The sentences were 
recorded by a male native speaker of British English and sampled at 
44.1 KHz. The audio files were played via a mono channel split 
across two speakers that were positioned on each side of the screen. 
We also noted the onsets and offsets of the critical words in the 
experimental sentences (using a sound editing program) for carrying 
out later analysis. The sentences were coupled with their 
corresponding scenes and allocated to three conditions in a fixed-
random order. Three lists of stimuli were made, which included all of 
the 24 experimental scenes, but only one version from each of the 
sentence-pairs. As such, the visual scenes were always the same for 
all three conditions, while the sentences differed. The same 24 filler 
sentences and scenes were used in all three conditions. Participants 
were allocated to either condition 1, 2, or 3 and presented with a total 
of 48 trials presented in the same randomised order for all conditions.      
 
Procedure 
The experiment was run on an Eyelink II head-mounted eye-tracker, 
which sampled at 250 Hz from the right eye. Participants were 
seated approximately 60 cm. from the display screen. They were told 
that first they would be shown a picture, the picture would then 
disappear, and they would hear a sentence. Participants’ task was 
simply to look at the pictures and listen to the sentences. Prior to 
presenting the trials, a nine-point calibration procedure was 
performed, followed by a validation of the calibrations. Once this had 
been performed successfully participants were presented with four 
practice trials, whereafter the remaining 48 trials were presented. 
Between each trial a single centrally located dot was presented in the 
centre of the screen, which corrected any drift in the eye-track 
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calibration. The images were presented for five seconds and then 
replaced by a grey screen. The onset of the audio (corresponding to 
the scenes) occurred one second after the scene had been removed 
and the trials finished 11 seconds after the audio onset. As such, 
each trial lasted a total of 17 seconds. After every sixth trial, the eye-
tracker was recalibrated. The total duration of experiment was 
approximately 45 minutes. 
 
Analysis 
We defined four identically sized regions of interest within each 
scene (see figure 2.6.); one, corresponding to the plausible location 
of the moved glass (the previous region of the table top), another 
corresponding to the implausible location of the moved glass (the 
previous region of the lamp), and a third area corresponding to the 
unmoved location of the glass (the previous region of the glass). 
Finally, we included a fourth area that corresponded to a distractor 
item (the previous region of the bookcase). This region was included 
since it would provide a ‘baseline’ for the proportion of looks to an 
unnamed item, thereby allowing us to compare the proportion of 
looks to previously named locations (plausible and implausible) and 
unnamed locations. Participants’ eye movements were examined 
during certain time points in the spoken sentences with the 
percentage of saccades as the dependent measure. These critical 
time points occurred during ‘the wine carefully into’ (anticipatory eye 
movements), and during the final noun phrase ‘the glass’. 
     To begin with, we compared the proportion of saccades to the 
region of the table and the glass in the moved and the unmoved 
conditions. This comparison allowed us to see if we were able to 
replicate the previous findings by Altmann and Kamide (2009). 
Secondly, we compared the proportion of saccades to the region of 
the table (plausible locations) and the region of the lamp (implausible 
locations). This allowed us to see if the plausibility of these locations 
had any influence on eye movements. Finally, we compared looks to 
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the region of the table/lamp with looks to the region of the books 
(distractor). This provided information about whether the proportion 
of saccades to the plausible and implausible locations was higher 
than the ‘baseline’ proportion of looks to an unnamed distractor item. 
In order to evaluate the extent to which any effects could be 
generalised across participants and items we analysed the data 
separately by-subjects (t1) and by-items (t2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Example of the regions of interest, shown in black, superimposed over 
a visual scene. 
 
2.5.2. Results  
 
Moved vs. unmoved 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ (anticipatory eye movements) there 
were more looks toward the previous location of the glass in the 
unmoved condition (the woman is too lazy to move the glass…), 
compared to the plausible moved condition (the woman will move the 
glass onto the table…) (t1 (47) = -2.135, p < .05) (t2 (23) = -2.435, p 
< .05). A similar pattern of eye movements was observed during “the 
glass” (t1 (47) = -3.538, p < .01) (t2 (23) = -3.401, p < .01).  
     Likewise, there were more looks toward the previous location of 
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the table in the moved condition, compared to the unmoved 
condition, both during “the wine carefully into” (t1 (47) = 2.387, p < 
.05) (t2 (23) = 3.273, p < .01) and “the glass” (t1 (47) = 3.808, p < 
.001) (t2 (23) = 4.985, p < .001) 2 (see figures 2.7., 2.8., and table 
2.1.). These results replicate previous findings by Altmann and 
Kamide (2009).    
 
Time glass 
(unmoved) 
glass 
(moved) 
table 
(unmoved) 
table  
(moved) 
the wine carefully into 7 3 5 10 
the glass 7 2 1 8 
 
Table 2.1. Percentage of trials with looks to the previous location of the glass and 
the table during “the wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages calculated from the 
total number of trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Looks to the previous location of the glass (original location) and the 
table (plausible location) during “the wine carefully into the glass”.
                                                
2 Arcsine transformations were applied to the data prior to t-tests in order to 
better comply with the assumption of a normally distributed dataset.  
11	  
	  	  	   	   	   	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.8. P
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Plausible vs. implausible 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were more anticipatory looks 
toward the previous location of the table in the plausible condition 
(the woman will move the glass onto the table…) than there were 
looks to the previous location of the lamp in the implausible condition 
(the woman will move the glass onto the lamp…) (t1 (47) = -3.154, p 
< .01) (t2 (23) = -2.163, p < .05). However, during ‘the glass’ there 
were no more looks toward the previous location of the table in the 
plausible condition, than there were looks to the previous location of 
the lamp in the implausible condition3 (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) <1).  
     It is further worth noting that during ‘the wine carefully into’ there 
were more looks to the previous region of the table than the books 
(distractor) in the plausible condition (t1 (47) = 4.076, p < .001) (t2 
(23) = 4.461, p < .001), but there were no more looks to the previous 
region of the lamp than the books in the implausible (t1 (47) = 1.374, 
p > .05) (t2 (23) = 1.602, p > .05). This suggests that participants 
anticipated the table (plausible locations) more than the unnamed 
distractor, but they did not anticipate the lamp (implausible locations) 
any more than they anticipated the distractor. During the final 
reference to ‘the glass’, there were more looks to the region of the 
table than the books in the plausible condition (t1 (47) = 3.884, p < 
.001) (t2 (23) = 4.036, p < .01) and similarly more looks to the region 
of the lamp than the books in the implausible condition (t1 (47) = 
3.091, p < .01) (t2 (23) = 2.558, p < .05) (see figures 2.9., 2.10., and 
table 2.2.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 This pattern of eye movements has since been replicated in a later 
experiment (see appendix 4 for methods and results). 
 	  
62	  
Time lamp  
(impl.) 
table  
(pl.) 
books  
(impl.) 
books  
(pl.) 
the wine carefully into 4 10 2 2 
the glass 7 8 2 1 
 
Table 2.2. Percentage of trials with looks to the previous location of the lamp, table 
and books (distractor) during “the wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages 
calculated from the total number of trials. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Looks to the previous location of the lamp (implausible location), table 
(plausible location) and the books (distractor) during “the wine carefully into the 
glass”.  
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Fig 2.10. P
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2.5.3. Discussion  
The data showed that plausibility only influenced anticipatory eye 
movements – at the end of the narrative there was no difference in 
looks to the plausible and implausible locations. This finding might 
initially be unexpected – if the effect of plausibility was simply a result 
of the implausible locations being less accessible we would expect to 
see a similar pattern of eye movements later in the sentence during 
“the glass”. However, during this latter part of the sentence there 
were as many looks to the implausible locations, as there were looks 
to the plausible locations. Furthermore, we see a delay in looks to the 
lamp in the beginning of the sentence (“the woman will move the 
glass onto the...”). This delay is presumably a result of anticipatory 
looks to the table due to the likelihood of this being the upcoming 
location. Similarly, Altmann and Kamide (1999) showed that verbs 
such as ‘eat’ were able to direct anticipatory eye movements to the 
appropriate object within a visual scene. While the verb ‘move’ is not 
as constraining as the verb ‘eat’, it is possible that participants’ 
expectations about the upcoming location might have been further 
constrained by experiential knowledge. This notion further relates to 
a study by Kamide et al., (2003) who showed that a combination of 
verb-related information and real-world knowledge is able to guide 
anticipatory eye movements towards the most appropriate and 
plausible (goal) item, even when this item is not presented 
immediately after the verb. For example, when hearing “the woman 
will spread the butter… ” they found more anticipatory looks (after the 
verb) to the bread in the visual scene. In contrast, when hearing “the 
woman will slide the butter…” there were more anticipatory looks to 
the man in the visual scene. Following those principles we may 
speculate that in the current experiments experiential knowledge 
similarly guided participants’ eye movements towards the most likely 
(and consequently, most anticipated) location for the glass. As such, 
participants initially anticipated (and looked at the table), only 
directing their eye movements towards the lamp upon hearing “…the 
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lamp”. It may then be possible that participants’ processing was 
affected by this delay later in the sentence, resulting in fewer eye 
movements to the implausible location. However, this account does 
not explain why we only see an effect of plausibility during the 
anticipatory region of the sentence. Could it be the case that 
participants initially processed the implausible sentences slower, yet 
once this implausible information had been processed it allowed 
them to ‘catch up’ during the final region of the sentence when 
hearing “…the glass”? Another possibility is that the difference in 
anticipatory eye movements is related to the likelihood of the verb 
(e.g. pour) referring to one of the previously introduced entities. In 
other words, it may be the case that when the glass is described as 
having been moved onto the table it presents a plausible referent for 
‘pouring the wine carefully into’. However, when the glass is 
described as having been moved onto the lamp, the unlikelihood of 
this location makes it a much less plausible referent4. If the observed 
plausibility effect is exclusively related to the linguistic processing of 
plausible and implausible scenarios we would expect to see the 
same pattern of eye movements if the visual scene had remained 
onscreen throughout the entire trial. However, if the effect is 
somehow modulated by the nature/constraints of the visual context 
we would expect to see a different pattern of eye movements 
depending on the presence/absence of the visual context. The 
second experiment aimed to explore these options further by making 
the visual scene available throughout the entire duration of each trial.         
 
2.6. EXPERIMENT 2 
The second experiment was identical to the previous experiment, 
except the visual scenes remained onscreen throughout the duration 
of the trials. This design allowed us to explore the extent to which the 
effect of plausibility is solely related to linguistic processing (in which 
                                                
4	  We return to this possible explanation in chapter 5. 
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case we would expect to see the same pattern of eye movements as 
in experiment 1), or somehow mediated by the absence/presence of 
a visual context (in which case we would expect to see a different 
pattern of eye movements to that observed in experiment 1).   
 
2.6.1. Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £3. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli 
The auditory and visual stimuli were identical to those used in 
experiment 1. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure for this experiment was the same as in experiment 1, 
except that the scenes remained on the screen throughout each of 
the experimental trials and the visual stimulus was presented for only 
1000 ms before the onset of the auditory stimuli5. The trials ended 11 
seconds after the audio onset, lasting a total of 12 seconds. The 
experiment was run on an Eyelink II head-mounted eye-tracker, 
which sampled at 250 Hz from the right eye.  
 
Analysis 
We used the same four regions of interest as in experiment 1. 
However, since the scenes remained onscreen throughout each of 
the trials, we defined the regions of interest according to the outline 
                                                
5	  The different timings for the picture preview (5000ms for blank screen 
experiments and 1000ms for concurrent screen experiments) are based on 
previous studies (e.g. Altmann & Kamide, 2009). This ensures that the visual 
scenes are presented for a similar period of time before the onset of the critical part 
of the narrative (e.g. ‘…the wine carefully into the glass’).   
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of the target object. This way participants’ eye movements had to be 
directed to one of the pixels occupied by each object within the 
scene, as opposed to rectangular regions surrounding the objects. 
As in experiment 1 we compared the proportion of saccades to the 
table and the glass in the moved and the unmoved conditions, since 
this would let us know whether we were able to replicate previous 
findings by Altmann and Kamide (2009). In order to see if plausibility 
of location had any influence on eye movements we compared the 
proportion of saccades to the table (plausible location) with the 
proportion of saccades to the lamp (implausible location). Finally, we 
compared looks to the region of the table/lamp with looks to the 
region of the books (distractor). This provided information about 
whether the proportion of saccades to the plausible and implausible 
locations was higher than the ‘baseline’ proportion of looks to an 
unnamed distractor item. 
 
2.6.2. Results 
Moved vs. unmoved 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were no more anticipatory eye 
movements toward the glass in the unmoved condition (the woman is 
too lazy to move the glass…), compared to the plausible moved 
condition (the woman will move the glass onto the table…) (t1 (47) < 
1) (t2 (23) <1). Similarly, there was no difference in the proportion of 
looks toward the table in the moved condition, compared to the 
unmoved condition (see figure 1) (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) < 1). While 
Altmann and Kamide (2009) found no difference in anticipatory looks 
to the glass, they did see more anticipatory looks to the table in the 
moved condition, compared to the unmoved condition. We did not 
see this difference here. One explanation may lie in the inclusion of 
the new ‘implausible’ condition. This would have resulted in 
participants having heard objects being moved to highly unlikely 
locations in one third of the experimental trials, which could explain 
why we see fewer anticipatory looks to the table in this experiment. In 
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Altmann and Kamide’s (2009) experiment objects were either moved 
to a plausible location, or not moved at all. In this case, as soon as 
participants heard “pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully 
into…” they would automatically anticipate the most likely upcoming 
location (e.g. the table). However, in this experiment objects were 
either moved to the table, or the lamp, which could have resulted in 
fewer anticipatory looks to the table.  
     During ‘the glass’ there were marginally more looks to the glass in 
the unmoved condition, compared to the moved condition, although 
this difference was not statistically significant (t1 (47) = -1.959, p > 
.05) (t2 (23) = -1.645, p > .05). In the by-subjects analysis there were 
more looks to the table in the moved condition compared to the 
unmoved condition (t1 (47) = 2.236, p < .05), however the effect was 
not statistically significant in the by-items analysis (t2 (23) = 1.721, p 
= .09), (see figures 2.11., 2.12., and table 2.3.). Overall, the results 
show a similar pattern of eye movements to that previously observed 
by Altmann and Kamide (2009).  
 
 
Time glass 
(unmoved) 
glass 
(moved) 
table 
(unmoved) 
table  
(moved) 
the wine carefully into 27 26 19 21 
the glass 26 21 14 19 
 
Table 2.3. Percentage of trials with looks to the glass and the table during “the 
wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages calculated from the total number of 
trials.  
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Figure 2.11. Looks to the glass (original location) and the table (plausible location) 
during “the wine carefully into the glass”.  
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Fig 2.12. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the table and the glass in the m
oved and 
unm
oved conditions. The percentages show
 the proportion of trials on w
hich participants fixated 
on each region of interest during ‘the w
om
an w
ill put the glass onto the table. Then, she w
ill pick 
up the bottle, and pour the w
ine carefully into the glass. The fixations w
ere calculated every 25 m
s 
sequentially from
 the synchronisation point.     
 
 Percentage of fixations 
 	  
71	  
Plausible vs. implausible 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ (anticipatory eye movements) there 
were no more looks toward the table in the plausible condition (the 
woman will move the glass onto the table) than there were looks to 
the the lamp in the implausible condition (the woman will move the 
glass onto the lamp) (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) < 1). As in experiment 1 
there was no difference in looks to the table and the lamp and during 
‘the glass’ (t1 (47) = -1.265, p > .05) (t2 (23) < 1) (see figures 2.13., 
2.14., and table 2.4.).6 
     It is also worth noting that during ‘the wine carefully into’ there 
were more looks to the table than the books (distractor) in the 
plausible condition (t1 (47) = 3.525, p < .01), although the effect 
narrowly failed to be statistically significant in the by-items analysis 
(t2 (23) = 2.015, p = .056). Likewise, there were more looks to the 
lamp than the books in the implausible condition (t1 (47) = 5.107, p < 
.001) (t2 (23) = 3.403, p < .01). During the final reference to ‘the 
glass’, there were similarly more looks to both the region of the table 
and the books in the plausible condition (t1 (47) = 7.755, p < .001) (t2 
(23) = 4.860, p < .001) and the region of the lamp and the books in 
the implausible condition (t1 (47) = 4.544, p < .001) (t2 (23) = 4.885, 
p < .001).   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 In concurrent experiments where the visual scene is represented 
alongside spoken language it is not general practice to compare looks to 
one region against looks to another region because of likely confounds due 
to saliency in size, colour, screen positioning etc. In blank screen 
experiments, we assume that such confounds doesn’t determine eye 
movements since the visual stimulus is no longer available. However, it is 
nonetheless possible that saliency confounds are able to make certain 
items more accessible in terms of participants’ internal 
representations/visual memory of the previously presented visual scene.  
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Time lamp  
(impl.) 
table  
(pl.) 
books  
(impl.) 
books  
(pl.) 
the wine carefully into 20 21 9 10 
the glass 16 19 5 3 
 
Table 2.4. Percentage of trials with looks to the lamp, table and books (distractor) 
during “the wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages calculated from the total 
number of trials.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13. Looks to the lamp (implausible location), table (plausible location) and 
the books (distractor) during “the wine carefully into the glass”.  
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Fig 2.14. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the table (plausible condition), the lam
p 
(im
plausible condition) and the books (distractor). The percentages show
 the proportion of trials on 
w
hich participants fixated on each region of interest during ‘the w
om
an w
ill put the glass onto the 
table/lam
p. Then, she w
ill pick up the bottle, and pour the w
ine carefully into the glass. The 
fixations w
ere calculated every 25 m
s sequentially from
 the synchronisation point.     
 
 
Percentage of fixations 
 	  
74	  
2.6.3. Discussion 
In contrast to experiment 1 there was no effect of plausibility on 
anticipatory eye movements to the event-specific location of the 
glass when the visual scene was presented alongside the spoken 
sentences. This difference between the two experiments suggests 
that the effect of plausibility we observed in experiment 1 is not 
exclusively related to linguistic processing. In experiment 1 we 
observed a delay in looks to the lamp in the beginning of the 
sentence (“the woman will move the glass onto the...”), presumably 
due to the likelihood of the table being the upcoming location. In the 
second experiment we see a similar delay, yet no difference in 
anticipatory looks to the table and the lamp. We earlier proposed that 
this delay might explain the results from experiment 1 – i.e. that the 
slower processing of the first mention of the implausible location 
(lamp) resulted in a processing delay which consequently lead to the 
lack of anticipatory eye movements to the implausible location later in 
the sentence. However, as we only observed an effect of plausibility 
during the anticipatory region of the sentence (not at the end of the 
sentence) we had to further assume that participants’ slower 
processing of the implausible location somehow managed to ‘catch 
up’ to the same of the participants’ processing of plausible locations. 
The results from the second experiment rules out this possibility. 
While we observe the same delay in looks to the lamp pattern of eye 
when it is first mentioned, the pattern of eye movements observed in 
the concurrent version of the experiment shows an equal proportion 
of subsequent anticipatory looks to both the plausible (table) and 
implausible (lamp) locations.  
     To sum up, the difference in eye movements occurred in looks 
directed to the table and the lamp – when the scene was absent 
participants anticipated the pouring event to take place on the table 
(after hearing that the glass has been moved to this location), but not 
on the lamp. However, when the scene was present participants 
anticipated the pouring event to take place both on the table and the 
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lamp. Findings by Wassenburg and Zwaan (2010) showed that 
participants were faster to read sentences that matched the 
orientation of previously seen objects, suggesting that the visual 
memory of an object is able to influence language processing. 
Accordingly, participants’ visual memory of previously viewed scenes 
should likewise be able to influence their processing of spoken 
sentences related to those scenes much in the same way that 
current visual scenes would influence sentence processing. 
However, if eye movements were driven solely by participants’ visual 
memory of the scene we would not expect a difference in anticipatory 
looks in response to concurrent and absent scenes. Rather, we 
would expect more looks to the region of the glass after hearing 
‘pour’ as opposed to the table or the lamp, since our visual memory 
of the scene statically represents the glass in its original and 
unchanged location on the floor. Similarly, findings by Altmann and 
Kamide (2009) showed a higher proportion of eye movements to the 
table when the glass was said to have been moved there, compared 
to when the glass was said to not have moved at all. As such, eye 
movements (after ‘pour’) reflected the moved location of the glass as 
conveyed by the spoken language (describing the glass as being on 
the table), as opposed to the depicted location of the glass (floor). 
These results demonstrate that participants mapped spoken 
sentences onto internal representations of the previously presented 
scenes (rather than their visual memory of those scenes), thus 
allowing language to mediate a dynamic updating of mental 
representations as the described event unfolded. 
     The findings from experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the 
availability/absence of a visual scene is able to influence our 
anticipation of upcoming events (at least when those events are 
implausible). On the other hand, Knoeferle and Crocker’s (2007) 
blank screen experiment replicated the results from their previous 
study (2006) in which the visual scenes were presented alongside 
spoken sentences – both these studies demonstrated a stronger 
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reliance on concurrent, or previously seen visual information as 
opposed to language-mediated real-world knowledge. In contrast, the 
results from experiments 1 and 2 showed a different pattern of 
anticipatory eye movements depending on whether the visual scene 
is present or absent. Interestingly, this difference only occurred for 
anticipatory eye movements directed to the implausible locations – 
when comparing eye movements to the plausible locations we found 
a similar pattern of eye movements irrespective of whether the visual 
scene remained onscreen, or was removed before the onset of 
spoken language. This suggests that in terms of plausibility the 
presence/absence of visual information is able to influence our 
anticipation of implausible events. In the current studies the presence 
of a visual scene is able to guide anticipatory eye movements to both 
plausible and implausible locations, whereas the absence (or 
memory) of a visual scene is only able to direct anticipatory looks to 
plausible locations. This supports the notion that a concurrent visual 
scene provides an additional level of (visual) constraints, which 
consequently restricts the number of possible referents, making the 
implausible object-representations more accessible and as such 
easier to anticipate and keep track of when referred back to later in 
the sentence.         
 
2.6.4. Summary & questions 
The findings from experiment 1 (where we removed the visual scene 
before the onset of spoken language) showed that participants only 
anticipated plausible locations. When locations were implausible 
there was little or no evidence of anticipatory eye movements. In 
contrast, results from experiment 2 (where the visual scene remained 
onscreen throughout the duration of spoken language) showed no 
influence of plausibility – in this experiment we found anticipatory eye 
movements to both the plausible and implausible locations. Why do 
we see this difference in anticipatory looks between the two 
presentations types (blank screen and concurrent screen)? One 
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possible explanation is that we process and anticipate upcoming 
discourse differently when language refers to something outside our 
visual environment, as opposed to when language refers to entities 
within our immediate visual proximity. During language 
comprehension we assume that participants in an event will be 
drawn from the visual context if one is available (e.g. Altmann & 
Mirkovic, 2009; Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus et al., 1995). In terms of 
anticipation the concurrent visual context, alongside language serves 
to restrict the number of potential participants and this makes it 
easier to anticipate which item will most likely be referred to next. 
However, in the context of a blank screen the anticipatory activation 
of appropriate representations is no longer bound exclusively by the 
visual context, but may now be influenced by real-world knowledge. 
While experiential knowledge informs us that a table is a very likely 
location for a glass, it also informs us that a lamp is a very unlikely 
location. This unlikelihood may in turn lead us to anticipate a number 
of alternative options.   
     A potential confound in these experiments is that we describe 
items as being moved to distinct (plausible and implausible) 
locations. As noted earlier, in concurrent experiments it is not general 
practice to compare looks to different regions since confounds such 
as colour, size and screen positioning may make one item more 
salient than another. While these issues do not appear to have 
influenced anticipatory eye movements in the context of a concurrent 
visual scene, in the context of a blank screen it is nonetheless 
possible that differences in saliency could have made certain 
locations more accessible within participants’ internal 
representations, or memory of the previously depicted scenes. It is 
possible that this higher accessibility of the plausible locations could 
have made it easier to anticipate these regions when referred to the 
second time around. 
     Experiments 3 and 4 aimed to explore whether the pattern of eye 
movements we observed in experiments 1 and 2 can be generalised 
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and extended to contextual plausibility. In these experiments we 
controlled for saliency of location by describing contextually plausible 
and implausible items as being moved to the same location. This 
manipulation further allowed us to explore how an early visual 
introduction of implausible items (as well as the proportion initial eye 
movements to the plausible and implausible items) might influence 
the accessibility of these items when referred to later in the spoken 
narrative.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MANIPULATING CONTEXTUAL PLAUSIBILITY  
 
In the previous chapter we explored the extent to which plausibility of 
location is able to influence the accessibility of objects within event-
representations and further, how this may be modulated by the 
nature of the visual context (as present or absent). We found that in 
the context of a blank screen (experiment 1) participants only 
anticipated plausible locations. When items had been moved to 
implausible locations there was little or no evidence of anticipatory 
eye movements. However, in the context of a concurrent visual 
scene (experiment 2) participants anticipated both the plausible and 
implausible locations. In both experiments there was no influence of 
plausibility during the final reference to the glass. Experiments 3 and 
4 aimed to explore whether the pattern of eye movements we 
observed in experiments 1 and 2 can be generalised and extended to 
contextual plausibility. Instead of moving objects to different locations 
we now moved contextually plausible (e.g. a cat in a kitchen scene) 
and implausible items (e.g. a penguin in a kitchen scene) to the same 
location.  
     In experiments 1 and 2 plausibility was manipulated purely 
through language. In other words, the visual scenes always depicted 
a plausible setting and only the sentences determined whether the 
glass was moved to a plausible or an implausible location (e.g. the 
woman will move the glass onto the table/lamp). As such, 
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participants only became aware of the implausible component after 
having viewed the visual scenes. In the current set of experiments 
we introduced the component of plausibility immediately, presenting 
it within the visual scenes – in these experiments half of the 
experimental scenes depicted items that were contextually 
implausible, or in other words, unlikely considering the scene that 
they were presented in. Thereby, participants became aware of the 
implausible component immediately upon seeing the visual scene 
and this allowed them to process and accommodate the aspect of 
implausibility before the onset of spoken language. This early 
introduction of the implausible components of the scene gave 
participants more time to prepare for (and perhaps anticipate) the 
implausible nature of upcoming events and this could have made the 
implausible items more accessible and therefore easier to anticipate 
and keep track of when referred to later in the narrative. This 
manipulation of ‘visual plausibility’ further allowed us to examine 
participants’ initial eye movements to contextually plausible and 
implausible items in the absence of language and whether initial 
attention to an item might make it more accessible when referred to 
at a later point in time. For example, it may be the case that a 
contextually implausible item such as ‘a penguin’ will be more salient 
and therefore more memorable, precisely because it is unusual 
compared to the other (contextually plausible) items within the scene. 
Loftus and Mackworth (1978) proposed that implausible items are 
often seen as being more distinctive and as such more informative 
for later discrimination compared to plausible items. On a similar 
note, Friedman (1979) proposed that participants’ identification of 
unexpected items leads to more processing of local visual details, 
whereas identification of expected items results in a more global level 
of processing (in the next section we discuss the findings of these 
studies). According to these theories we might similarly expect the 
implausible items (as well as the locations associated with these 
items) to be more distinctive than the plausible items and therefore 
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more accessible when later referred to by spoken language.  
     Experiments 3 and 4 also differ from the previous experiments in 
terms of how the target items within the scene were referred to. In 
experiments 1 and 2 the reference during the second sentence to the 
plausible or implausible location was somewhat indirect. In other 
words, these locations were only directly referred to at the beginning 
of the narrative (e.g. ‘the woman will move the glass onto the 
table/lamp’). Subsequent eye movements to the table and the lamp 
were due to the second and final reference to the glass (e.g. ‘then, 
she will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass’), 
whereby participants’ knowledge of the location of the glass as 
described by spoken language led to an increase in eye movements 
to this location. In contrast, the current experiments manipulated the 
plausibility of the referent itself (e.g. ‘the woman will lift the 
cat/penguin onto the table. Then she will quickly feed the 
cat/penguin’). As such, the location of the referent was always the 
same, whereas the referent itself was either contextually plausible, or 
implausible. This manipulation allowed us to explore how plausibility 
of the referent (as opposed to location) might influence eye 
movements when described as being moved to an identical location.  
As mentioned earlier, if implausible items are more salient and 
memorable than their plausible counterparts they should similarly be 
more accessible when later referred to7. If this is the case, we should 
see an increase in anticipatory looks to the location of the implausible 
items – both when referred to in the context of a concurrent or blank 
screen. On the other hand, a similar pattern of eye movements to 
that observed in experiments 1 and 2 would suggest that the 
influence of plausibility is not specifically related to plausibility of 
location, but may be extended to the contextual plausibility of the 
referent itself.  
                                                
7	  A previous study by van Gompel and Majid (2004) showed that participants 
processed pronouns were faster when the lexical frequency of the antecedent was 
low compared to when the lexical frequency of the antecedent was high. They 
proposed that this was due to a stronger saliency of the infrequent antecedents.  
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3.1. Object-plausibility in the context of a visual scene 
From time to time we may come across objects that seem strangely 
out of place considering the context that we encounter them in (e.g. a 
mouse in the bedroom), whereby our initial encounter with this item 
might take us by surprise and therefore attract our attention in a 
different manner from items we would expect to encounter within that 
same context. An early study by Loftus and Mackworth (1978) 
investigated how participants view pictures containing either 
contextually plausible objects (e.g. a tractor in a farmyard scene), or 
contextually implausible objects (e.g. an octopus in a farmyard 
scene). Participants’ eye movements were recorded as they viewed 
pictures, which they had previously been told required a subsequent 
recognition task. The data showed that participants fixated more 
often on contextually implausible objects, compared to contextually 
plausible items and further that participants’ first fixations to the 
implausible objects were longer than their first fixations to the 
plausible objects. These findings suggest that the context in which an 
item is presented can influence how we view that item. Specifically, 
in terms of processing and encoding visual information for 
subsequent recognition, implausible items are seen as being more 
distinctive and as such more informative when later having to 
discriminate between similar visual scenes. Loftus and Mackworth 
further explain their findings in relation to schema theory, suggesting 
that implausible objects require more processing in order to 
incorporate them into participants’ schematic and prototypical 
representation of the depicted event (but see Henderson, Weeks & 
Hollingworth, 1999; Underwood & Foulsham, 2006 for an alternative 
explanation). In the current study we similarly manipulated the 
contextual plausibility of items since this allowed us to examine eye 
movements to contextually plausible and implausible items in the 
absence of language and the extent to which increased initial 
attention to an item might make it more accessible when later 
referred to.   
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     Friedman (1979) similarly recorded participants’ eye movements 
while they viewed pictures containing expected (e.g. a sink in the 
context of a kitchen) and unexpected (e.g. a hockey stick in the 
context of a kitchen) objects. After seeing a picture for 30 seconds 
participants had to discriminate the target pictures from distractor 
pictures in which either the expected or unexpected items had been 
changed. Friedman proposed that participants’ identification of 
unexpected items would lead to more processing of local visual 
details, whereas identification of expected items would results in a 
more global level of processing. Her findings supported this theory, 
showing that participants’ first fixations to the unexpected items were 
approximately twice as long as first fixations to the expected items. 
During the discrimination task participants noticed when both the 
expected and unexpected items had been removed from the visual 
scene, or replaced with different items. However, when the items 
were slightly different participants tended to only recognise the 
changes made to the unexpected items and this occurred regardless 
of having fixated on both the unexpected and expected target items 
when viewing the pictures. This supports Friedman’s notion of 
unexpected items being processed locally, because they are 
implausible and therefore more informative for later discrimination. In 
contrast, scenes containing expected items were processed more 
globally, since our stereotypical knowledge about such scenes 
already entailed the presence of such objects, whereby they were 
deemed less informative for later discrimination. Therefore, 
participants’ recognition and discrimination of expected items 
appeared to rely more on their prototypical knowledge of a familiar 
scene, whereas later recognition and discrimination of unexpected 
items relied more on the visual memory of the scene itself.  
     These studies demonstrate the importance of the context in which 
objects are presented and further, how ‘out of place’ objects are 
sometimes able to attract our attention in a different manner from 
items we expect to encounter within specific contexts. If contextually 
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implausible items attract more attention and participants rely more on 
their visual memory for such items we may further speculate that 
implausible items will be more accessible when referred to in the 
context of a blank screen. If this is the case, we would expect to see 
a higher proportion of looks to the regions of the implausible items, 
than the plausible items (as well the locations of these items) when 
referred to later in the narrative. 
  
3.2. EXPERIMENT 3 
In experiment 3 we used the blank screen paradigm to explore the 
extent to which the plausibility effect observed in experiment 1 is 
solely dependent on plausibility of location, or if this effect can be 
extended to contextual plausibility. In other words, will we see a 
similar pattern of eye movements when we manipulate the plausibility 
of the referent itself, rather than its location? We created a new set of 
stimuli, which presented either contextually plausible items (e.g. a cat 
in a kitchen), or contextually implausible items (e.g. a penguin in a 
kitchen). The items were always described as being moved to the 
same location. This design further allowed us to examine 
participants’ initial eye movements to the contextually plausible and 
implausible items in the absence of language and whether increased 
initial attention to the implausible items might make them more 
accessible and therefore easier to anticipate when referred to later in 
the narrative.   
 
3.2.1. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £3. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
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Stimuli 
Sixteen experimental scenes (see figure 3.1.) were matched with two 
conditions: 
 
1. The woman will lift the cat onto the table. Then, she will 
quickly feed the cat. 
 
(Contextually plausible) 
 
2. The woman will lift the penguin onto the table. Then, she will 
quickly feed the penguin. 
 
(Contextually implausible) 
 
 
   
 
Fig 3.1. Example of the visual scenes paired with sentence 1 and 2 as shown 
above. 
 
In both conditions the first sentence always described the agent 
moving the target object to a new location. In condition (1) the target 
object (cat) was plausible, given the context it was presented in. In 
condition (2) the target object (penguin) was implausible, given the 
context of the scene (see appendix 5 for a full list of the experimental 
sentences). In both conditions the target objects were always moved 
to the same locations8. In addition to the 16 experimental trials, 32 
sentence-picture pairs were included as fillers (see appendix 6 for an 
                                                
8	  In	  experiments 1 and 2 we compared eye movements across three conditions 
(plausible moved, implausible moved and unmoved) since this design allowed us 
to replicate the results from Altmann and Kamide (2009) in addition to exploring the 
influence of plausibility. As the experiments presented in this thesis were mainly 
interested in the influence of plausibility we did not include an ‘unmoved’ condition 
in the subsequent experiments.   
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example of the filler items). Twelve of the filler scenes depicted a 
contextually implausible item, however this item was never referred 
to. These items were included so that participants would not be able 
to automatically assume the subsequent relevance of the implausible 
items.  
     The visual stimuli were created using commercially available 
ClipArt packages (see appendix 7 for a full set of the experimental 
pictures) and presented at a resolution of 800 x 600 pixels. The 
positions of the objects representing the plausible and implausible 
items (e.g. the cat and the penguin), the locations that these were 
described as being moved to (e.g. the table), and the distractor 
locations (e.g. the oven) were counterbalanced to ensure that the 
location of each item varied across the full set of experimental 
scenes. The sentences were recorded by a male native speaker of 
British English and sampled at 44.1 KHz. The audio files were played 
via a mono channel split across two speakers that were positioned 
on each side of the screen. The onsets and offsets of the critical 
words in the experimental sentences were noted (using a sound 
editing program) for carrying out later analysis.   
     The sentences were coupled with their corresponding pictures 
and allocated to two conditions in a fixed-random order. Two lists of 
stimuli were made, which included one of the 16 sets of experimental 
scenes alongside the corresponding version from each of the 
sentence-pairs. The same 32 fillers were used in both conditions. 
Participants were allocated to either condition 1 or 2 and presented 
with a total of 48 trials presented in the same randomised order for all 
conditions. 
 
Norming for action & contextual plausibility  
To ensure that the items were perceived as intended we normed the 
experimental stimuli for contextual plausibility and likelihood of the 
actions being performed on the items. In the first norming study we 
presented 46 participants with the 16 experimental scenes and asked 
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them to consider the target item (e.g. a penguin) alongside the 
context that it was presented in (e.g. a kitchen). Participants were 
then asked to rate the likelihood of the item given its surrounding 
context. Plausibility was rated on a scale from 1-7 (1 being “not very 
plausible” and 7 being “very plausible”). Two lists were created, 
ensuring that participants rated either the plausible or the implausible 
version of each event. Thereby list (a) presented 50% of the 
plausible events and 50% of the implausible events, whereas list (b) 
presented the opposite versions of the plausible and implausible 
events. The presentation order of the sentences was randomised 
across both lists. The mean rating for the plausible contexts was 6.02 
(SD = 0.76) and 1.89 (SD = 0.69) for the implausible contexts. The 
difference in likelihood between the plausible and implausible 
contexts differed significantly, t (15) = 15.262, p < .001; items were 
consistently judged as more likely when presented in a plausible 
context.   
     In the second norming study we presented 55 participants with 
the 16 experimental sentences and asked them to consider the target 
item and rate how likely they would be to perform a specific action on 
this item (e.g. suppose you had a cat/penguin – how likely would you 
be to feed it?). Likelihood was rated on a scale from 1-7 (1 being “not 
very likely” and 7 being “very likely”). The mean rating for the actions 
performed on the plausible items was 4.41 (SD = 1.83) and 3.54 (SD 
= 1.33) for the implausible location. There was no significant 
difference in likelihood between actions being performed on the 
plausible and implausible items, t (15) = 1.892, p > .05.  
 
Procedure 
The visual scenes were presented for five seconds and then 
replaced by a grey screen. The onset of the audio (corresponding to 
the scenes) occurred one second after the scene had been removed 
and the trials finished 11 seconds after the audio onset. As such, 
each trial lasted a total of 17 seconds. The total duration of the 
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experiment was approximately 40 minutes. The experiment was run 
on an Eyelink II head-mounted eye-tracker, which sampled at 250 Hz 
from the right eye. 
 
Analysis 
We defined four identically sized regions of interest within each 
scene; one, corresponding to the new location of the cat/penguin 
(e.g. the previous region of the table top), another corresponding to 
the original location of the cat/penguin (the previous region of the 
cat/penguin), and a third area that corresponded to an unnamed 
distractor item (the previous region of the oven) (see figure 3.2.).  
              
  
 
Figure 3.2. Example of the regions of interest, shown in black, superimposed over 
a visual scene. 
 
 
Participants’ eye movements were examined during certain time 
points in the spoken sentences with the percentage of saccades and 
percentage of fixations as the dependent measures. These critical 
time points occurred during ‘quickly feed’ and during the final noun 
phrase ‘the cat/penguin’. It is important to note that in contrast to the 
critical time points analysed in experiments 1 and 2 where the 
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anticipatory region of the sentence occurred after the final verb (e.g. 
‘the woman will put the glass onto the table/lamp. Then, she will pick 
up the bottle and pour the wine carefully into the glass’), the 
anticipatory region in the current experiments occurred earlier, 
beginning at the onset of the word immediately preceding the final 
verb, and ending at the offset of the final verb (e.g. ‘the woman will lift 
the cat/penguin onto the table. Then, she will quickly feed the 
cat/penguin’). This difference in the anticipatory region is due to the 
structure of the experimental sentences and allowed us to measure 
anticipatory eye movements at the earliest possible moment, both 
before and during verb-related information9.        
     To begin with, we compared the proportion of saccades to the 
region of the table in the plausible (cat) and implausible (penguin) 
conditions. This allowed us to see if the contextual plausibility of the 
items moved to this location had any influence on eye movements. 
We also compared looks to the table with looks to the oven 
(distractor). This provided information about whether the proportion 
of saccades to the table (in both the plausible and implausible 
conditions) was higher than the ‘baseline’ proportion of looks to an 
unnamed distractor item. Finally, we compared the proportion of 
saccades to the region of the cat (plausible item) and the region of 
the penguin (implausible item). This comparison allowed us to see if 
the unexpected nature of the contextually implausible items would 
lead to a higher proportion of looks than the contextually plausible 
items.   
 
 
 
                                                
9	  Kamide, Altmann and Haywood (2003) showed that in Japanese (where 
the verb is typically presented at the end of a sentence), information 
derived from pre-verbal arguments was able to facilitate anticipatory eye 
movements to the most appropriate target. Later we return to the 
discussion of what can be anticipated during this early region.         
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3.2.2. Results  
Table – plausible vs. implausible 
During ‘quickly feed’ there were more anticipatory looks toward the 
previous location of the table after hearing ‘the woman will lift the cat 
onto the table’ (plausible condition), than after hearing ‘the woman 
will lift the penguin onto the table’ (implausible condition) (t1 (31) = 
2.982, p < .01) (t2 (15) = -2.573, p < .05). Interestingly, we see the 
same difference even before the onset of the verb – during ‘quickly’ 
there were more looks to the region of the table when the cat was 
said to have been moved there, than when the penguin was said to 
have been moved there (t1 (31) = 3.418, p < .01) (t2 (15) = -2.374, p 
< .05). With respect to the proportion of anticipatory eye movements 
it is further worth noting that during ‘quickly feed’ there were more 
looks to the table than the oven (distractor) in the plausible condition 
(t1 (31) = 4.996, p < .001) (t2 (15) = 2.961, p < .05). In contrast, there 
were no more looks to the table than the oven in the implausible 
condition (t1 (31) = 1.158, p > .05) (t2 (15) = 1.420, p > .05). This 
suggests that when the cat (contextually plausible item) was 
described as having been moved to the table participants anticipated 
the table more than the unnamed distractor. However, when the 
penguin (contextually implausible item) was described as having 
been moved to the table participants did not anticipate that location 
any more than they anticipated the distractor. During the final 
reference to ‘the cat/penguin’, there was no difference in looks to the 
region of the table between the plausible and implausible conditions 
(t1 (31) < 1) (t2 (15) <1)10 (see figures 3.3., 3.5., and table 3.1.).  
 
                                                
10	  The percentage of trials with saccades to the previous region of the table 
is quite low during	  the final reference to ‘the cat/penguin’ and this is the 
case in both conditions. However, 1000ms after the offset of ‘the 
cat/penguin’ the percentage of trials with saccades increases to 11-12%, 
suggesting a slight delay in looks to this region.     
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Fig 3.3. Looks toward the previous region of the table and the oven (distractor) 
during ‘quickly feed the cat/penguin’. 
 
 
Cat/penguin – plausible vs. implausible 
During ‘quickly feed’ there was no difference in anticipatory looks to 
the region of the cat in the plausible condition and looks to the region 
of the penguin in the implausible condition (t1 (31) < 1) (t2 (15) <1).  
Likewise, during the final reference to the cat/penguin there was no 
difference in looks to the region of the cat in the plausible condition 
and looks to the region of the penguin in the implausible condition (t1 
(31) = 1.438, p > .05) (t2 (15) = -1.282, p > .05).  
     However, during the first 500 milliseconds of the picture preview11 
(before the onset of spoken language) there were more looks to the 
region of the penguin, than there were looks to the region of the cat 
(t1 (31) = -2.837, p < .01), although the effect was not statistically 
significant in the by-items analysis (t2 (15) <1). Similarly, there were 
more fixations on the region of the penguin than the cat (t1 (31) = -
3.499, p < .01), but again the effect was not statistically significant in 
the by-items analysis (t2 (15) <1) (see figure 3.4.). There was no 
difference in first fixation duration and gaze duration to these regions.  
 
                                                
11	  The visual scene was presented for 5000ms and then removed before 
the onset of spoken language. 	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Time table  
(impl.) 
table  
(pl.) 
oven  
(impl.) 
oven  
(pl.) 
penguin 
(impl.) 
cat  
(pl.) 
quickly feed 6 15 3 3 2 3 
the cat/penguin 5 4 2 1 1 2 
 
Table 3.1. Percentage of trials with looks to the previous location of the table, oven 
(distractor), penguin and cat during “quickly feed the cat/penguin”. Percentages 
calculated from the total number of trials.  
 
 
 
  
 
Fig 3.4. Percentage of trials with saccades to the cat and the penguin. as well as 
percentage of trials with fixations on the cat and the penguin during the first 500ms 
of the picture preview.  
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Fig 3.5. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the previous region of the table and the oven 
(distractor). The percentages show
 the proportion of trials on w
hich participants fixated on each 
region of interest during ‘the w
om
an w
ill put the cat/penguin onto the table. Then, she w
ill quickly 
feed the cat/penguin’. The fixations w
ere calculated every 25 m
s sequentially from
 the 
synchronisation point.     
 
 Percentage of fixations 
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3.2.3. Discussion  
In line with experiment 1, plausibility influenced anticipatory eye 
movements to the event-specific location of the target item, but not 
eye movements during the final reference to ‘the cat/penguin’ (in 
experiment 1 plausibility influenced anticipatory eye movements to 
the event-specific location of the glass, but not eye movements 
during the final reference to ‘the glass’). This suggests that the 
plausibility effect observed in experiment 1 is not exclusively related 
to plausibility of location, but can be further extended to contextual 
plausibility. During ‘quickly feed’ participants anticipated (and looked 
to) the table when the contextually plausible item (cat) was described 
as having been moved there but not when the contextually 
implausible item (penguin) had been moved there. This difference 
indicates that while an early visual manipulation of plausibility may 
have allowed participants more time to process and prepare for the 
implausible nature of upcoming events, this ‘extra time’ did not make 
the implausible items easier to anticipate and keep track of when 
referred to later in the sentences.  
     Interestingly, we also found a difference in anticipatory eye 
movements even before the onset of the verb, during ‘quickly’. This 
suggests that anticipatory looks to the table occurred independently 
on any knowledge derived from verb-related information (e.g. upon 
hearing that the woman is about to feed the cat/penguin), instead 
indicating that any action the woman was about to perform (e.g. then 
she will quickly…) would be more likely to involve the cat, as 
opposed to the penguin (despite that the constraints of this part of 
the narrative would allow the woman to perform any number of 
actions not related to either the cat or the penguin). It may be the 
case that the difference in anticipatory eye movements reflected the 
number of possible actions involving the plausible and implausible 
items within the context of the narrative. For example, our knowledge 
and experience with cats informs us that cats are often kept as pets 
and therefore they might regularly spend time in a kitchen. 
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Considering this, the woman could be about to perform a number of 
actions involving the cat (e.g. feeding, stroking, brushing etc.). On the 
other hand, our experience of penguins (as a whole, or in kitchens) is 
for most people much more limited, as is our knowledge of the type 
of actions one might perform involving a penguin. This might explain 
why participants anticipated an event to take place on the table when 
the cat had been moved there, but not when the penguin had been 
moved there.  
     In experiments 1 and 2 items were always described as being 
moved to separate (plausible and implausible) locations, whereby 
differences in saliency could have made the plausible locations more 
accessible within participants’ internal representations, or memory of 
the previously depicted scenes. The pattern of eye movements 
observed in the current experiment suggest that the plausibility effect 
observed in experiment 1 did not arise as a result of differences in 
saliency between the plausible and implausible locations since the 
current experiment removed any discrepancies in saliency by moving 
the target items to the same location. In a future study one might also 
manipulate the plausibility of the context in which an item is 
presented – for example, presenting the penguin in either a plausible 
context such as a zoo, or an implausible context such as a kitchen. 
This design would allow us to control for both the saliency of the 
target item, as well as the location that this item is described as being 
moved to. If the effect we observed in experiments 1 and 3 is purely 
driven by plausibility we would similarly expect to see a higher 
proportion of anticipatory eye movements if the penguin was to be 
presented in a plausible context, compared if it was presented in an 
implausible context.  
     Friedman (1979) proposed that participants’ identification of 
unexpected items lead to more processing of local visual details 
because these items were more informative for later discrimination. 
In contrast, identification of expected items resulted in a more global 
level of processing – since our stereotypical knowledge about familiar 
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scenes already entailed the presence of such objects they were 
deemed less informative. Her findings supported this notion showing 
longer first fixations, as well as better recognition to changes to 
unexpected items, compared to expected items. As such, 
participants’ recognition and discrimination of expected items 
seemed to rely more on prototypical knowledge, whereas later 
recognition and discrimination of unexpected items relied more on 
the visual memory of the scene itself. If this theory extends beyond 
identification and recognition we would expect to see longer first 
fixations on the contextually implausible items since participants’ had 
to rely on internal representations or their visual memory of these 
scenes at the onset of spoken language. In contrast to the findings 
by Friedman (as well as Loftus and Mackworth, 1978), we found no 
difference in first fixation, or gaze durations to the plausible and 
implausible items. This suggests that Friedman’s findings might have 
been specifically related to participants having to perform a 
subsequent discrimination and recognition task. In the current 
experiment participants were simply required to ‘look and listen’ and 
it may be the case that when no later recognition or discrimination is 
required, participants simply have less need to rely on visual memory 
for contextually implausible items. 
     We did, however see a difference in the proportion of saccades 
and fixations during the first 500 milliseconds of the picture preview, 
with more attention focused on the contextually implausible items 
than the plausible items. This suggests that the implausible items did 
initially attract participants’ attention more than the plausible items, 
but only for a brief moment. Furthermore, this increased attention to 
the implausible items did not seem to make these items, or their 
locations more accessible when referred to later in the sentence. 
During the final reference to the cat/penguin there were no more 
looks to the region of the penguin than there were looks to the region 
of the cat and similarly there was no difference in looks to the table. 
During ‘quickly feed’ there was no difference in the proportion of 
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anticipatory looks to the region of the cat and the penguin. We did 
however, see more looks to the region of the table when the cat was 
said to have been moved there, than when the penguin was said to 
have been moved there. This indicates that the smaller proportion of 
anticipatory looks to the region of the table when the penguin had 
been moved there were not due to a higher proportion of looks to the 
region of the penguin, compared to the region of the cat. These 
findings suggest that the higher proportion of initial attention to the 
penguin did not influence the proportion of later looks to this region, 
or the described location of the penguin. Several factors may explain 
why a higher proportion of looks to the penguin did not influence the 
proportion of later looks to this region. Firstly, the penguin only 
attracted more attention than the cat for a very brief period – after 
500 milliseconds there was no difference in looks to these items. It 
may be the case that this is simply too short a period to be able to 
exert any influence on accessibility and subsequent eye movements. 
Secondly, it is important to remember that the visual scene was 
replaced with a blank screen before the onset of spoken language, in 
effect removing any advantage of perceptual saliency the penguin 
may have had over the cat (however, it may have remained 
conceptually salient, although if that were the case, we might have 
expected to see more looks to the region of the table, or the penguin 
towards the end of the second sentence). As such, we may 
speculate that if the visual scene was to remain onscreen, the 
continuous saliency of the penguin might make it more accessible 
than the cat when referred to later in the sentence.  
 
3.3. EXPERIMENT 4 
The results from experiment 3 showed that participants anticipated 
the region of the table when the cat was said to have moved there 
(contextually plausible), but not when the penguin was said to have 
been moved there (contextually implausible). This is similar to the 
findings from experiment 1, which showed that participants 
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anticipated the region of table (plausible location), but not the lamp 
(implausible location). In contrast, the data from experiment 2, where 
the scene remained onscreen throughout the trial, showed that 
participants anticipated both the table and the lamp. These first two 
experiments suggests that the effect of plausibility is not specifically 
related to difficulties with processing the implausible sentences, but 
rather modulated somehow by the absence/presence of the visual 
context. In light of this difference we would similarly expect that 
leaving the visual scene onscreen would result in anticipatory eye 
movements to the table when both the cat and the penguin are 
described as having been moved this location.  
     On the other hand, certain differences in the experimental design 
might lead us to expect a different outcome. As mentioned earlier, 
reference to the plausible and implausible locations in experiments 1 
and 2 was indirect since these locations were only directly referred to 
at the start of the narrative (e.g. the woman will move the glass onto 
the table/lamp) – any subsequent eye movements to the table and 
the lamp were derived from the second and final reference to the 
glass (e.g. then, she will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine 
carefully into the glass), whereby participants’ knowledge of the 
location of the glass as described by spoken language lead to an 
increase in eye movements to this location. In contrast, the current 
experiments manipulated the plausibility of the referent itself (e.g. 
‘the woman will lift the cat/penguin onto the table. Then she will 
quickly feed the cat/penguin’), which allowed us to explore the extent 
to which the saliency of contextually plausible and implausible items 
might influence accessibility when referring back to these items. For 
example, if implausible items are more salient than their plausible 
counterparts they should similarly be more memorable and 
accessible when later referred to. While the data from experiment 3 
showed a higher proportion of looks and fixations to the contextually 
implausible items compared to the contextually plausible items, this 
difference only appeared during the first 500 milliseconds of the 
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picture preview. Furthermore, the removal of the visual scene prior to 
the onset of language is likely to have minimised any influence of 
saliency during spoken language. If this is the case we would expect 
more (later) looks to the implausible items than the plausible items 
(and their described locations) if the visual scene remained 
onscreen, since the continuous saliency advantage of the implausible 
items should make them more accessible when referred to in the 
second sentence.  
 
3.3.1. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £3. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli 
The auditory and visual stimuli were identical to those used in 
experiment 3. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure for this experiment was the same as in experiment 3, 
except that the scenes remained on the screen throughout each of 
the experimental trials and the visual stimulus was presented for only 
1000 milliseconds before the onset of the auditory stimulus. The trials 
ended 11 seconds after the audio onset, lasting a total of 12 
seconds. The experiment was run on an Eyelink II head-mounted 
eye-tracker, which sampled at 250 Hz from the right eye. 
 
Analysis 
We used the same four regions of interest as in experiment 3. 
However, since the scenes remained onscreen throughout each of 
the trials, we defined the regions of interest according to the outline 
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of the target object. This way participants’ eye movements had to be 
directed to one of the pixels occupied by each object within the 
scene, as opposed to rectangular regions surrounding the objects.     
Firstly, we compared the proportion of saccades to the table in the 
plausible (cat) and implausible (penguin) conditions. This allowed us 
to see if the contextual plausibility of the items moved to this location 
had any influence on eye movements. We also compared looks to 
the table with looks to the oven (distractor). This provided information 
about whether the proportion of saccades to the table (in both the 
plausible and implausible conditions) was higher than the ‘baseline’ 
proportion of looks to an unnamed distractor item. Finally, we 
compared the proportion of saccades to the cat (plausible item) and 
the penguin (implausible item). This comparison allowed us to see if 
the unexpected nature of the contextually implausible items would 
attract a higher proportion of looks than the contextually plausible 
items.   
     
3.3.2. Results 
Table – plausible vs. implausible 
During ‘quickly feed’ there was no difference in anticipatory looks to 
the table between the plausible (cat) and implausible (penguin) 
conditions (t1 (31) = 1.323, p > .05) (t2 (15) = -1.168, p > .05). 
Likewise, before the onset of the verb, during ‘quickly’ there were no 
more looks to the table when the cat was said to have been moved 
there than when the penguin was said to have been moved there (t1 
(31) < 1) (t2 (15) < 1). During the final reference to ‘the cat/penguin’ 
there were no more looks to the table when the cat was said to have 
been moved there than when the penguin was said to have moved 
there (t1 (31) < 1) (t2 (15) <1) (see figures 3.6. and table 3.2.).  
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Fig 3.6. Looks toward the table and the oven (distractor) during ‘quickly feed the 
cat/penguin’. 
 
While these data could initially be interpreted as null results, figure 
3.8. shows that compared to the baseline (at the onset of the 
sentence) there were both anticipatory eye movements and eye 
movements to the appropriate object during its reference. In other 
words, at the start of the sentence there were few looks to both the 
table and the oven (distractor) in both the plausible condition (t1 (31) 
= 1.770, p > .05) (t2 (15) = 2.059, p > .05) and the implausible 
condition (t1 (31) < 1) (t2 (15) < 1). However, at the first mention of 
the table and during ‘quickly feed’ there was a gradual increase in 
looks to this location, yet no increase in looks to the oven. The high 
proportion of fixations to the table, as well as the short timespan 
between the offset of ‘table’ and the onset of ‘quickly feed’ makes it 
difficult for the proportion of looks to the table to decrease much 
during this period, consequently constraining the potential increase in 
looks to the table during ‘quickly feed’ (the proportion of looks to the 
table did not begin to decrease until approximately 500 milliseconds 
before the onset of ‘quickly feed’). This confound might have been 
prevented by including a reference to a different object before the 
anticipatory region of the sentence (e.g. ‘the woman will put the 
cat/penguin onto the table. Then, she will reach for the dish, and 
quickly feed the cat/penguin’).  
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     With respect to the proportion of anticipatory eye movements it is 
further worth noting that during ‘quickly feed’ there were more looks 
to the table than the oven in both the plausible (t1 (31) = 6.700, p < 
.001) (t2 (15) = 4.103, p < .01) and implausible (t1 (31) = 6.830, p < 
.001) (t2 (15) = 3.414, p < .01) conditions. However, in the context of 
a blank screen (experiment 3 – see figure 3.3. on page 88) there 
were more anticipatory looks to the table than the oven in the 
plausible condition (t1 (31) = 4.996, p < .001) (t2 (15) = 2.961, p < 
.05), but not in the implausible condition (t1 (31) = 1.158, p > .05) (t2 
(15) = 1.420, p > .05). While we cannot compare directly across the 
two experiments, the proportion of looks within each experiment 
nonetheless suggests that participants anticipated the lamp 
(implausible location) in the context of a concurrent scene, but not in 
the context of a blank screen.  
 
Cat/penguin – plausible vs. implausible 
During ‘quickly feed’ there was no difference in anticipatory looks to 
the cat in the plausible condition and looks to the penguin in the 
implausible condition (t1 (31) < 1) (t2 (15) < 1). Similarly, at the end 
of the second sentence during ‘the cat/penguin’ there was no 
difference in looks to the cat in the plausible condition and the 
penguin in the implausible condition (t1 (31) < 1) (t2 (15) < 1). 
However, during the first 500 milliseconds of the picture preview12 
there were more looks to the penguin than the cat (t1 (31) = 2.881, p 
< .01), although the effect was not statistically significant in the by-
items analysis (t2 (15) = 1.686, p > .05). Similarly, there were more 
fixations on the region of the penguin than the cat (t1 (31) = 2.417, p 
< .05), but again the effect was not statistically significant in the by-
items analysis (t2 (15) = 1.086, p > .05) (see figure 3.7.). As in 
experiment 3 there was no difference in first fixation duration and 
                                                
12	  The visual scene was presented for 1000ms and then removed before 
the onset of spoken language. 	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gaze duration to these regions.  
 
Time table  
(impl.) 
table  
(pl.) 
oven  
(impl.) 
oven  
(pl.) 
penguin 
(impl.) 
cat  
(pl.) 
quickly feed 22 19 8 6 7 9 
the cat/penguin 16 12 6 4 13 10 
 
Table 3.2. Percentage of trials with looks to the table, oven (distractor), penguin 
and cat during “quickly feed the cat/penguin”. Percentages calculated from the total 
number of trials.  
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.7. Percentage of trials with saccades to the cat and the penguin. as well as 
percentage of trials with fixations on the cat and the penguin during the first 500ms 
of the picture preview.  
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Fig 3.8. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the table and the oven (distractor). The 
percentages show
 the proportion of trials on w
hich participants fixated on each region of interest 
during ‘the w
om
an w
ill put the cat/penguin onto the table. Then, she w
ill quickly feed the 
cat/penguin’. The fixations w
ere calculated every 25 m
s sequentially from
 the synchronisation 
point.     
 
 
Percentage of fixations 
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3.3.3. Discussion 
In experiment 3 where we removed the visual scene before the onset 
of spoken language we found that plausibility influenced anticipatory 
eye movements to the event-specific location of the target item, but 
not eye movements during the final reference to ‘the cat/penguin’. In 
other words, participants anticipated the location of the table when 
the cat (plausible item) was said to have been moved there, but not 
when the penguin (implausible item) was said to have been moved 
there. However, when the cat/penguin was directly referred to at the 
end of the second sentence there was no difference in looks to the 
region of the table. In experiment 4 the visual scene remained 
onscreen throughout the spoken narrative. Here we found no more 
anticipatory looks to the table when the cat was said to have been 
moved there, than when the penguin was said to have been moved 
there. Similarly, there was no difference in looks to the table during 
the final reference to ‘the cat/penguin’.   
     A previous study by Loftus and Mackworth (1978) found that 
participants fixated more frequently on contextually implausible 
objects (e.g. an octopus in a farmyard scene) compared to 
contextually plausible objects (e.g. a tractor in a farmyard scene). 
The study further showed that first fixations to the implausible objects 
were longer than first fixations to the plausible objects. Loftus and 
Mackworth explained these findings, suggesting that people are 
more attentive to implausible items since these tend to be more 
informative when later having to discriminate between similar visual 
scenes. The current experiment manipulated contextual similarity in a 
similar fashion, but in this experiment participants were not required 
to perform any discrimination tasks – they were simply told to look at 
the visual scenes and listen to the spoken sentences. In contrast to 
the findings by Loftus and Mackworth we found no difference in first 
fixation duration to the contextually implausible and plausible items. 
However, during the first 500 milliseconds of the picture preview 
(before the onset of spoken language) we found a higher proportion 
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of saccades and fixations to the implausible items, suggesting that 
the contextually implausible items did initially attract more attention 
than the plausible items, even if only for a brief period of time. While 
Loftus and Mackworth interpreted participants’ increased attention to 
implausible objects as a consequence of such objects being more 
informative for later discrimination, the current study was interested 
in the extent to which an increased salience of implausible items 
might make these items more accessible when later referred to. For 
example, if the implausible items attracted more attention than the 
plausible items (before any references were made to these items), 
we might expect this greater level of attention to make the 
implausible items more accessible, consequently leading to a higher 
proportion of looks when anticipated, or referred to at the end of the 
narrative. However, our data does not indicate that this is the case – 
while we did see more saccades and fixations to the implausible 
items during the first 500 milliseconds of the picture preview there 
were no more looks to these items when referred to later in the 
narrative (during ‘quickly feed the cat/penguin’). This suggests that a 
continuous saliency advantage of the contextually implausible items 
did not make these items more accessible when leaving the visual 
scene onscreen during the spoken narrative.  
     The current experiment show a similar pattern of eye movements 
to that observed in experiment 2 (where we similarly left the visual 
scene onscreen during spoken language). While experiment 2 
showed as many looks to the implausible locations (e.g. lamp) as to 
the plausible locations (e.g. table), the data from the current 
experiment showed that participants looked as much to the location 
of the implausible items as they looked to the location of the plausible 
items. Together these findings suggest that the effect of plausibility 
observed in experiments 1 and 3 (where we removed the visual 
scene before the onset of language) is not specifically related to 
difficulties with processing references to either implausible locations, 
or implausible items, but rather modulated somehow by the 
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absence/presence of the visual context. 
 
3.3.4. Summary & questions 
The findings from experiment 3, where we removed the visual scene 
before the onset of spoken language, showed that after having heard 
‘the woman will move the cat/penguin onto the table’ participants 
looked to the location of the table during ‘quickly feed’ when they 
anticipated the cat (contextually plausible), but not when they 
anticipated the penguin (contextually implausible). During the final 
reference to ‘the cat/penguin’ participants looked to the location of 
the table regardless of whether the cat, or the penguin had been 
moved there. In experiment 4 where the visual scene remained 
onscreen during the spoken narrative we found that participants 
looked to the table both when they anticipated the cat and when they 
anticipated the penguin. As in experiments 3, during the final 
reference to ‘the cat/penguin’ there were as many looks to the table 
irrespective of whether the cat or the penguin was said to have been 
moved there.  
     The findings from experiment 3 and 4 show a similar pattern of 
eye movements to experiments 1 and 2, where an identical target 
item was moved to either a plausible or an implausible location. In 
these experiments items were described as being moved to either a 
plausible or an implausible location (e.g. ‘the woman will move the 
glass onto the table/lamp. Then, she will pick up the bottle and pour 
the wine carefully into the glass.’). The data showed that in the 
context of a blank screen (experiment 1) participants anticipated the 
location of the table, but not the lamp. However, in the context of a 
concurrent visual scene (experiment 2) participants anticipated both 
the table and the lamp as the upcoming location for pouring the wine 
into. There was no influence of plausibility during the final reference 
to the glass in either experiment 1 or 2. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that the influence of plausibility observed in 
experiment 1 is not exclusively related to plausibility of location (or 
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any difference in saliency between the plausible and implausible 
locations), but may be extended to the contextual plausibility of the 
referent itself.  
     The data from experiments 3 and 4 further indicate that while an 
early visual introduction of the implausible items might have given 
participants more time to prepare for the implausible nature of 
upcoming events, this ‘extra time’ did not make the implausible items 
more accessible, or in other words, easier to anticipate when later 
referred to in the context of a blank screen. Likewise, the higher 
proportion of ‘initial’ eye movements to the more salient implausible 
items did not result in a higher proportion of looks to either the items 
themselves, or the described locations of these items. However, it is 
nonetheless important to keep in mind that any differences in eye 
movements only appeared during the first 500 milliseconds of the 
picture preview, whereby it is possible that any advantage of saliency 
for the implausible items might have been too brief to be able to exert 
any influence on later eye movements.  
     Why do we see this difference in anticipatory looks depending on 
the presence/absence of a visual scene? In the previous chapter we 
proposed an explanation based on the differences in constraints 
afforded by a blank or concurrent visual scene and we will return to 
this account later in the thesis. In the following chapter we explore a 
different theory based on the notion that in the context of a blank 
screen the proportion of previous looks toward a specific location 
matters. For example, in experiment 1 there were always more (and 
earlier) looks to the region of the table than the region of the lamp 
when first mentioned (‘the woman will move the glass onto the 
table/lamp’), simply because of the plausibility (and anticipation) of 
this location. In other words, when hearing ‘the woman will move the 
glass onto the…’ the most likely place to put the glass (within the 
visual scene) is the table and this is why participants begin to look to 
the region of the table even before they hear the spoken location of 
the glass. It is possible that this higher proportion of early looks to the 
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region of the table could have subsequently made this more 
accessible than the location of the lamp (i.e. during the anticipatory 
region in ‘then, she will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully 
into the glass’). We explore this theory in the following chapter by 
manipulating the proportion of looks to the region of the table and the 
lamp when these first are mentioned in the narrative.      
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CHAPTER 4  
 
MANIPULATING INITIAL EYE MOVEMENTS 
 
In the previous experiments we explored how plausibility can 
influence the accessibility of objects within event-representations and 
further how this might be modulated by the absence or presence of a 
visual context. Our findings showed that plausibility did not influence 
looks to the described location of an object once this object was 
directly referred to. However, participants made few anticipatory eye 
movements to locations when these were either implausible (e.g. a 
glass on a lamp), or when a contextually implausible item was 
described as being in this location (e.g. a penguin on a kitchen 
worktop). Interestingly, this pattern of eye movements only occurred 
in the context of a blank screen – when the visual scene remained 
onscreen participants anticipated these locations regardless of 
plausibility.  
     In experiment 5 we investigated whether the proportion of 
previous eye movements to specific locations might explain these 
findings. Going back to the data from experiment 1 we found that 
there were always more (and earlier) looks to the regions of the 
plausible locations compared to the implausible locations when these 
were first mentioned. For example, when hearing ‘the woman will 
move the glass onto the table/lamp’ participants looked more to the 
previous region of the table than the lamp because world knowledge 
informed them that this was the most likely location to put a glass. 
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This likelihood further allowed participants to anticipate the table, 
during ‘move the glass’, as the upcoming location for the glass even 
before they heard where the glass was moved. As such, their 
expectations turned out to be correct when the glass was described 
as being moved to the table, but not when the glass was described 
as being moved onto the lamp. In this case, participants needed to 
hear that the glass would be moved onto the lamp in order to redirect 
their eye movements from the region of the table to the region of the 
lamp. This resulted in a slower increase in looks to the region of the 
lamp, compared to the region of the table, as well an overall smaller 
proportion of looks by the time a new referring expression (in this 
case ‘the bottle’) directed eye movements to a different location13 
(see figure 4.1.). Taking this into account it is possible that the higher 
proportion of looks to the region of the table could have made the 
location of the table more accessible later in the sentence, resulting 
in more anticipatory looks to that location (during ‘then, she will pick 
up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass’)14. In 
experiment 5 we attempted to manipulate (and equalise) the 
proportion of looks to the region of the table and the lamp when 
these locations were first mentioned at the beginning of the narrative.  
 
 
                                                
13	  In the by-subjects analysis there were	  more looks to the region of the 
table than the region of the lamp (t1 (47) = 2.324, p < .05) between the 
offset of the first mention of ‘the glass’ and the onset of ‘pour’. However, 
this difference was not statistically significant in the by-items analysis (t2 
(15) < 1). 
14	  We performed a contingency analysis of the data from experiment 1 in 
order to separate the data according to whether the region of the table/lamp 
had been fixated prior to the onset of the second sentence. The results did 
not indicate that participants who looked to the region of the table/lamp 
when first mentioned were more likely to look to these locations later in the 
narrative during “the wine carefully into the glass”. However, as the 
proportion of eye movements to these regions was quite low any 
relationship between early and later looks might have been difficult to 
establish using this type of analysis.    
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Fig 4.1. P
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ill put the glass onto the table. 
Then, she w
ill pick up the bottle, and pour the w
ine carefully into the glass. The fixations w
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calculated every 25 m
s sequentially from
 the synchronisation point.     
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4.1. Accessibility and spatial memory  
A number of findings suggest that we associate spoken information 
with certain locations on the screen and then use these associations 
as spatial cues during recall (e.g. Bourlon, Oliviero, Wattiez, Pouget 
& Bartolomeo, 2011; Brandt & Stark, 1997; Johansson, Holsanova & 
Holmqvist, 2005; Laeng & Theodorescu, 2002; Spivey & Geng, 
2001). As mentioned earlier (chapter 2) Richardson and Spivey 
(2000), showed participants a sequence of visual scenes that were 
divided into four equally sized quadrants. Each scene depicted a 
different face in a different quadrant and each face would deliver a 
fact of general knowledge (e.g. “the Pyrenees is a mountain range 
separating France and Spain”) whereafter it would disappear from 
the screen. Next, participants heard a second statement, which was 
related to one of the four previously provided facts (e.g. “the 
Pyrenees is a mountain range”) and were required to say if the 
statement was either true or false. The findings showed that when 
participants were formulating their answers, they were more likely to 
look at the quadrant that had previously contained the person who 
delivered the fact in question. Interestingly, this occurred even 
though the spatial information was irrelevant to the task, or in other 
words even though the blank region of the screen did not provide any 
visual information that would be able to directly help participants 
answer the questions correctly. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
relevant for the present study, Richardson and Spivey did not find a 
relationship between participants’ proportion of looks to the relevant 
region of the screen and the rate of accurate answers, which 
suggests that eye movements to the region associated with certain 
information did not facilitate participants’ memory of the previous 
information.  
     A subsequent study that we previously discussed in chapter 2 is 
by Hoover and Richardson (2008) who similarly found no correlation 
between memory for linguistic information and eye movements to the 
associated locations on the screen. In this experiment participants 
 	  
114	  
watched animals burrowing underground and then emerging from a 
molehill. For example, in one condition a rabbit would first emerge in 
one location during which the participants would hear a piece of 
information, for example about Cleopatra. The rabbit would then 
descend the molehill and a moment later an identical rabbit would 
emerge from a different location (this time no information was given) 
and descend shortly afterwards. Participants were then asked a 
(yes/no) question about the previous information. The second 
condition was similar to the first, except this time the rabbit would 
descend the molehill whereafter burrowing would begin in a different 
off-screen location. This presentation sequence suggested that the 
rabbit associated with the provided information was different from the 
second rabbit to emerge. In contrast, the on-screen burrowing in the 
first condition connected the appearances of the rabbit, suggesting 
that the second rabbit to emerge was the same as the first. When 
answering the questions participants looked at both locations when 
the rabbit appeared to be the same. However, when there appeared 
to be two separate rabbits, participants only looked to the first 
location. As in the previous study by Richardson and Spivey (2000) 
participants associated the spoken information with certain locations 
on the screen and used this as a spatial cue when later recalling the 
information. When what appeared to be the same rabbit emerged in 
two different locations, participants kept track of these locations and 
relied on (and looked to) both locations when answering questions. In 
contrast, when what appeared to be two different rabbits emerged in 
two locations participants only relied on the location that had been 
associated with the spoken information. In this case, participants 
were able to keep track of each individual rabbit as it moved around 
the screen and as such constrain the spatial cues to those 
exclusively associated with the spoken information. However, like in 
the previous experiment by Richardson and Spivey (2000) there was 
no relationship between eye movements to the locations of the rabbit 
associated with the spoken information and the proportion of 
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accurately answered questions. This suggests that while participants 
might have used the locations of the rabbit as spatial cues during 
recall, looks to these locations did not enhance performance when 
having to recall information associated with these locations.  
     On the other hand, Laeng and Theodorescu (2002) conducted a 
slightly different experiment exploring the function of eye movements 
during imagery and showed a correlation between eye movements 
during imagery and memory of visual information. In the first 
(perceptual) part of the experiment participants were shown an 
image displaying a tropical fish in one of the four corners of the 
screen and told to try and remember the image. In the second 
(imagery) part participants were asked to imagine, or construct an 
internal image of the previous display whilst keeping their eyes open. 
When participants indicated that they had done so they were asked a 
question concerning a property or physical attribute of the fish (e.g. 
whether the tail was yellow). Critically, participants in one condition 
were free to move their eyes during both the perceptual and the 
imagery part of the experiment. Participants in the second condition 
were free to move their eyes during the perceptual phase, but not 
during the imagery phase. In contrast, participants in the third 
condition were required to fixate on the center of the screen during 
the perception phase, but were free to move their eyes during the 
imagery phase. Findings showed that participants’ scan patterns, or 
in other words, sequence of eye movements during the perceptual 
phase correlated with the eye movements made during the imagery 
phase. In short, if participants had looked at the fish during the 
perceptual phase, they also looked to the previous location of the fish 
during the imagery phase. Similarly, participants who had looked at 
the center of the screen during the perceptual phase, continued to 
look at the center of the screen during the imagery phase and this 
occurred even when no constraints had been imposed on eye 
movements during the imagery phase. Furthermore, data from the 
memory test showed that participants who were free to move their 
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eyes during both the perception and imagery phase responded more 
accurately than participants who were free to move their eyes during 
the perception phase, but restricted to look at the center of the 
screen during the imagery phase. Laeng and Theodorescu proposed 
that eye movements to the previous location of the fish served to 
enhance participants’ mental image of the fish and that this lead to a 
higher proportion of accurate answers when participants were 
subsequently required to recall the physical properties of the fish. 
These findings indicate that (during imagery) the proportion and 
specific location of eye movements in the context of a blank screen 
might serve a functional role, specifically in terms of assisting the 
encoding of information for later recall.       
     Going back to experiment 1, the findings showed that in the 
context of a blank screen participants only anticipated the location of 
the glass if this was plausible – if the glass had been moved to the 
lamp there were few anticipatory looks to this location. This 
difference in eye movements suggests that the implausible location is 
a less viable candidate than the plausible location when it comes to 
guessing, or anticipating where the wine will be poured. In contrast, 
plausibility did not influence looks to the described location of an 
object, once this object was directly referred to. In other words, 
during the final reference to ‘the glass’ there were as many looks to 
the table as there were to the lamp, suggesting that participants had 
no problem retrieving the implausible location once the glass was 
directly referred to. While these findings seems to indicate that the 
plausibility effect is not directly related to problems with retrieving the 
implausible locations, it doesn’t rule out the notion that fewer 
previous eye movements to the lamp could have made participants’ 
internal representation of the lamp less accessible, consequently 
leading to a delay in anticipatory looks to this region. This notion 
relates to the findings by Laeng and Theodorescu (2002) (referred to 
above) suggesting that a higher proportion of previous looks to the 
region of the table may have served to enhance participants’ 
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representation of the table, thereby making it a more prominent and 
viable candidate when having to anticipate where the wine will be 
poured.  
 
4.2. EXPERIMENT 5   
In the following experiment we explored whether a higher proportion 
of looks to the plausible locations could have made these locations 
more accessible and therefore easier to anticipate when later 
referred to. In order to manipulate the proportion of early looks to the 
table and lamp we enhanced the stimuli to include a preliminary 
sentence, which aimed to attract an equal number of looks to the 
table and lamp when first mentioned. For example, participants 
would either hear, at the start of each vignette, “ the woman will wipe 
the table” (condition 1), or “the woman will dust the lamp” (condition 
2). In both cases the vignettes then continued as in Experiments 1 
and 2, with the woman moving the glass to the table/lamp and 
subsequently pouring the wine into the glass. Since wiping the table 
and dusting the lamp are both plausible we would expect an equal 
proportion of looks to the table and the lamp during this early part of 
the narrative. In a third condition the preliminary sentence referred to 
an otherwise unnamed distractor (e.g. “the woman will look at the 
books”). Apart from the preliminary sentence this condition was 
identical to condition 2. As such, condition 3 provided us with a 
‘baseline’ proportion of looks to the lamp, thereby allowing us to 
compare ‘later’ looks to the lamp when it had either been referred at 
the beginning of the narrative, or not. If the proportion of ‘initial’ eye 
movements to a specific location is related to the proportion of later 
(anticipatory) looks to this location we would expect more anticipatory 
looks to the region of the lamp after initially hearing “ the woman will 
dust the lamp” than after hearing “the woman will look at the books”. 
The intention, then, is to use the wiping/dusting actions to equalize 
the proportion of initial eye movements to the table and to the lamp, 
with as many looks to the region of the lamp after hearing “the 
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woman will dust the lamp”, as looks to the region of the table after 
hearing “the woman will wipe the table”.  
 
4.2.1. Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £3. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli  
Twenty-four experimental scenes (the same used in experiments 1 
and 2) were matched with three conditions: 
 
1. The woman will wipe the table. Then, she will put the glass 
onto the table, pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully 
into the glass.  
 
(Plausible – table) 
 
2. The women will dust the lamp. Then, she will put the glass 
onto the lamp, pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully 
into the glass. 
 
(Implausible – lamp) 
 
3. The women will look at the books. Then, she will put the glass 
onto the lamp, pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully 
into the glass. 
 
(Implausible – books) 
 
In all three conditions the first sentence always described the agent 
performing a plausible action related to one of the objects within the 
scene: In condition 1 the action referred to the plausible location (e.g. 
table), whereas in condition 2 the action referred to the subsequently 
implausible location (e.g. lamp).  
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By inserting these references we hoped to increase the proportion of 
initial looks to the implausible locations, making them equal to the 
proportion of initial looks to the plausible locations.15 In condition 3 
the action referred to a distractor item (e.g. the books), which were 
not otherwise referred to. This provided us with a ‘baseline’ 
proportion of later looks to the implausible locations allowing us to 
compare looks to the e.g. the lamp when this had either been 
referred to at the beginning of the sentence, or not. In addition to the 
24 experimental scenes, 24 sentence-picture pairs were taken from 
the set of fillers previously used in experiments 1 and 2.  
 
Procedure 
The procedure for the experiment was the same as in the previous 
blank screen experiments. The visual images were presented for five 
seconds and then replaced by a grey screen. The onset of the audio 
occurred one second after the scene had been removed and the 
trials finished 14 seconds after the audio onset. As such, each trial 
lasted a total of 20 seconds. The total duration of the experiment was 
approximately 45 minutes. The experiment was run on an Eyelink II 
head-mounted eye-tracker, which sampled at 250 Hz from the right 
eye.   
 
Analysis 
We used the same four regions of interest as in experiment 1. To 
begin with, we compared the proportion of saccades to the region of 
the table in the plausible condition with the proportion of saccades to 
the region of the lamp in the implausible conditions. Secondly, we 
compared the proportion of saccades to the region of the lamp after 
participants had initially heard either ‘the woman will dust the lamp’, 
                                                
15	  In experiment 1 there were always more (and earlier) looks to the regions 
of the plausible locations, compared to the implausible locations when 
these were first mentioned. For example, participants looked to the 
previous region of the table earlier than the region of the lamp because the 
table was the most likely location to put a glass.  
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or ‘the woman will look at the books’. These comparisons allowed us 
to explore whether a similar proportion of ‘initial’ eye movements to 
the implausible and plausible locations made the implausible regions 
more accessible when later anticipated and referred to. Finally, we 
performed a contingency analysis in order to separate the data 
according to whether the plausible and implausible regions had been 
fixated prior to their second mention. In this analysis we compared 
the proportion of saccades (which were initiated after the onset of 
‘pour the wine carefully into the glass’) to the region of the 
table/lamp/books depending on whether participants had either 
initially looked to these locations, or not. These comparisons allowed 
us to explore the extent to which the proportion of early looks to the 
region of the table and the lamp are related to the later proportion of 
looks to those regions.  
 
4.2.2. Results  
Initial eye movements 
Between the first mention of ‘the table/lamp’ and the onset of ‘the 
glass’ (e.g. the woman will wipe the table. Then, she will put the 
glass onto the table…) there was a similar increase in looks to both 
the region of the table in the plausible condition and the region of the 
lamp in the implausible condition (see figure 4.2.), whereby the 
manipulation of participants’ ‘initial’ eye movements lead to an equal 
proportion of early looks to these locations (t1 (47) = -1.037, p > .05) 
(t2 (23) < 1). In contrast, participants looked more to the region of the 
lamp after hearing ‘the woman will dust the lamp’ than after hearing 
‘the woman will look at the books’ (t1 (47) = -5.746, p < .001) (t2 (23) 
= 7.201, p < .001). 
     It is further worth noting that during this region there were more 
looks to the previous region of the table than the region of the books 
(distractor) in the plausible condition, where participants heard ‘the 
woman will wipe the table’ (t1 (47) = 5.934, p < .001) (t2 (23) = 6.488, 
p < .001). Similarly, there were more looks to the previous region of 
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the lamp than the region of the books in the implausible condition, 
where participants heard ‘the woman will dust the lamp’ (t1 (47) = 
4.277, p < .001) (t2 (23) = 5.275, p < .001). In contrast, when 
participants heard ‘the woman will look at the books’ there were more 
looks to the region of the books, than there were looks to the region 
of the lamp (t1 (47) = -6.575, p < .001) (t2 (23) = -5.013, p < .001).  
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Fig 4.2. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the previous region of the table and the lam
p in 
the plausible and im
plausible conditions, as w
ell as the books (distractor) in the plausible 
condition. The percentages show
 the proportion of trials on w
hich participants fixated on each 
region of interest during ‘the w
om
an w
ill put the glass onto the table. Then, she w
ill pick up the 
bottle, and pour the w
ine carefully into the glass. The fixations w
ere calculated every 25 m
s 
sequentially from
 the synchronisation point.     
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Plausible – table vs. implausible – lamp 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were more anticipatory looks to 
the region of the table in the plausible condition (the woman will wipe 
the table) than there were looks to the region of the lamp in the 
implausible condition (the woman will dust the lamp), however, this 
difference was not statistically significant (t1 (47) = -1.325, p > .05) 
(t2 (23) = 1.756, p > .05). During ‘the glass’ there were no more looks 
to the region of the table in the plausible condition than there were 
looks to the region of the lamp in the implausible condition (t1 (47) < 
1) (t2 (23) < 1) (see figure 4.3. and table 4.1.). 
     During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were more looks to the 
previous region of the table than the region of the books (distractor) 
in the plausible condition, where participants heard ‘the woman will 
wipe the table’ (t1 (47) = 2.810, p < .01) (t2 (23) = 4.045, p < .01). In 
the implausible condition, where participants heard ‘the woman will 
dust the lamp’ there were also more looks to the previous region of 
the lamp than the region of the books (t1 (47) = 2.144, p < .05) (t2 
(23) = 2.912, p < .01). In contrast, when participants initially heard 
‘the woman will look at the books’ there were no more anticipatory 
looks to the region of the lamp, than there were looks to the region of 
the books (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) < 1). During the final reference to ‘the 
glass’, there were more looks to the region of the table than the 
books in the plausible condition (t1 (47) = 2.810, p < .01) (t2 (23) = 
2.828, p < .05) and similarly more looks to the region of the lamp 
than the books in the implausible condition (t1 (47) = 2.144, p < .05) 
(t2 (23) = 2.731, p < .05). In contrast, when participants initially heard 
‘the woman will look at the books’ there were no more looks to the 
region of the lamp, than there were looks to the region of the books 
(t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) < 1). 
 
Lamp – implausible (lamp) vs. implausible (books)  
During ‘the wine carefully into’ participants looked no more to the 
region of the lamp after initially hearing ‘the woman will dust the 
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lamp’, than after initially hearing ‘the woman will look at the books’, 
(t1 (47) = 1.095, p > .05) (t2 (23) = 1.565, p > .05). Similarly, during 
‘the glass’ there was no difference in looks to the region of the lamp 
between the two conditions (t1 (47) = 1.618, p > .05), although this 
difference was marginally significant in the by-items analysis (t2 (23) 
= 1.949, p > .06) (see figure 4.3. and table 4.1.). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Looks to the previous location of the lamp (implausible location) and 
the table (plausible location) during “the wine carefully into the glass”. 
 
 
 
Time table  
(pl. – table) 
lamp  
(impl. – lamp) 
lamp  
(impl. – books) 
the wine carefully into 14 11 8 
the glass 7 8 5 
 
Table 4.1. Percentage of trials with looks to the previous location of the lamp and 
the table during “the wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages are calculated from 
the total number of trials.  
 
This data above show that by adding a preliminary sentence to the 
narratives we were able to equalise the proportion of ‘initial’ looks to 
the plausible (e.g. table) and implausible (e.g. lamp) locations. The 
findings also show that in contrast to experiment 1 there was no 
difference between the proportions of anticipatory looks to the region 
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of the table (plausible location) and looks to the region of the lamp 
(implausible location). However, there was also no difference in the 
proportion of anticipatory looks to the region of the lamp when 
participants had initially heard either ‘the woman will dust the lamp’, 
or ‘the woman will look at the books’. This data suggests that an 
early mention of the lamp (as opposed to an early mention of the 
books) did not make its location more accessible when anticipating 
the location of the glass later in the narrative. In order to separate the 
data according to whether the plausible and implausible regions had 
been fixated prior to their second mention we performed a 
contingency analysis.  
 
Contingency analysis 
The contingency analysis served to separate the data according to 
whether the region of the table and the lamp had been fixated prior to 
the second mention of those locations (e.g. between the first mention 
of ‘the table/lamp’ and the onset of ‘the glass’ – the woman will wipe 
the table. Then, she will put the glass onto the table, pick up the 
bottle and pour the wine carefully into the glass). This type of 
analysis allowed us to explore the extent to which the proportion of 
early looks to the region of the table and the lamp is related to the 
later proportion of looks to those regions. In order to avoid baseline 
differences due to participants lingering on the regions of the table 
and the lamp after their first mention we eliminated trials in which eye 
movements started before the anticipatory point in the narrative. In 
other words, we only included eye movements that were initiated 
after the onset of ‘pour the wine carefully into the glass’. As such, the 
proportion of later looks was calculated to start from zero at the onset 
of ‘pour’ (see figure 4.4.).   
 
Table – plausible (table)  
Participants who had looked to the previous location of the table 
during the early part of the narrative (e.g. between the first mention of 
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‘the table/lamp’ and the onset of ‘the glass’ – the woman will dust the 
lamp. Then, she will put the glass onto the lamp…) were no more 
likely to return to that location later in the narrative (e.g. at the offset 
of ‘into’ after hearing ‘Then, she will pick up the bottle, and pour the 
wine carefully into…the glass’) compared to participants who had not 
looked to the previous location of the table during the early part of the 
narrative (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) = 1.818, p > .05) (see figures 4.4., and 
4.5.). This suggests that participants’ early looks to the region of the 
table did not make this location any more accessible later on. 
 
Lamp – implausible (lamp) 
In contrast, participants who had looked to the previous location of 
the lamp during the early part of the narrative (e.g. between the first 
mention of ‘the table/lamp’ and the onset of ‘the glass’ – the woman 
will dust the lamp. Then, she will put the glass onto the lamp…) were 
more likely to return to that location later in the narrative (e.g. at the 
offset of ‘into’ after hearing ‘Then, she will pick up the bottle, and 
pour the wine carefully into…the glass’) compared to participants 
who had not looked to the previous location of the lamp during the 
early part of the narrative (t1 (47) = 2.225, p < .05) (t2 (23) = 3.039, p 
< .01) (see figures 4.4., and 4.5.). This suggests that participants’ 
early looks to the region of the lamp made that location more 
accessible later on.    
 
Table (plausible) vs. lamp (implausible) 
Participants who had initially looked to the previous location of the 
table (after hearing ‘the woman will wipe the table) did not return to 
that location later in the narrative (e.g. at the offset of ‘into’ after 
hearing ‘Then, she will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully 
into…the glass’) any more than participants who had initially looked 
to the previous location of the lamp (after hearing ‘the woman will 
dust the lamp’) returned to the region of the lamp (t1 (47) = 1.188, p 
> .05) (t2 (23) = 1.247, p > .05). In contrast, participants who had 
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initially looked to the previous region of the table returned more to 
that location, compared to participants who had not initially looked to 
the previous region of the lamp returned to the region of the lamp (t1 
(47) = 2.934, p < .01) (t2 (23) = 4.065, p < .001). However, 
participants who had initially looked to the previous region of the 
lamp did not return to that location any more than participants who 
had not initially looked to the previous region of the table returned to 
the region of the table (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) < 1) (see figures 4.4., and 
4.5.). This suggests that the region of the table remained as 
accessible as the region of the lamp, even when participants did not 
initially look to the table.  
 
Lamp – implausible (lamp) vs. implausible (books)  
Participants who initially heard ‘the woman will dust the lamp. Then 
she will put the glass onto the lamp, pick up the bottle and pour the 
wine carefully into the glass’ were no more likely to return to the 
location of the lamp later in the narrative (e.g. at the offset of ‘into’ 
after hearing ‘Then, she will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine 
carefully into…the glass’), compared to participants who initially 
heard ‘the woman will look at the books. Then she will put the glass 
onto the lamp, pick up the bottle and pour the wine carefully into the 
glass’ (t1 (47) = 1.578, p > .05) (t2 (23) = 1.966, p > .05). 
Furthermore, participants who had initially looked to the previous 
region of the lamp (after hearing ‘the woman will dust the lamp’) did 
not return to that location, any more than participants who had not 
initially looked to the previous region of the lamp (after hearing ‘the 
woman will look at the books’) (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) = 1.241, p > .05). 
Similarly, participants who had initially looked to the previous region 
of the lamp (after hearing ‘the woman will look at the books’) did not 
return to that location any more than participants who had not initially 
looked to the previous region of the lamp (after hearing ‘the woman 
will dust the lamp’) (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) < 1) (see figures 4.4., and 
4.5.). These findings indicate that the proportion of later looks to the 
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lamp is not driven solely by whether participants initially looked to 
that region, or not.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Fixations on the previous location of the lamp (implausible location) 
and the table (plausible location) when participants had either initially looked to 
these locations or not initially looked to these locations.  
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Fig 4.5. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the previous region of the table after initially 
hearing ‘w
ipe the table’, the lam
p after initially hearing ‘dust the lam
p’, and the lam
p after initially 
hearing ‘look at the books’. The percentages show
 the proportion of trials on w
hich participants 
fixated on each region of interest during ‘pour the w
ine carefully into the glass. The thick lines 
represent trials w
ere participants initially looked to the target region and the thin lines represent 
trials w
ere participants did not initially look to the target region. The fixations w
ere calculated every 
25 m
s sequentially from
 the synchronisation point.     
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4.2.3. Discussion  
In the current experiment we explored the extent to which a higher 
proportion of ‘initial’ eye movements to the region of the plausible 
locations (e.g. the table) might have made this location more 
accessible later in the sentence thereby resulting in a higher 
proportion of anticipatory looks to this region. The findings showed 
that by adding a preliminary sentence to the narratives we were able 
to equalise the proportion of ‘initial’ looks to the plausible (e.g. table) 
and implausible (e.g. lamp) locations. In order to separate the data 
according to whether the region of the table and the lamp had been 
fixated prior to the second mention of those locations we performed a 
contingency analysis.  
     The findings from this analysis showed that participants who 
initially looked to the previous location of the lamp during the early 
part of the narrative were more likely to anticipate that location later 
in the narrative, compared to participants who did not initially look to 
the previous region of the lamp. These data suggests that when 
participants initially looked to the region of the lamp, the proportion of 
‘early’ looks served to enhance the accessibility of this location, 
thereby making it easier to anticipate later in the narrative. However, 
it is interesting to note that this relationship only occurred between 
early and later looks to the region of the lamp. Going back to the 
beginning of this chapter we speculated that the higher proportion of 
looks to the region of the table in experiment 1 could have made that 
location more accessible and therefore easier to anticipate later in 
the narrative. If this were the case we would expect to find a 
relationship between the proportion of early and later looks to the 
region of the table, as well as to the lamp. However, the contingency 
analysis showed that participants who initially looked to the previous 
location of the table were just as likely to anticipate that location later 
in the narrative as participants who had not initially looked to the 
region of the table. This indicates that participants’ early looks to the 
region of the table did not make this location any more accessible 
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later on. The discrepancy between contingent looks to the region of 
the table and the lamp makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions 
as to whether the pattern of eye movements observed in experiment 
1 (where we found anticipatory looks to the region of the table, but 
not to the region of the lamp) can be explained by a higher proportion 
of ‘initial’ eye movements to the region of the table.   
      A further analysis of eye movements to the table in condition 1 
(where participants initially heard “the woman will wipe the table”) 
and condition 2 (“the woman will dust the lamp”) allowed us to 
compare whether the proportion of early looks to the region of the 
table and the lamp is related to the later proportion of looks to those 
regions. The results showed that participants who had initially looked 
to the previous location of the table (after hearing ‘the woman will 
wipe the table’) were no more likely to anticipate that location than 
participants who had initially looked to the previous location of the 
lamp (after hearing ‘the woman will dust the lamp’). This indicates 
that ‘initial’ looks to the region of the table/lamp made these regions 
equally accessible later in the narrative. Furthermore, participants 
who had initially looked to the previous region of the table returned 
more to that location, compared to cases where participants who had 
not initially looked to the previous region of the lamp returned to the 
region of the lamp. On the other hand, participants who had initially 
looked to the previous region of the lamp returned as much to that 
location as participants who had not initially looked to the previous 
region of the table returned to the region of the table. This suggests 
that the region of the table remained as accessible as the region of 
the lamp, even when participants did not initially look to the location 
of the table.  
     The findings also showed that participants who initially looked to 
the previous region of the lamp (after hearing ‘the woman will dust 
the lamp’) returned as much to that location as participants who had 
initially looked to the previous region of the books (after hearing ‘the 
woman will look at the books’). This indicates that the proportion of 
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later looks to the lamp is not driven solely by whether participants 
initially looked to that region, or not. Taken together the data 
suggests that the higher proportion of anticipatory eye movements to 
the plausible locations (observed in experiment 1) is not solely 
dependent on the higher proportion of early looks to these locations.  
     This relates to previous studies by Hoover and Richardson (2008) 
and Richardson and Spivey (2000) who found no relationship 
between participants’ proportion of eye movements to regions 
associated with specific information and their memory for linguistic 
information. In these experiments participants were more likely to 
look at the (blank) region of the screen associated with the 
information related to the current question, suggesting that they used 
the location as a spatial cue when required to recall information. 
However, in both experiments there was no correlation between 
participants’ proportion of looks to the relevant region of the screen 
and the rate of accurate answers. This indicates that a higher 
proportion of eye movements to the region associated with certain 
information did not serve to enhance participants’ performance when 
recalling information associated with these locations.  
     In contrast, findings by Laeng and Theodorescu (2002) showed 
that participants who were free to move their eyes while viewing an 
item (e.g. a fish) and thereafter imaging that item responded more 
accurately to subsequent questions about the physical properties of 
the item compared to another group of participants who were free to 
move their eyes when viewing the item, but not when imagining the 
item. These findings suggest that the proportion of eye movements in 
the context of a blank screen might serve a functional role, 
specifically in terms of assisting the encoding of information for later 
recall. However, it is important to keep in mind that participants in this 
experiment were required to recall information concerning the visual 
properties of the previous image. In contrast, Richardson and Spivey 
asked participants questions about previously encountered spoken 
information and this study showed no relationship between eye 
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movements and accuracy during recall. This inconsistency between 
the findings from these two studies may be related to the type of 
information that participants were asked to recall. In other words, it 
may be the case that while eye movements in the context of a blank 
screen are able to facilitate recall for visual information, there is no 
facilitation when having to recall spoken information. One way to 
explore this notion further could be to ask questions about both the 
visual properties of a previously seen image (e.g. was the bottle in 
the picture green?), as well as the spoken information associated 
with a previously seen image (e.g. did the woman pick up a bottle?). 
Such an experiment would allow us to directly compare the extent to 
which eye movements are able to enhance recall of both visual and 
linguistic information.  
 
4.2.4. Summary & questions 
In experiment 1 we explored how plausibility is able to influence the 
accessibility of objects within our representations of a described 
event. The findings from this experiment showed that in the context 
of a blank screen plausibility did not influence looks to the described 
location of an object once this object was directly referred to (e.g. ‘the 
woman will move the glass onto the table/lamp. Then, she will pick 
up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass’). However, 
during ‘the wine carefully into’ participants made few anticipatory eye 
movements to locations when these were implausible (e.g. the lamp) 
compared to when an item was described as having been moved to 
a plausible location (e.g. the table).  
     In the current experiment we investigated whether the higher 
proportion of ‘initial’ eye movements to the plausible locations could 
have made these locations more accessible when later having to 
anticipate where the wine would be poured. The findings showed that 
participants who looked to the previous location of the lamp during 
the early part of the narrative were more likely to anticipate that 
location later in the narrative, compared to participants who did not 
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initially look to the previous region of the lamp. However, participants 
who initially looked to the previous location of the table were no more 
likely to anticipate that location later in the narrative than participants 
who had not initially looked to the region of the table. This suggests 
that the proportion of initial looks only made the implausible regions 
(e.g. the lamp) more accessible later in the narrative, making it 
difficult to explain the pattern of eye movements observed in 
experiment 1 (where we found anticipatory looks to the region of the 
table, but not to the region of the lamp) in terms of enhanced 
accessibility due to the higher proportion of ‘initial’ eye movements to 
the region of the table. The data further indicated that participants 
who initially looked to the previous region of the lamp (after hearing 
‘the woman will dust the lamp’) returned as much to that location as 
participants who had initially looked to the previous region of the 
books (after hearing ‘the woman will look at the books’). Taken 
together the data suggests that the higher proportion of anticipatory 
eye movements to the plausible locations (observed in experiment 1) 
is not solely dependent on the higher proportion of early looks to 
these locations.  
     So how might we explain this difference and why plausibility only 
influences anticipatory eye movements in the context of a blank 
screen? As mentioned earlier, the effect of plausibility might be 
related to the way we process and anticipate upcoming discourse 
when language refers to something outside our visual environment, 
as opposed to when language refers to entities within our immediate 
visual proximity. When a visual context is available we automatically 
assume that participants in a described event will be drawn from 
within this context (e.g. Altmann & Mirkovic, 2009, Cooper, 1974; 
Tanenhaus et al., 1995). In terms of anticipation the concurrent visual 
context alongside language provides a stronger constraint, which in 
turn makes implausible object-representations more accessible and 
therefore easier to anticipate. However, in the context of a blank 
screen the anticipatory activation of appropriate representations is no 
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longer restricted by the visual context, but may now be influenced by 
real world knowledge. This experiential knowledge provides 
additional information concerning event-plausibility, which could lead 
us to consider a number of alternative options during anticipation.  
     In everyday language an item is rarely introduced without having 
some relevance to the upcoming topic of conversation. Likewise, if 
an object is introduced into a narrative we normally assume that this 
object is both informative and relevant to the current topic (e.g. Grice, 
1975) and as such, is likely to be referred to again. According to this 
assumption, if we were to linguistically introduce an object into the 
context of a previously seen visual scene we might similarly 
anticipate that this object will be referred to later in the narrative. As 
such, our expectations of an upcoming reference to this recently 
introduced object might provide a greater level of constraint, making 
it easier to anticipate the appropriate reference to an object (as well 
as its location). In the following experiment we compared looks to the 
described location of the glass having either removed it from the 
visual scene, thus introducing it purely through language, or having 
first introduced it within the visual scene. This manipulation allowed 
us to investigate the extent to which a purely linguistic representation 
is able to enhance anticipation towards the implausible locations in 
the context of a blank screen.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
INTRODUCING ‘THE GLASS’ PURELY THROUGH 
LANGUAGE 
 
The previous experiments showed that in the context of a blank 
screen we only anticipate locations when these are either plausible, 
or when the items moved to these locations are contextually 
plausible. However, in the context of a concurrent visual scene we 
anticipate upcoming locations regardless of plausibility. Furthermore, 
the findings from experiment 5 suggest that participants’ early looks 
to the plausible locations (in experiment 1) did not make these 
locations more accessible later in the narrative. Together these 
findings suggest that the absence/presence of a visual context 
provides a quantitative difference in how we process and anticipate 
implausible events. In this chapter we compared eye movements to 
the described locations of a target item (e.g. the glass), having either 
removed this item from the visual scene (thus introducing it purely 
through language), or first introducing the item within the context of 
the visual scene. This manipulation allowed us to investigate the 
extent to which a purely linguistic representation is able to enhance 
anticipation towards the implausible locations in the context of a 
blank screen.  
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5.1.     Assuming future reference  
In everyday language an item is rarely introduced without having 
some relevance to the upcoming topic of conversation. Likewise, if 
an object is introduced into a narrative we normally assume that this 
object is both informative and relevant to the current topic (e.g. Grice, 
1975) and as such, is likely to be referred to again. For example, 
when reading a sentence such as “Jenny was searching for her 
passport…” we expect the passport to be relevant to the upcoming 
discourse and therefore likely to be referred to again (e.g. “Jenny 
was searching for her passport…She remembered seeing it in her 
study a couple of days ago”). On the other hand, if the passport turns 
out not to be relevant to the upcoming discourse we would expect the 
sentence to be followed by some type of transitional cue indicating a 
shift in, for example topic, time or space (e.g. Zwaan et al., 1995a, 
1995b) (e.g. “Jenny was searching for her passport…Suddenly the 
phone rang so she went into the kitchen to find out who was ringing 
her”).  
     A study by Altmann (1999) further explored the circumstances 
under which we assume reference to previously mentioned entities 
and how this may be related to information derived from specific 
verbs. In this experiment participants read a series of scenarios such 
as the one below: 
 
A car was driving downhill when it suddenly veered out of 
control. In its path were some dustbins and a row of bollards. 
It injured ⁄ missed... 
 
The sentences were presented word-by-word and after each word 
participants were asked to indicate whether the sentence continued 
or stopped making sense. After the verb ‘injured’ participants’ reading 
times were longer than after the verb ‘missed’ and there were more 
indications that the sentence stopped making sense. However, when 
the scenario was slightly changed (as below) there were no 
differences between the two verbs.   
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A car was driving downhill when it suddenly veered out of 
control. In its path were some pigeons and a row of bollards. It 
injured ⁄ missed... 
 
 
These findings suggest that during the verb participants anticipated 
that the upcoming action (e.g. injured/missed) would refer to one of 
the entities previously introduced into the narrative (e.g. 
dustbins/pigeons). In the first scenario there is no antecedent that the 
verb ‘injured’ can refer to without violating selectional restrictions 
since both items are inanimate. As such, when reading the verb 
participants either indicated that the sentence stopped making sense, 
or they spent more time reading the verb. In the second scenario on 
the other hand, both an inanimate, as well as an animate antecedent 
had been introduced, allowing participants to plausibly assume that 
the verb ‘injured’ would refer back to the animate antecedent. This 
shows that when encountering a verb we evaluate it in terms of how 
it may plausibly refer to any previously introduced entities within the 
current scenario. The data further illustrates our tendency to 
anticipate that verb-based information refers to previously introduced 
entities even when this might not necessarily be the case, as 
demonstrated in the example below: 
 
A car was driving downhill when it suddenly veered out of control. 
In its path were some pigeons and a row of bollards. It injured 
several people who were standing nearby.   
 
 
In this example our assumption that the verb ‘injured’ will refer to a 
previously mentioned entity turns out to be wrong. This example 
shows that the verb doesn’t necessarily have to refer to any of the 
previously mentioned entities, so why do participants nonetheless 
indicate that the sentence stops making sense as soon as the verb 
cannot plausibly refer to any of the previously introduced entities? 
Altmann (1999) proposed that when encountering the verb ‘injured’ 
we automatically evaluate the extent to which it can plausibly refer to 
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any of the previously introduced entities. If a plausible entity has 
been mentioned we anticipate that the verb will refer to this entity. 
However, if it turns out that no plausible entities have been 
introduced, we cannot anticipate the referent and as such we either 
take longer to read the verb, or we judge that the sentence has 
stopped making sense.  
 
5.2. EXPERIMENT 6  
The study by Altmann (1999) illustrates how during anticipation we 
evaluate the extent to which the language we encounter is likely to 
refer to any previously mentioned entities with a narrative. It further 
showed that when a plausible entity has been introduced earlier in 
the narrative we tend to assume that subsequent language (or in this 
case verbs) is going to refer back to this entity. In the following 
experiment we explored the effect of plausibility when removing the 
target item (e.g. the glass) from the visual scene and introducing it 
purely through language. In other words, we compared looks to the 
described location of the glass in situations where we had either 
removed it completely from the visual scene, or when the glass was 
first presented within the visual scene and thereafter referred to by 
language. In condition 1 the target items (e.g. the glass) were always 
presented in the visual scene (see figure 5.1.). After the visual scene 
was removed these items were further referred to by spoken 
language (e.g. “the woman will put the glass onto the lamp. Then she 
will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass”). 
However, in condition 2 the target items (e.g. the glass) were absent 
from the visual scene and therefore introduced purely through 
language (see figure 5.2.). 
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       Figure 5.1. Example of one of the visual scenes used in condition 1. 
 
 
       
       Figure 5.2. Example of one of the visual scenes used in condition 2. 
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This manipulation allowed us to investigate the notion of competition 
(e.g. Altmann and Kamide, 200916), which might lead to participants’ 
memory of the visual instantiation of the glass (in condition 1 the 
glass is always depicted on the floor) to compete with their internal 
representation of the linguistically introduced glass (describing the 
glass as having been moved onto the lamp). In other words, in 
condition 1 participants’ visual memory of the glass being on the floor 
conflicts with their representation of the glass being on the lamp. This 
conflict might lead to a lower proportion of looks to the region of the 
lamp since participants’ memory of the visual location of the glass is 
forced to compete with the described location of the glass. In 
condition 2, on the other hand, the glass is never depicted. In this 
case there is only one (linguistic) representation of the glass and 
therefore no competition between a visual and described location of 
the glass. As such, the absence of the glass in the visual scene 
should serve to minimise any interference from the depicted location 
of the glass and this might increase sensitivity, thereby allowing more 
subtle differences to emerge.    
     Another issue worth considering is the extent to which either a 
purely linguistic object-representation, or a visual/linguistic object-
representation is able to enhance anticipation towards the 
implausible locations in the context of a blank screen. As mentioned 
earlier, if an object is introduced into a narrative we normally assume 
that this object is both informative and relevant to the current topic 
(e.g. Grice, 1975) and as such, is likely to be referred to again. 
Having previously introduced the glass in the visual scene (condition 
1) any subsequent references to ‘the glass’ are interpreted in this 
context. In contrast, when the glass is absent from the visual scene 
                                                
16 Altmann and Kamide (2009) showed that the salience of a concurrent 
visual scene (depicting the glass on the floor) lead to increased competition 
and therefore fewer looks to the described location of the glass (table), 
compared to the visually depicted location of the glass. In contrast, when 
the visual scene had been removed prior to the onset of spoken language 
competition decreased, now showing fewer looks to the (previous) visual 
location of the glass, compared to the described location of the glass.  
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(condition 2) it is introduced purely through language and therefore 
we assume that it must be relevant to the upcoming topic of 
conversation (why else introduce it into the narrative?). In other 
words, we might expect that there is a specific reason for why ‘a 
glass’ is suddenly being brought into a narrative, which otherwise 
corresponds perfectly to a prior visual context. This might lead 
participants to expect that the recently introduced glass will be 
referred to again, consequently making it more prominent and 
accessible when anticipating where the wine will be poured. As in the 
case of competition (see above) we would similarly expect to see a 
higher proportion of anticipatory eye movements to the described 
location of the glass when it has been introduced solely through 
language, compared to when it has first been introduced within the 
visual scene and then referred to by language.   
 
5.2.1. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £3. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli 
Twenty-four experimental scenes were matched with two conditions. 
In condition 1 we used the same experimental scenes used in 
experiment 1 (e.g. depicting the glass on the floor). In condition 2 the 
visual scenes were identical except now the target items (e.g. the 
glass) had been removed from the visual scenes. In both conditions 
the filler items were the same as the fillers used in experiment 1.  
 
1. The woman will put the glass onto the lamp. Then, she will 
pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
 
(Original implausible) 
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2. The woman will put a glass onto the lamp. Then, she will pick 
up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
 
          (No glass implausible) 
 
Procedure 
The procedure for this experiment was the same as in the previous 
blank screen experiments – the visual scenes were presented for five 
seconds and then replaced by a grey screen. The onset of the audio 
occurred one second after the scene had been removed and the 
trials finished 11 seconds after the audio onset. As such, each trial 
lasted a total of 17 seconds. The total duration of experiment was 
approximately 45 minutes. The experiment was run on an Eyelink II 
head-mounted eye-tracker, which sampled at 250 Hz from the right 
eye. 
 
Analysis 
In condition 1 we used the same regions of interest as in experiment 
1 (e.g. the region of the glass, table, lamp and books). In condition 2 
the regions of interest were the same, except for the region 
corresponding to the location of the glass. This region of interest was 
excluded since the target items (e.g. the glass) were never depicted 
in this condition. 
     To begin with, we compared the proportion of saccades to the 
region of the lamp (implausible location) when glass had either been 
depicted in the visual scene or not been depicted. This comparison 
allowed us to explore whether a purely linguistic introduction of the 
glass is able to enhance anticipation towards the implausible 
locations in the context of a blank screen. Secondly, we compared 
the proportion of saccades to the region of the lamp with the 
proportion of saccades to the region of the books (distractor). This 
provided information about whether the proportion of saccades to the 
described location of the glass was higher than the ‘baseline’ 
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proportion of saccades to an unnamed distractor item. 
 
5.2.2. Results 
Lamp – original implausible vs. no glass implausible 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there was no difference in anticipatory 
looks to the region of the lamp between the original implausible (e.g. 
the woman will put the glass onto the lamp…) and the no glass 
implausible (the woman will put a glass onto the lamp…) conditions 
(t1 (31) = -1.109, p > .05) (t2 (23) = -1.293, p > .05). Similarly, during 
‘the glass’ there was no difference in looks to the region of the lamp 
between conditions (t1 (31) = 1.305, p > .05) (t2 (23) = 1.596, p > 
.05) (see figures 5.3., 5.4., and table 5.1.).  
 
Lamp vs. distractor 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there was no difference in anticipatory 
looks to the region of the lamp and the region of the unnamed 
distractor item (in this case the books). This occurred both in the 
original implausible condition (t1 (31) = 1.441, p > .05) (t2 (23) = 
1.513, p > .05) and the no glass implausible condition (t1 (31) < 1) (t2 
(23) < 1). This suggests that participants did not anticipate the lamp 
any more than they anticipated the unnamed distractor and this 
occurred both when the glass was present or absent in the visual 
scene. Likewise, during ‘the glass’ there was no difference between 
looks to the region of the lamp and the distractor region in the original 
implausible condition (t1 (31) < 1) (t2 (23) < 1). This was also the 
case in the no glass implausible condition (t1 (31) = 1.274, p > .05) 
(t2 (23) = 1.901, p > .05).  
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Time lamp  
(glass) 
lamp  
(no glass) 
books  
(glass) 
books  
(no glass) 
the wine carefully into 9 6 5 7 
the glass 3 5 3 2 
 
Table 5.1. Percentage of trials with looks to the previous location of the lamp and 
books (distractor) during “the wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages calculated 
from the total number of trials. 
 
 
    
 
Fig 5.3. Looks toward the lamp and the books (distractor) during ‘the wine carefully 
into the glass’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
146	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.4. P
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ard the previous region of the lam
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5.2.3. Discussion 
In this experiment we explored the effects of plausibility when 
removing the target item (e.g. the glass) from the visual scene and 
introducing it purely through language. We compared looks to the 
lamp in one condition where we had either removed the glass 
completely from the visual scene, or in a second condition where the 
glass was first presented within the visual scene and thereafter 
referred to by language. This manipulation allowed us to investigate 
the extent to which either a purely linguistic representation of the 
glass, or a visual/linguistic representation of the glass would be able 
to enhance anticipation towards the implausible locations in the 
context of a blank screen.  
     The findings showed that during ‘the wine carefully into’ there 
were slightly more anticipatory eye movements to the region of the 
lamp in condition 1 (where the glass had previously been presented 
in the visual scene), compared to condition 2 (where the glass had 
been removed from the visual scene). However, this difference was 
not statistically significant. Similarly, there was no difference between 
conditions in looks to the region of the lamp during the final reference 
to the glass. These data suggests that a purely linguistic 
representation of ‘a glass’ did not enhance the accessibility and 
anticipation of its described location any more than a visual/linguistic 
representation of ‘the glass’. In other words, the linguistic introduction 
of ‘a glass’ did not to seem to emphasise the future relevance of this 
item enough to make it’s described location more accessible and 
therefore easier to anticipate.  
     The findings further suggest that looks to the region of the lamp 
were not influenced by different levels of competition, in terms of 
whether participants’ representation of the linguistically introduced 
glass (describing the glass as having been moved onto the lamp) 
had to compete with their memory of the visual instantiation of the 
glass (depicting the glass on the floor). In condition 1 participants’ 
visual memory of the glass being on the floor conflicted with their 
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representation of the glass having been moved to the lamp and we 
speculated that this conflict might have forced the two instantiations 
of the glass to compete, thereby resulting in a lower proportion of 
looks to the region of the lamp, compared to when participants only 
had one (linguistic) representation of the glass. Altmann and Kamide 
(2009) showed that the salience of a concurrent visual scene 
(depicting the glass on the floor) lead to increased competition and 
therefore fewer looks to the described location of the glass (table), 
compared to the visually depicted location of the glass. In contrast, 
when the visual scene had been removed prior to the onset of 
language the degree of competition decreased, resulting in fewer eye 
movements to the (previous) visual location of the glass, compared 
to the described location of the glass. So why did we not see any 
influence of competition in the current experiment? One reason could 
be that once the visual scene had been removed the salience of 
participants’ visual memory-representation of the glass declined to 
the extent that the prior instantiation of the glass was not prominent 
enough to compete with participants’ linguistic representation of the 
glass. A future version of the current experiment might investigate 
this notion further by measuring eye movements to the lamp in the 
context of a concurrent visual scene. In this case the stronger 
salience of a concurrent visual representation of the glass (as well as 
a competing linguistic representation of the glass) might lead to fewer 
looks to the lamp than a purely linguistic representation of the glass. 
     Finally, it is important that we highlight one potential problem with 
the data from the current experiment. When we compared looks to 
the region of the lamp (implausible location) and the region of the 
books (distractor) we found that during the critical part of the 
sentence (the wine carefully into the glass) there were no more looks 
to the region of the lamp than there were looks to the region of the 
books, and this was the case for both conditions. The distractor 
regions always corresponded to items that were not named in the 
narrative, thus providing us with a ‘baseline’ of the proportion of eye 
 	  
149	  
movements to any unnamed items. Since there were no more looks 
to the region of the lamp than the region of the distractor it is possible 
that participants’ looks to the region of the lamp were not derived 
from any previous mention of the/a glass being moved to this 
location, but rather occurred due to the same levels of chance that 
lead to a certain proportion of looks to an unnamed distractor region. 
Alternatively, it may be the case that the proportion of looks to the 
regions of the distractor did not differ from the proportion of looks to 
the region of the lamp because of the low likelihood of this location.  
     In the next experiment we attempted to control for this potential 
confound by comparing looks to plausible (e.g. table) and implausible 
(e.g. lamp) locations, having previously introduced the target item 
(e.g. the glass) solely through language. Whereas in the previous 
experiment the glass was either present, or absent in the visual 
scene, this experiment never depicted the glass in either of the 
conditions. For example, having removed the glass from the visual 
scene participants would hear either ‘the woman will put a glass onto 
the table. Then, she will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine 
carefully into the glass’ (plausible condition), or they would hear ‘the 
woman will put a glass onto the lamp. Then, she will pick up the 
bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass’ (implausible 
condition). Like in the previous experiment we speculate that a purely 
linguistic introduction of the glass will lead to a strong expectation of 
its future relevance, in which case we would expect anticipatory looks 
to both the plausible and implausible location of the glass. 
Furthermore, if looks to the region of the lamp in experiment 6 were 
not derived from language, but purely due to chance we would 
similarly expect to see no difference in looks to the region of the table 
and the region of the books (unnamed distractor).  
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5.3. EXPERIMENT 7 
5.3.1. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £3. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli  
Twenty-four experimental scenes were matched with two conditions. 
We used the same experimental scenes as in experiment 1, but this 
time we removed the target items (e.g. the glass) from the visual 
scenes for both the experimental trials (see figure 5.5), as well as the 
filler trials (see appendix 8 for an example of the filler items). 
 
1. The woman will put a glass onto the table. Then, she will pick 
up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
 
(Plausible moved) 
 
2. The woman will put a glass onto the lamp. Then, she will pick 
up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
           
          (Implausible moved) 
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       Figure 5.5. Example of one of the visual scenes used in conditions 1 and 2. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure for this experiment was the same as in the previous 
blank screen experiments. The scenes were presented for five 
seconds and then replaced by a grey screen. The onset of the audio 
occurred one second after the scene had been removed and the 
trials finished 11 seconds after the audio onset. As such, each trial 
lasted a total of 17 seconds. The total duration of the experiment was 
approximately 45 minutes. The experiment was run on an Eyelink II 
head-mounted eye-tracker, which sampled at 250 Hz from the right 
eye. 
 
Analysis 
We used the same regions of interest as in experiment 1 (e.g. the 
table, lamp and books) with the exception of the region 
corresponding to the previous location of the target item (e.g. the 
glass). First, we compared the proportion of saccades to the region 
of the table (plausible locations) and the region of the lamp 
(implausible locations). This allowed us to see if the plausibility of 
these locations had any influence on eye movements when the glass 
was not depicted in the visual scene, but introduced purely through 
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language. Secondly, we compared looks to the region of the 
table/lamp with looks to the region of the books (distractor). These 
comparisons provided information about whether the proportion of 
saccades to the plausible and implausible locations was higher than 
the ‘baseline’ proportion of looks to an unnamed distractor item. 
 
5.3.2. Results 
Table (no glass plausible) vs. lamp (no glass implausible) 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were more anticipatory looks 
toward the region of the table in the plausible condition (the woman 
will move a glass onto the table), than there were looks to the region 
of the lamp in the implausible condition (the woman will move a glass 
onto the lamp) (t1 (31) = -3.173, p < .01) (t2 (23) = -2.209, p < .05). 
However, during the final reference to the glass there were no more 
looks to the region of the table in the plausible condition, than there 
were looks to the region of the lamp in the implausible condition (t1 
(31) = -1.461, p > .05) (t2 (23) < 1) (see figures 5.6., 5.7., and table 
5.2.). This is similar to the pattern of eye movements previously 
observed in experiment 1.  
 
No glass implausible – lamp vs. distractor  
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were no more anticipatory looks 
to the region of the lamp than the region of the books (distractor) (t1 
(31) = 1.488, p > .05) (t2 (23) = -1.829, p > .05. During the final 
reference to the glass there were more looks to the region of the 
lamp than the region of the books (t1 (31) = 3.589, p < .01) (t2 (23) = 
-3.704, p < .01).  
 
No glass plausible – table vs. distractor  
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were more anticipatory looks to 
the region of the table than the region of the books (distractor) (t1 
(31) = 4.611, p < .001) (t2 (23) = -5.939, p < .001). This suggests that 
participants anticipated the table (plausible locations) more than the 
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unnamed distractor, but they did not anticipate the lamp (implausible 
locations) any more than they anticipated the distractor. During the 
final reference to the glass there were more looks to the region of the 
lamp than the region of the books (t1 (31) = 4.088, p < .001) (t2 (23) 
= -3.788, p < .01). 
 
Time lamp 
(impl.) 
table 
(pl.) 
books 
(impl.) 
books 
(pl.) 
the wine carefully into 13 21 9 5 
the glass 9 12 2 3 
 
Table 5.2. Percentage of trials with looks towards the previous location of the lamp, 
table and books (distractor) during “the wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages 
calculated from the total number of trials. 
 
 
   
 
 
Fig 5.6. Looks toward the lamp/table during ‘the wine carefully into the glass’. 
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5.3.3. Discussion  
In the current experiment we removed the target item (e.g. the glass) 
from the visual scene and introduced it purely through language (e.g. 
“the woman will put a glass onto the table/lamp…”). This allowed us 
to explore the extent to which a purely linguistic representation of the 
glass might be able to enhance anticipation towards implausible 
locations in the context of a blank screen. The results showed that 
participants anticipated the location of the glass when it was said to 
have been moved to a plausible location, but not when it was said to 
have been moved to an implausible location. However, when the 
glass was directly referred to at the end of the narrative participants 
looked to its described location regardless of plausibility.    
     This suggests that a purely linguistic representation of the glass 
did not lead to an increase in the proportion of anticipatory looks to 
the implausible locations. Rather, the findings were similar to the 
pattern of eye movements we observed in experiment 1 – in this 
experiment the target items (e.g. the glass) were always presented in 
the visual scene whereafter they were introduced by spoken 
language (e.g. “the woman will put the glass onto the table/lamp…”). 
While we cannot compare eye movements directly across these two 
experiments, the similarity of the observed patterns further indicates 
that a purely linguistic representation of the glass did not enhance 
participants’ anticipation of the implausible locations any more than a 
visual/linguistic representation of the glass. In other words, the 
linguistic introduction of ‘a glass’ did not appear to emphasise the 
future relevance of the glass (or increase its accessibility) any more 
than when that same glass had first been presented within the visual 
scene. Like in experiment 1, when ‘a glass’ was described as being 
moved to the lamp (implausible location) we found little evidence of 
anticipatory eye movements to the previous region of the lamp. In 
contrast, when ‘a glass’ was described as being moved to the table 
(plausible location), we found that participants anticipated and looked 
to this region. During the final reference to the glass participants 
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looked as much to the region of the lamp as they looked to the region 
of the table.  
     In experiment 6 we compared looks to implausible locations (e.g. 
the region of the lamp) in situations where we had either removed the 
target items (e.g. the glass) completely from the visual scene, or 
when the target items were first presented within the visual scene 
and thereafter referred to by language. When we compared looks to 
the region of the lamp and the region of the books (distractor) we 
found that during the critical part of the sentence (the wine carefully 
into the glass) there were no more looks to region of the lamp than 
there were looks to the unnamed books and this was the case for 
both conditions. As such, it is possible that the proportion of looks to 
the region of the lamp were not derived from any previous mention of 
the/a glass being moved to an implausible location, but rather 
occurred due to the same level of chance that lead to a certain 
proportion of looks to an unnamed distractor region. In the current 
experiment we attempted to control for this confound by comparing 
looks to plausible (e.g. table) and implausible (e.g. lamp) locations 
when the target items (e.g. the glass) were absent from the visual 
scene in both conditions. During ‘the wine carefully into’ we found no 
difference in the proportion of anticipatory looks to the region of the 
lamp (implausible locations) and looks to the region of the books 
(unnamed distractors). In contrast, there were more anticipatory 
looks to the region of the table (plausible locations) than the region of 
the books. During the final reference to the glass there were more 
looks to both the region of the table and the lamp, compared to the 
region of the books. This suggests that the proportion of looks to the 
plausible and implausible locations were not due to levels of chance, 
but rather derived from internal representations of the glass as 
described by spoken language. In other words, during ‘the wine 
carefully into’ participants looked more to the region of the table than 
the region of the books because they anticipated the table as the 
location where the wine would be poured. However, when the glass 
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was described as having been moved to the lamp, participants did 
not anticipate this location (because of its unlikelihood) and therefore 
looked no more to the region of the lamp than the region of the 
books.  
     To sum up, the pattern of eye movements observed in the current 
experiment was similar to that observed in experiment 1, showing 
that plausibility influenced anticipatory eye movements to the event-
specific location of the glass, but not eye movements during the final 
reference to the glass. How might we explain this pattern of eye 
movements? Going back to Altmann’s (1999) experiment, 
participants indicated that a sentence stopped making sense when 
the verb (e.g. injured) could not plausibly refer to any of the 
previously introduced (inanimate) entities, suggesting that as soon as 
encountering the verb, participants evaluated the extent to which it 
could plausibly refer to any of the previously introduced entities. If a 
plausible entity had been previously introduced participants 
anticipated that the verb would refer to this entity. However, if no 
plausible entity had been introduced, participants took longer to read 
the verb and were more likely to indicate that the sentence no longer 
made any sense. In the current experiment we found that after 
hearing the verb ‘pour’ participants anticipated the plausible location 
of the glass (table), but not the implausible location (lamp). It may be 
that when hearing ‘pour the wine carefully into…’ participants 
evaluated the extent to which ‘pour’ might refer to any of the 
previously introduce entities, correctly determining that the glass was 
the only entity that afforded ‘pouring into’. Therefore when the glass 
was described as having been moved to the table participants 
anticipated and looked to the previous location of the table. However, 
when the glass was described as having been moved to the lamp the 
unlikelihood of this location might have lead participants to no longer 
consider the glass a plausible referent and this might explain why it is 
we see anticipatory eye movements to the plausible locations, but 
not the implausible locations.  
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5.3.4. Summary & questions 
In experiment 6 we compared looks to the lamp in situations where 
the glass had either been removed from the visual scene (and 
therefore introduced solely through language), or when the glass was 
first presented within the visual scene and then referred to by 
language. This manipulation allowed us to investigate the extent to 
which a purely linguistic representation of the glass would be able to 
enhance anticipation towards implausible locations in the context of a 
blank screen. We found no difference in the proportion of looks to the 
region of the lamp, suggesting that a purely linguistic representation 
of ‘a glass’ did not enhance the accessibility and anticipation of the 
its described location any more than a visual/linguistic representation 
of ‘the glass’. However, since there was no difference in the 
proportion of eye movements to the region of the lamp and the region 
of an unnamed distractor item it is possible that looks to the region of 
the lamp during the critical part of the narrative were not related to 
spoken language, but rather occurred due to levels of chance.  
     In experiment 7 we attempted to control for this potential confound 
by comparing looks to the region of the table (plausible locations) 
with looks to the region of the lamp (implausible locations), after 
removing the glass from the visual scene in both conditions. The 
results showed a similar pattern of eye movements to experiment 1 
(where the glass was first presented in the visual scene and then 
referred to by spoken language). In both these experiments 
participants anticipated the location of the glass when it had been 
moved to a plausible location, but not when it had been moved to an 
implausible location. In contrast, there was no influence of plausibility 
during the final reference to the glass. Together these findings 
suggest that a purely linguistic representation of the glass did not 
increase the proportion of anticipatory eye movements to the 
implausible locations. The data further showed that during ‘the wine 
carefully into’ participants anticipated the table as the location where 
the wine would be poured, more than they anticipated the location of 
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the distractor. However, when the glass was said to have been 
moved to the lamp participants did not anticipate (and look to) this 
location any more than they anticipated the location of the distractor. 
During the final reference to the glass there were more looks to both 
the region of the table and the lamp, compared to the region of the 
distractor. These findings suggest that the proportion of looks to the 
event-specific location of the glass were derived from language-
mediated representations, rather than levels of chance.  
     Previous data by Altmann (1999) indicate that the difference in 
anticipatory eye movements may be related to the likelihood of the 
verb (e.g. pour) referring to one of the previously introduced entities. 
As such, it may be the case that when the glass is described as 
having been moved onto the table it presents a plausible referent for 
‘pouring the wine carefully into’. In contrast, when the glass is 
described as having been moved onto the lamp, the unlikelihood of 
this location makes it a much less plausible referent. This account 
might explain why participants anticipated the location of the table, 
but not the lamp. However, it doesn’t explain why plausibility only 
influenced eye movements in the context of a blank screen – recall 
that in experiment 2 where the visual scene remained onscreen, 
participants anticipated both the plausible and implausible locations. 
In the next chapter we outline a theory attempting to explain why 
plausibility only affects anticipatory eye movements in the context of 
a blank screen. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ANTICIPATION, EVENT-PLAUSIBILITY AND SCENE 
CONSTRAINTS 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 explored the extent to which plausibility of 
location is able to influence the accessibility of objects within event-
representations and further, how this may be modulated by the 
nature of the visual context (as present or absent). We found that in 
the context of a blank screen (experiment 1) participants only 
anticipated plausible locations. When items had been moved to 
implausible locations there was little or no evidence of anticipatory 
eye movements. However, in the context of a concurrent visual 
scene (experiment 2) participants anticipated both the plausible and 
implausible locations. In both experiments there was no influence of 
plausibility during the final reference to the target item.  
     Experiments 3 and 4 investigated whether the pattern of eye 
movements observed in experiments 1 and 2 could be generalised 
and extended to contextual plausibility. As opposed to moving 
objects to either plausible or implausible locations, we now moved 
contextually plausible (e.g. a cat in a kitchen) and implausible items 
(e.g. a penguin in a kitchen) to the same location. The findings were 
similar to the pattern of eye movements we observed in experiments 
1 and 2. In other words, plausibility only influenced anticipatory eye 
movements in the context of a blank screen (experiment 3). When 
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the visual scene remained onscreen (experiment 4) participants 
anticipated the described location, both when a contextually 
plausible, or implausible item was said to have been moved there. 
During the final reference to the target item there was no influence of 
plausibility in either of the experiments.  
     In experiment 5 we investigated the extent to which a higher 
proportion of initial eye movements to the plausible locations 
(observed in experiment 1) could have enhanced the accessibility of 
those locations during later anticipation. The findings showed that 
while the proportion of initial looks made the implausible regions 
more accessible later in the narrative, this was not the case for the 
plausible locations. The data further indicated that participants who 
initially looked to the previous region of the lamp returned as much to 
that location as participants who had initially looked to the previous 
region of the books. Taken together the data suggests that the higher 
proportion of anticipatory eye movements to the plausible locations 
(observed in experiment 1) is not solely dependent on the higher 
proportion of early looks to these locations.  
     In experiments 6 and 7 we explored the extent to which a purely 
language-mediated representation of the target item (e.g. a glass) 
would be able to increase the proportion of anticipatory looks towards 
the implausible locations in the context of a blank screen. The idea 
here was that introducing new entities into the language generally 
indicates that they will be referred to subsequently (whereas referring 
to previously introduced entities, such as “the glass” is not 
necessarily accompanied by subsequent references). The findings 
indicated that a linguistic representation of the target item did not 
enhance the accessibility and anticipation of its described location. 
     Together these data suggest that the absence/presence of a 
visual context provides a quantitative difference in how we process 
and anticipate implausible events. In other words, the constraint that 
is drawn from a previous visual scene is weaker than the constraint 
drawn from a concurrent visual scene and this allows real-world 
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knowledge to exert a greater influence on the probabilistic activation 
of likely candidates. This probabilistic approach means that the 
underlying mechanism is the same, but that quantitative differences 
in the strength of constraints leads to what appear to be qualitative 
differences in behaviour. In the context of a blank screen we only 
anticipate locations when these are either plausible, or when the 
items moved to these locations are contextually plausible. However, 
in the context of a concurrent visual scene we anticipate upcoming 
locations regardless of plausibility. As such, it seems that the 
absence of a visual scene somehow renders implausible items, or 
locations less viable in terms of guessing or anticipating any 
upcoming actions involving these items or locations. Furthermore, it 
is important to note that both in the context of a blank, or concurrent 
visual scene the data showed no influence of plausibility when the 
target item was referred to at the end of the narrative. This suggests 
that once the target item was directly referred to participants had no 
difficulty retrieving its (implausible) location.    
     In the previous chapter we proposed that the difference in 
anticipatory eye movements (in the context of a blank screen) could 
be related to the likelihood of the verb referring to one of the 
previously introduced entities (e.g. Altmann, 1999). For example, 
when hearing “the woman will move the glass onto the table/lamp. 
Then she will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into…” 
participants evaluated the extent to which the verb ‘pour’ could 
plausibly refer to any of the objects previously introduced within the 
narrative, correctly determining that the glass was the only object that 
could afford ‘pouring into’. When the glass had been moved onto the 
table participants judged it to be a plausible referent and therefore 
they anticipated and looked to the location of the table. However, 
when the glass was described as having been moved to the lamp, 
the unlikelihood of this location could have resulted in participants no 
longer considering it to be a plausible referent when having to 
anticipate where the wine would be ‘poured into’. Only when the 
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glass was directly referred to at the end of the narrative (pour the 
wine carefully into…the glass) did it become clear that the glass was 
the correct referent, whereby participants looked to its location 
irrespective of plausibility. While this account might explain why 
participants only anticipated the glass when it had been moved to a 
plausible location, it doesn’t explain why plausibility only influenced 
eye movements in the context of a blank screen – in experiments 2 
and 4 where the spoken narratives were presented in the context of a 
concurrent visual scene we found no effect of plausibility. 
     In this chapter we propose an account explaining why plausibility 
affects anticipatory eye movements in the context of a blank screen, 
but not in the context of a concurrent visual scene. Our explanation is 
based on the assumption that there is a quantitative difference in 
how we process and anticipate upcoming discourse when language 
refers to something outside our visual environment, as opposed to 
when language refers to entities within our immediate visual 
proximity. During language comprehension we assume that 
participants in an event will be drawn from our visual environment 
(e.g. Altmann & Mirkovic, 2009; Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus et al., 
1995) and this occurs even when characters are depicted performing 
a non-stereotypical action (e.g. Knoeferle & Crocker, 2006). 
However, in the absence of a visual context we have to rely on our 
memory, or internal representation of the visual scene. When this is 
the case the constraints of the visual scene may be weakened since 
our memory trace of the scene is inevitably weaker than the actual 
source of that trace. In effect, we are no longer constrained as 
strongly as in the concurrent case, to anticipate that the object about 
to be referred to is an object that has been previously introduced.  
 
6.1.     Visual and linguistic constraints 
Several studies have shown that during language comprehension we 
very rapidly establish reference to objects within our visual 
environment (e.g. Allopenna, Magnuson & Tanenhaus 1998; 
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Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy & Tanenhaus, 1995). 
Interestingly, this also happens when we are not explicitly instructed 
to look towards the named items (Altmann, 2011) and even when we 
are actively encouraged to ignore spoken language (Salverda & 
Altmann, 2011). Early research by Cooper (1974) showed that eye 
movements tend to be rapidly directed towards items when these are 
directly referred to by spoken language. In this study participants 
viewed a visual scene consisting of nine different items while they 
listened to short stories containing words that directly referred to the 
depicted items. The findings showed that when hearing the name of 
one of the depicted items (for example, a zebra) participants looked 
more toward that item, compared to the unnamed items.  
     Later research by Tanenhaus et al. (1995) demonstrated that 
during language comprehension we sequentially establish reference 
to objects within our visual environment and that this occurs at the 
earliest moment in time. In this study participants were shown a 
visual display containing several different objects and asked to 
perform a set of instructions related to one of those objects. The 
findings showed that participants looked sequentially to each 
potential object until the instructions uniquely identified which specific 
object was referred to. As soon as participants had enough 
information to identify which of the objects was referred to, they 
looked to this object, whereafter they carried out the instructions. 
These studies show a rapid and sequential integration between 
language comprehension and the visual world. In other words, as 
language unfolds spoken information serves to constrain the 
potential number of upcoming referents within the visual scene.  
 
6.2.     Anticipatory constraints  
Altmann and Kamide (1999) further demonstrated how language (in 
this case semantic information derived from verbs) is able to rapidly 
direct our attention towards anticipated objects within a specific 
visual context. When shown a visual scene depicting a boy, a toy 
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train set, a toy car, a balloon, and a birthday cake and hearing either 
“the boy will eat the cake” or “the boy will move the cake” participants 
looked more towards the cake upon hearing the verb ‘eat’, compared 
to when they heard the verb ‘move’. These findings suggest that 
participants used verb-related information (i.e. the verb eat implied 
that the upcoming referent must be something edible) in order to 
anticipate which of the items in the visual scene would most likely be 
referred to next. In other words, by integrating verb-related 
information with the features and affordances of the items presented 
in the visual context, participants were able to restrict the number of 
possible upcoming referents and thereby correctly anticipate the 
most appropriate antecedent before it was directly referred to. As 
such, the concurrent visual context alongside linguistic information 
served to constrain the number of potential participants consequently 
making it easier for participants to anticipate which item would be 
referred to next.  
   Kamide et al. (2003) extended this research by investigating 
whether anticipatory eye movements are exclusively related to 
semantic information derived from the verb, or if we further rely on 
real-world knowledge when anticipating the most likely outcome of an 
event in which the verb (on its own) allows for several outcomes. 
Participants viewed a concurrent visual scene depicting a man, a 
young girl, a motorbike and a carousel. They then heard either “the 
man will ride the motorbike” or “the girl will ride the carousel”. In this 
event the verb ‘ride’ could refer to both the carousel and the 
motorbike, whereby verb-related information alone did not allow 
participants to determine whether ‘ride’ referred to the depicted 
motorbike, or the carousel. When this was the case participants had 
to further rely on experiential knowledge to provide a stronger degree 
of constraints in terms of plausibility. In other words, while the man 
could be intending to ride both the motorbike and the carousel, real-
world knowledge would suggest that a man would be more likely to 
ride a motorbike, whereas a young girl would be more likely to ride a 
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carousel. The data reflected this likelihood showing that upon hearing 
“the man will ride the...” participants made more anticipatory eye 
movements toward the motorbike. In contrast, when hearing “the girl 
will ride the...” there were more anticipatory looks toward the 
carousel. This shows that in situations where verb-related information 
may equally apply to several objects within a concurrent visual 
context, participants had to integrate linguistic information with real-
world knowledge in order to anticipate the most plausible referent. In 
other words, participants’ experiential knowledge increased the 
degree of constraint by informing participants about the plausibility of 
each possible outcome.  
6.3. Constraints in the absence of a visual context    
While language is often used to refer to items within our visual 
proximity, we also use language to refer to objects when these are 
absent from our visual context. The blank screen paradigm allows us 
to explore how we map language onto our internal representation of 
a previously encountered visual scene, as opposed to the visual 
scene itself. In such cases we might expect the constraints derived 
from the visual scene to be weakened, since our memory trace of a 
visual scene is inevitably weaker than a concurrent visual scene (e.g. 
Averbach & Coriell, 1961; Sperling, 1960). In other words, in the 
context of a blank screen the anticipatory activation of appropriate 
representations is no longer bound exclusively by the visual context, 
but may now be further influenced by real-world knowledge. This 
notion of ‘visual constraints’ relates to a reading study by Rayner et 
al. (2004), which investigated the effects of reading plausible (e.g. 
John used a knife to chop the large carrots for dinner), implausible 
(e.g. John used an axe to chop the large carrots for dinner) and 
anomalous (e.g. John used a pump to inflate the large carrots for 
dinner) sentences. Rayner and colleagues found an earlier pattern of 
disruption in response to the anomalous sentences compared to the 
implausible sentences, which only showed disruption at a later point 
in time. In contrast, the visual world studies by Altmann and Kamide 
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(1999) and Kamide et al. (2003) showed early plausibility effects, 
specifically in terms of anticipating upcoming references. Rayner et 
al. proposed that this difference between experiments might be 
related to the stronger degree of constraint afforded by visual 
scenes, which made it easier to for participants to anticipate the most 
plausible referents. In contrast, during reading participants are not 
restricted by a visual context and are therefore less able to anticipate 
upcoming referents based on their likelihood. According to this 
theory, we might similarly expect a concurrent visual scene (as 
opposed to a blank screen) to provide a stronger degree of 
constraint, resulting in an earlier (anticipatory) influence of 
plausibility.  
     Altmann (2004) explored how language is able to direct our 
attention towards anticipated objects when the visual scene was 
removed before the onset of the spoken language. Participants were 
shown a visual image depicting a man, a woman, a newspaper and a 
cake. After five seconds the image was removed and replaced with 
plain white screen and participants heard either “the man will eat the 
cake”, or “the woman will read the newspaper”. Like in the previous 
experiment by Altmann and Kamide (1999) participants looked more 
towards the previous region of cake upon hearing the verb ‘eat’ than 
when hearing the verb ‘read’. In contrast, there were more 
anticipatory looks to the previous region of the newspaper upon 
hearing the verb ‘read’. These findings suggest that anticipatory eye 
movements are not necessarily dependent on seeing a concurrent 
visual scene – in the absence of a visual context, participants simply 
mapped spoken language onto an internal representation of the 
previously encountered scene. Furthermore, while the constraints 
derived from participants’ memory of the visual scene may have 
been weaker than the constraints provided by a concurrent visual 
scene, linguistic constraints derived from the verb, alongside real-
world knowledge allowed participants to anticipate the most 
appropriate object even in the absence of a concurrent visual 
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context. In this example the cake was the only item in the previous 
visual scene that fulfilled the selectional restrictions of the verb ‘eat’. 
Similarly, real-world knowledge informed participants that cakes are 
not only edible, but also tasty and this in turn made the cake a more 
plausible referent than the newspaper. 
     But what might have happened if, instead of a cake the visual 
scene had depicted something that fulfilled the selectional restrictions 
of the verb ‘eat’ (e.g. a tarantula, or a poisonous toadstool), but that 
real-world knowledge informed us was not something most people 
would be likely to eat? Under these circumstances real-world 
knowledge differs from the selectional restrictions in terms of what 
we can eat and what we are likely to eat and this discrepancy might 
lead us to anticipate a number of alternative options that are not 
directly related to the previous visual context.  
 
6.4. Explaining the plausibility effect 
Going back to experiments 1 and 2 we found that in the context of a 
concurrent visual scene (experiment 2) participants anticipated the 
location of the glass regardless of whether it had been moved to the 
table (plausible location), or the lamp (implausible location). 
However, in the context of a blank screen (experiment 1) participants 
only anticipated the location of the glass when it had been moved to 
the table – when the glass had been moved to the lamp there was 
little or no evidence of anticipatory eye movements. In the context of 
a concurrent visual scene participants assumed that referred items 
would be drawn from within this context. Looking back at the visual 
scene (see figure 6.1.) it is clear that the glass is the only item within 
this scene that affords ‘pouring into’. Therefore, when hearing ‘the 
woman will move the glass onto the table/lamp. Then, she will pick 
up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass’ participants 
anticipated and looked to the described location of the glass, even 
when it had been moved to the lamp. In other words, if participants 
assumed that the upcoming reference would be drawn from within 
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the visual scene and the glass was the only item within the scene 
that could afford ‘pouring into’, the visual context constrained them to 
anticipate the event-specific location of the glass, even when this 
location was implausible.      
                
 
    Figure 6.1. Example of one of the visual scenes from experiment 1 and 2.  
 
However, in the context of a blank screen participants had to rely on 
a visual memory, or internal representation of the scene. As such, 
the constraints derived from the visual scene were weakened since 
anticipation was no longer so strongly bound by the visual context. 
Rather, in the absence of a visual scene participants relied on 
linguistic information, as well as real-world knowledge and this could 
have rendered the upcoming reference much less specific. When the 
glass was said to have been moved to the table real-world 
knowledge would have informed participants that this was a plausible 
and appropriate location to put a glass. Based on this information 
participants anticipated and looked to the table as the upcoming 
location for pouring the wine into. However, when the glass was 
described as having been moved to the lamp experiential knowledge 
would have informed participants that this was an unlikely and 
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inappropriate location to put a glass. It is possible that the 
unlikelihood of this location changed participants’ perception of the 
glass (making it less affordable) and this may have lead them to 
consider and anticipate a number of alternative options for ‘pouring 
the wine into’. In other words, in the absence of a visual context 
participants’ anticipation was no longer exclusively constrained by 
the visual scene and as such the wine needn’t be poured into that 
one specific glass, but could instead be poured into a completely 
different location. For example, if we were to redirect our attention 
from e.g. the table to the kitchen counter, we would no longer be able 
to see any objects that were on the table (e.g. the glass), but we 
would be able to see other affordable objects situated on the kitchen 
counter (e.g. another glass, the sink, or a carafe). Only during the 
final reference to ‘the glass’ did it become clear that the wine was 
about to be poured into the previously mentioned glass, whereby 
participants looked to its described location regardless of plausibility.  
     In the following chapter we tested this account, firstly by 
manipulating the number of affordable items within the context of a 
concurrent visual scene (experiment 8) and secondly by linguistically 
restricting the number of affordable items within the context of a 
blank screen (experiment 9). These manipulations allowed us to 
explore the extent to which both visual and linguistic constraints are 
able to guide anticipatory eye movements to appropriate (yet 
implausible) locations.     
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CHAPTER 7  
 
MANIPULATING THE NUMBER OF AFFORDABLE 
ITEMS 
 
In the previous chapter we proposed an account explaining why 
plausibility affects anticipatory eye movements in the context of a 
blank screen, but not in the context of a concurrent visual scene. Our 
explanation is based on the assumption that there is a quantitative 
difference in how we process and anticipate upcoming discourse 
when language refers to something outside our visual environment, 
as opposed to when language refers to entities within our immediate 
visual proximity. During language comprehension we assume that 
participants in an event will be drawn from the visual context if one is 
available (e.g. Altmann & Mirkovic, 2009; Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus 
et al., 1995). However, in the absence of a visual context we have to 
rely on our memory, or internal representation of the visual scene. 
When this is the case the constraints of the visual scene are 
weakened since our memory trace of the scene is inevitably weaker 
than the actual source of that trace (e.g. Averbach & Coriell, 1961; 
Sperling, 1960).  
     In the context of a concurrent visual scene the referred target (e.g. 
the glass) was the only item that could afford the described action 
(e.g. pouring into). As such, the concurrent visual context alongside 
language served to constrain the number of potential upcoming 
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referents and this would explain why we anticipate the event-specific 
location of the target referent regardless of plausibility. However, in 
the context of a blank screen we have to rely on our memory/internal 
representation of a visual scene. In this case the anticipatory 
activation of appropriate representations is no longer strongly bound 
by the visual context, but may now be influenced by real-world 
knowledge. When the referred target is described as being moved to 
a plausible location (e.g. the table) real-world knowledge informs us 
that this is an appropriate location and therefore we anticipate (and 
look) to this location. However, when the referred target is described 
as being moved to an implausible location (e.g. the lamp) real-world 
knowledge similarly informs us that this is an inappropriate and 
unlikely location. This unlikelihood may lead us to consider and 
anticipate a variety of options. Only when the target is directly 
referred to at the end of the narrative does it become clear that 
spoken language refers to the previously mentioned item, whereby 
we look its event-specific location irrespective of whether this is 
plausible or not.  
     In this chapter we present two experiments that aimed to explore 
the extent to which both visual and linguistic constraints are able to 
guide anticipatory eye movements to appropriate (yet implausible) 
locations. In experiment 8 we manipulated the number of affordable 
items within the context of a concurrent visual scene. The aim of this 
experiment was to investigate the extent to which the inclusion of a 
second (un-referred) affordable item might be able to influence eye 
movements in the context of a concurrent visual scene. In the 
previous experiments the glass was always the only item that could 
afford ‘pouring into’ and we proposed that this is why participants 
anticipated its (implausible) location when the narrative was 
presented in the context of a concurrent visual context. As such, we 
might speculate that adding a second glass to the visual scene would 
decrease the weighting of constraints derived from object-
affordances by providing an alternative option for ‘pouring the wine 
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into’. In contrast, experiment 9 attempted to increase the weighting of 
constraints (in the context of a blank screen) by linguistically 
restricting the number of affordable items within the context of the 
narrative. By doing so, we hoped to linguistically equalise the 
constraints provided by a concurrent and a blank screen context. If 
language constrains the context of the narrative so that there is only 
one possible glass we would expect to see anticipatory eye 
movements to the appropriate location of the glass, even when 
implausible.  
 
7.1.     EXPERIMENT 8 
7.1.1.  Affordance-based constraints  
In the previous chapter we proposed that the constraints of a 
concurrent visual scene guides anticipatory eye movements to the 
event-specific location of the glass even when this location is 
implausible. In other words, since the glass is the only item in the 
scene that affords ‘pouring into’, the visual context (and the object-
affordances within this context) alongside language constrains 
anticipation, whereby participants look the location of the glass 
regardless of plausibility.  
     A number of studies have explored how affordance-based 
constraints are able to influence language comprehension (e.g. 
Chambers, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, Filip & Carlson, 2002; Glenberg et 
al., 2009; Kaschak & Glenberg, 2000), leading Glenberg and 
Robertson (2000) to suggest that our internal representations of 
language are representations of an event (as well as the affordances 
of this event), as opposed to representations of language itself. 
Glenberg (1997) further suggested that language comprehension 
often depends on the combination of affordances, whereby 
implausible combinations of affordances in terms of underlying goals 
can serve to constrain comprehension. Such affordance-based 
constraints are demonstrated in sentences like “Marissa forgot to 
bring her pillow on her camping trip, as a substitute for her pillow she 
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filled up an old sweater with water” (Glenberg et al., 2000, p. 385), 
whereby the combination is incompatible with the goal since a 
sweater cannot afford the containment of liquids. This in turn, makes 
it difficult for people to form a realistic mental representation of the 
described event.  
     Chambers, Magnuson and Tanenhaus (2004) investigated the 
extent to which participants’ behavioural goals and the affordances of 
presented objects were able to influence eye movements when 
listening to a set of syntactically ambiguous instructions. In this 
experiment participants were seated in front of a display of real 
objects and instructed to either; “pour the egg in the bowl over the 
flour” (temporarily ambiguous instructions), or “pour the egg that’s in 
the bowl over the flour” (unambiguous instructions). Two versions of 
the display were used (see figure 7.1.), each containing four object 
types: one target referent (egg in bowl – top right), one referential 
competitor (egg in glass – top left), one true goal (flour – bottom 
right), and one false goal (empty bowl – bottom left). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Example display (taken from Chambers et al., 2004, p. 689). 
 
 
In display A the target referent and the referential competitor were 
both displayed in liquid form, thus both being compatible with the 
action requested in the instructions (pour the egg). However, in 
display B the target referent was displayed in liquid form, whereas 
the referential competitor was presented in solid form. As such, the 
target referent was the only item in the display that was compatible 
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with the instructions.  
     The results showed that when both eggs were presented in liquid 
form participants initially found it difficult to determine which of the 
two eggs the instruction referred to. In other words, since both of the 
eggs could afford pouring participants interpreted the phrase ‘in the 
bowl’ as determining which of the eggs was referred to. In contrast, 
when only one egg was presented in liquid form participants were 
able to immediately determine which of the eggs the instructions 
referred to, whereby they interpreted the phrase ‘in the bowl’ as 
referring to the intended location for the pourable egg. Chambers et 
al. (2004) suggested that when one egg was displayed in liquid form 
and the other egg in solid form the affordances of each of the eggs, 
combined with verb-related information (pour) influenced syntactic 
ambiguity resolution by directing participants’ attention to the most 
plausible goal.  
     Other studies have further shown how the combination of objects 
and action-based affordances are able to guide anticipatory eye 
movements to the most appropriate item within a visual scene (e.g. 
Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Kamide, Scheepers & Altmann, 2003). 
Altmann & Kamide (2007) explored how a combination of the 
temporal aspects of a verb and the affordances of objects are able to 
influence anticipatory eye movements. They found that when 
presented with an image depicting, a man, a table with a full glass of 
beer, an empty wine glass, some cheese, and some Christmas 
crackers on the floor, participants looked more towards the full glass 
of beer upon hearing ‘the man will drink all of…’ whereas when 
hearing ‘the man has drunk all of…’ participants looked more to the 
empty wine glass. This study shows that participants’ knowledge 
about past and future events activated the objects’ affordances (i.e. 
the full glass afforded a future drinking event, whereas the empty 
glass could only afford a past drinking event), which then constrained 
the number of possible upcoming referents, enabling participants to 
correctly anticipate the appropriate reference. 
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     But how do we anticipate upcoming references in situations where 
there is more than one affordable item in the visual context? Kamide 
et al. (2003) showed that in such circumstances we have to rely on 
real-world knowledge in order to anticipate the most likely outcome of 
an event. When hearing sentences such as ‘the man will ride the…’, 
(whilst viewing a scene depicting a man, a girl, a motorbike, and a 
carousel), participants made more anticipatory eye movements 
towards the motorbike compared to the carousel. In contrast, when 
hearing or ‘the girl will ride the…’ there were more anticipatory looks 
to the carousel. In this example both the motorbike and the carousel 
were compatible with the verb (ride) and as such, participants had to 
further rely on real-world knowledge in order to correctly anticipate 
the most plausible referent. In other words, participants’ experiential 
knowledge about these types of events strengthened the weighting of 
constraint by informing them about the plausibility of each possible 
outcome.  
     In the current experiment we similarly manipulated the number of 
affordable items within a concurrent visual scene and this allowed us 
explore the extent to which the addition of a second (un-referred) 
affordable item might influence eye movements when the first 
affordable item is described as being moved to either a plausible, or 
implausible location. In the previous concurrent experiment 
(experiment 2) the glass was the only item in the visual scene that 
could afford ‘pouring into’ and we proposed that this is why 
participants anticipated its location regardless of plausibility. Taking 
this into account we might speculate that the inclusion of a second 
(affordable) glass to the visual scene will weaken the affordance-
based constraints, resulting in a higher influence of plausibility, 
compared to conditions where only one glass is depicted in the visual 
scene (see figure 7.2.). In other words, the addition of an alternative 
glass for ‘pouring the wine into’ might lead participants to consider 
this option more when the alternative glass is in an implausible 
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location, compared to when it is in a plausible location. 
 
             
 
Figure 7.2. Example of one of the visual scenes depicting two affordable items. 
 
7.1.2. Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £4. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli 
Sixty-four experimental scenes (see figures 7.3. and 7.4.) were 
matched with four conditions. In conditions 1 and 2 we presented two 
affordable target items. For example, one blue glass was depicted on 
the floor and one red glass was depicted on the table. In conditions 3 
and 4 we presented one affordable item and one unrelated item that 
could not afford the described action. In this example one blue glass 
was depicted on the floor and one red book was depicted on the 
table. This design allowed us to compare looks to the table (plausible 
location) with looks to the lamp (implausible location), as well as 
looks to the red glass (un-referred affordable item) between the 
plausible and implausible conditions. In addition to the experimental 
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trials, 64 sentence-picture pairs were included as fillers (see 
appendix 9 for examples of the filler items). Sixteen of the filler items 
depicted two differently coloured versions of the same un-referred 
item and a further 16 filler items depicted one version of a named 
coloured item. As such, 16 (filler) trials in each condition depicted two 
differently coloured versions of an un-named item and 16 
(experimental) trials depicted two differently coloured versions, 
naming one of those items. Another 16 (filler) trials and 16 
(experimental) trials referred to one version of a colour-specific item 
(e.g. the purple flower). The remaining 32 filler items referred to an 
item without specifying its colour (e.g. the flower).    
 
1. The woman will move the blue glass onto the table. Then, she 
will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the 
glass. 
 
(Two glasses plausible) 
 
2. The woman will move the blue glass onto the lamp. Then, she 
will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the 
glass. 
 
           (Two glasses implausible) 
 
3. The woman will move the blue glass onto the table. Then, she 
will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the 
glass. 
 
(One glass plausible) 
 
4. The woman will move the blue glass onto the lamp. Then, she 
will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the 
glass. 
  
           (One glass implausible) 
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Figure 7.3. Example of one of the visual scenes paired with sentences: 1) and 2). 
                
         
Figure 7.4. Example of one of the visual scenes paired with sentences: 3) and 4). 
 
Procedure 
The procedure for this experiment was the same as in the previous 
concurrent screen experiments – the visual scenes were presented 
for 1000 milliseconds, followed by the onset of the auditory stimuli. 
The trials ended 11 seconds after the audio onset, lasting a total of 
12 seconds. The experiment was run on an Eyelink II head-mounted 
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eye-tracker, which sampled at 250 Hz from the right eye. 
 
Analysis 
We defined four regions of interest within each scene; one area 
corresponded to the plausible location of the moved glass (e.g. the 
table, excluding the red glass/book), another corresponded to the 
implausible location of the moved glass (e.g. the lamp), and a third 
area corresponded to the unmoved location of the glass (e.g. the 
blue glass). Finally, we included a fourth area that either 
corresponded to the un-referred affordable item (e.g. the red glass), 
or the un-referred unaffordable item (e.g. the book). Since the visual 
scenes remained onscreen throughout each of the trials, we defined 
the regions of interest according to the outline of each target object. 
As such, participants’ eye movements had to be directed to one of 
the pixels occupied by each object within the scene. Participants’ eye 
movements were examined during certain time points in the spoken 
sentences with the percentage of saccades as the dependent 
measure. As in the previous experiments these critical time points 
occurred during ‘the wine carefully into’ (anticipatory eye 
movements), and during the final noun phrase ‘the glass’. 
     To begin with, we compared the proportion of saccades to the 
table/lamp when either one glass, or two glasses were presented in 
the visual scene. These comparisons allowed us to see if the 
inclusion of a second (un-referred) affordable item would be able to 
decrease the weighting of constraints and thereby influence eye 
movements to the plausible and implausible locations when the first 
glass had been moved there. Secondly, we compared the proportion 
of saccades to the region of the (un-referred) glass when the other 
glass had been moved to the table or the lamp. This allowed us to 
explore whether participants would anticipate and look to the 
alternative (un-referred) glass more when the first glass had been 
moved to an implausible locations, compared to a plausible location.  
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7.1.3. Results  
Table – one glass plausible vs. two glasses plausible 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were more anticipatory looks to 
the table in the ‘one glass’ plausible condition than there were looks 
to the table in the ‘two glasses’ plausible condition (t1 (63) = 2.622, p 
< .05), although this difference was not statistically significant in the 
by-items analysis (t2 (31) = -1.445, p > .05). During the final 
reference to ‘the glass’ there were no more looks to the table in the 
‘one glass’ plausible condition than there were looks to the table in 
the ‘two glasses’ plausible condition (t1 (63) = -1.010, p > .05) (t2 
(31) < 1) (see figures 7.5., 7.6., and table 7.1.).  
 
Lamp – one glass implausible vs. two glasses implausible 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were no more anticipatory looks 
to the lamp in the ‘one glass’ implausible condition than there were 
looks to the lamp in the ‘two glasses’ implausible condition (t1 (63) < 
1) (t2 (31) < 1). Similarly, during the final reference to ‘the glass’ 
there were no more looks to the lamp in the ‘one glass’ implausible 
condition than there were looks to the lamp in the ‘two glasses’ 
implausible condition (t1 (63) < 1) (t2 (31) < 1) (see figures 7.5., 7.6., 
and table 7.1.). This suggests that the inclusion of a second 
(affordable) glass did not weaken affordance-based constraints 
sufficiently to show an influence of plausibility. 
 
Table vs. lamp  
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there was no difference in anticipatory 
looks to the table in the ‘one glass’ plausible condition and looks to 
the lamp in the ‘one glass’ implausible condition (t1 (63) = 1.681, p > 
.05) (t2 (31) < 1). There was also no difference in anticipatory looks 
to the table in the ‘two glasses’ plausible condition and the lamp in 
the ‘two glasses’ implausible condition (t1 (63) < 1) (t2 (31) < 1). 
During the final reference to ‘the glass’ there were no more looks to 
the table in the ‘one glass’ plausible condition than there were looks 
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to the lamp in the ‘one glass’ implausible condition (t1 (63) = 1.298, p 
> .05) (t2 (31) = 1.266, p > .05). Similarly, there was no difference in 
looks to the table in the ‘two glasses’ plausible condition and looks to 
the lamp in the ‘two glasses’ implausible condition (t1 (63) = 1.089, p 
> .05) (t2 (31) < 1) (see figures 7.5., 7.6., and table 7.1.). 
 
Time table  
(1 glass) 
table  
(2 glasses) 
lamp  
(1 glass) 
lamp  
(2 glasses) 
the wine carefully into 34 28 30 29 
the glass 12 13 16 17 
 
Table 7.1. Percentage of trials with looks to the table and the lamp during “the wine 
carefully into the glass”. Percentages calculated from the total number of trials. 
 
 
         
 
 
     Figure 7.5. Looks to the table (plausible location) and the lamp (implausible     
     location) during “the wine carefully into the glass”.  
 
 
Figure 7.6. illustrates the percentage of trials with fixations toward the 
table and the lamp in the plausible and implausible conditions. The 
relatively low increase in looks to the table and the lamp during the 
final reference to ‘the glass’ is presumably due to competition from 
the visual instantiation of the referred blue glass depicted on the floor 
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(see Altmann & Kamide, 200917). Also, note the difference in the 
proportion of saccades in figure 7.5. and the proportion of fixations in 
figure 7.6., specifically during ‘the wine carefully into’. This 
dissociation is best explained by the dependent measures used to 
plot each of the figures – figure 7.5. shows the proportion of 
saccades during the critical part of the narrative and figure 7.6. 
illustrates the proportion of fixations during each moment of the 
narrative. While the proportion of saccades and the proportion of 
fixations are necessarily related (fixations provide information about 
when and on which region the eyes are lingering, saccades inform us 
about when, and to which region the eyes are being directed) these 
dependent measures have nonetheless been shown to disassociate 
since the likelihood of fixating on a region during a specific time 
frame does not account for when those fixations began (see Atmann 
& Kamide, 2004, pages 380-382; Altmann, 2011, pages 994-995). 
Looking at the discrepancy during ‘the wine carefully into’ there is a 
relatively high proportion of saccades to the table and the lamp in 
both conditions, yet a much lower proportion of fixations to those 
regions during the same period. This difference arises because there 
are almost as many looks away from the table/lamp as there are 
looks towards the those regions. And because different participants 
across different trials launch saccades towards, or away from, these 
regions at different times within the extended temporal region of 
interest, the net result is that across the temporal regions of interest 
there is only a small net increase in fixations, while there are many 
more saccades towards (and almost as many away from) these 
regions. 
                                                
17	  Altmann and Kamide (2009) showed that the salience of a concurrent 
visual scene (depicting the glass on the floor) lead to increased competition 
and therefore fewer looks to the described location of the glass (table), 
compared to the visually depicted location of the glass. In contrast, when 
the visual scene had been removed prior to the onset of spoken language 
competition decreased, now showing fewer looks to the (previous) visual 
location of the glass, compared to the described location of the glass.  
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Red glass – two glasses plausible vs. two glasses implausible 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were no more anticipatory eye 
movements to the un-referred affordable item (red glass) in the ‘two 
glasses’ plausible condition (where the blue glass was said to have 
been moved to the table) than there were looks to the un-referred 
affordable item in the ‘two glasses’ implausible condition (where the 
blue glass was said to have been moved to the lamp) (t1 (63) < 1) (t2 
(31) = 1.761, p > .05). Similarly, during the final reference to ‘the 
glass’ there was no difference in looks to the un-referred affordable 
item (red glass) between these two conditions (t1 (63) < 1) (t2 (31) < 
1) (see figures 7.7., 7.8., and table 7.2.). This suggests that when the 
blue glass was described as having been moved to the lamp 
participants did not consider the un-referred alternative red glass any 
more than when the blue glass was described as having been moved 
to the table.      
 
Time book   
(pl.) 
book   
(impl.) 
red glass  
(pl.) 
red glass  
(impl.) 
the wine carefully into 18 19 25 22 
the glass 10 5 9 9 
 
Table 7.2. Percentage of trials with looks to the un-referred book and the un-
referred red glass during “the wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages calculated 
from the total number of trials. 
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Figure 7.7. Looks to the red glass (un-referred affordable item) and the book (un-
referred unaffordable item) during “the wine carefully into the glass”.  
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7.1.4. Discussion  
In this experiment we manipulated the number of affordable items 
within the context of a concurrent visual scene and this allowed us to 
explore the extent to which the addition of a second (un-referred) 
glass might influence eye movements when the first glass had been 
moved to either the table (plausible location), or the lamp 
(implausible location). The findings showed that during ‘the wine 
carefully into’ there were more anticipatory eye movements to the 
table in the ‘one glass’ plausible condition than there were looks to 
the table in the ‘two glasses’ plausible condition. In contrast, there 
were no more anticipatory looks to the lamp in the ‘one glass’ 
implausible condition than there were looks to the lamp in the ‘two 
glasses’ implausible condition. During the final reference to ‘the 
glass’ there was no difference in the proportion of looks to the 
table/lamp when either one, or two glasses were depicted in the 
scene. There was no difference in the proportion of anticipatory looks 
to the un-referred red glass when the blue glass had either been 
moved to the table or the lamp. This was also the case during the 
final reference to ‘the glass’.  
     These findings suggest that the inclusion of a second (affordable) 
glass did not weaken affordance-based constraints sufficiently to 
show an influence of plausibility. In other words, the addition of an 
alternative glass for ‘pouring the wine into’ did not lead participants to 
consider this option any more when the other glass was in an 
implausible location, compared to when it was in a plausible 
location18. One possible explanation for these results may be related 
to the notion of ‘advantage of first mention’ (Gernsbacher, 1990), 
whereby participants assume that the wine will be poured into the 
blue glass (regardless of plausibility), since the reference to this 
                                                
18	  We also ran two other versions of this experiment (see appendices 10 
and 11 for methods and results). Like in the current experiment we found 
no influence of plausibility when including a second affordable item in the 
visual scene. 
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particular glass renders it more prominent and accessible than the 
un-referred red glass. One way to get around this problem in future 
studies would be to simplify the structure of the narratives, making 
them similar to the sentences used by Kamide et al. (2003). In this 
experiment participants heard sentences such as ‘the man will ride 
the motorbike’, or ‘the girl will ride the carousel’ (whilst viewing a 
scene depicting a man, a girl, a motorbike, and a carousel). Upon 
hearing ‘the man will ride…’ participants anticipated and looked to 
the motorbike, whereas when hearing ‘the girl will ride…’ there were 
more anticipatory looks to the carousel. In this example both the 
motorbike and the carousel could afford to be ridden, but in contrast 
to the current experiment, anticipatory eye movements were 
measured before any of these items were directly referred to. The 
findings showed that in scenarios where two different items are 
equally compatible with the verb, participants relied on real-world 
knowledge in order to correctly anticipate the most plausible referent. 
However, taking into account the notion of scene constraints we 
might further speculate that if the carousel was the only item in the 
scene to afford riding, affordance-based constraints would lead 
participants to anticipate that both the girl, as well as the man would 
ride the carousel. Likewise, if the motorbike was the only item that 
could afford riding, affordance-based constraints should lead 
participants to anticipate that both the man and the girl would ride the 
motorbike. In other words, if the motorbike (or the carousel) is the 
only item that affords riding, the constraints of the visual scene 
should guide anticipatory eye movements to this item irrespective of 
who is going to ride it. In contrast, when both the motorbike and 
carousel are depicted in the visual scene participants rely on real-
world knowledge, which then guides anticipatory eye movements to 
the most plausible upcoming reference.  
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7.2. EXPERIMENT 9 
7.2.1. Linguistic constraints in a blank screen context 
In chapter 6 we proposed that the constraints of a concurrent visual 
scene guide anticipatory eye movements to the event-specific 
location of the glass, even when this location is implausible. 
However, when we have to rely on our memory/internal 
representation of the visual scene these ‘visual’ constraints are 
weakened since our memory trace of the scene is inevitably weaker 
than the actual source of that trace. In the context of a blank screen 
anticipation is no longer strongly bound by the visual context and 
when this is the case we have to rely more on real-world knowledge 
when anticipating upcoming references. In experiment 8 we 
attempted to induce an influence of plausibility in the context of a 
concurrent visual scene by including a second affordable item. In 
contrast, in the current experiment we aimed to eradicate the 
influence of plausibility in the context of a blank screen, by providing 
a linguistic context in which there is only one affordable item. In other 
words, in the current experiment we tried to encourage anticipatory 
eye movements to the implausible locations by linguistically 
constraining the context so that it equalled the weighting of constraint 
provided by a concurrent visual scene.  
     Several studies have showed that constraints derived from 
linguistic information (alongside real-world knowledge) are able to 
influence language comprehension in the absence of a concurrent 
visual context (e.g. Altmann, 1999; Boland et al., 1995; McRae, 
Ferretti & Amyote, 1997; Schwanenflugel & LaCount, 1988; 
Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1985; Vu, Kellas, Petersen & Metcalf, 
2003). Such studies suggest that when visual information is not 
available we rely on linguistic information when having to anticipate 
upcoming references. The previous studies presented in this thesis 
show that participants anticipate implausible locations in the context 
of a concurrent visual scene, but not in the context of a blank screen. 
These findings suggest that there is a quantitative difference in how 
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we process and anticipate upcoming discourse when language refers 
to something outside our visual environment, as opposed to when 
language refers to entities within our immediate visual proximity. 
Rayner et al. (2004) noted that their reading study showed a later 
influence of plausibility compared to visual world studies by Altmann 
and Kamide (1999) and Kamide et al. (2003). They proposed that 
this difference might be related to the stronger level of constraints 
afforded by a concurrent visual scene, which made it easier for 
participants to anticipate the most plausible referent amongst a 
limited set of options. In contrast, during the reading study the 
number of possible upcoming references was not restricted by a 
visual context and as such participants were less able to anticipate 
specific upcoming referents based on their likelihood.  
     In experiment 2 the glass was the only item in the concurrent 
visual scene that could afford ‘pouring into’ and we proposed that this 
is why participants anticipated its location regardless of plausibility. 
However, in the absence of a visual context we may require a more 
constraining linguistic context in order to achieve the same weighting 
of constraints provided by a concurrent visual scene. In experiment 9 
we attempted to linguistically restrict the number of affordable items 
within the context of a blank screen so that it matched the constraint 
provided by a concurrent visual scene. In this experiment participants 
would hear a short narrative like this one below: 
 
The woman wanted some wine, but she could only find one glass. 
She was desperate for a drink so she put the glass on the 
table/lamp. Then, she picked up the bottle, and poured the wine 
carefully into the glass. 
 
If the difference in anticipatory eye movements is related to the 
weighting of constraints provided by the presence or absence of a 
visual context, we would expect this more constraining linguistic 
context (that unambiguously restricts the number of affordable items 
in the context of a blank screen) to guide anticipatory eye 
movements to the appropriate, yet implausible location of the glass. 
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In other words, by constraining the context of the narrative so that 
there is only one possible glass we would expect to see a similar 
pattern of eye movements to that observed in experiment 2 
(concurrent screen) where participants anticipated the plausible 
location of the glass (table), as much as they anticipated the 
implausible location of the glass (lamp).   
 
7.2.2. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £4. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli 
Twenty-four experimental scenes (see figure 7.9.) were matched with 
two conditions. Due to the increased length of the narrative we 
decided to use a quadrant design (displaying one item in each of the 
four quadrants of the display), as opposed to arranging the items 
within a visual scene like in the ones used in the previous 
experiments. We hoped that this design would increase the 
proportion of eye movements in the context of a blank screen, 
thereby preventing a floor effect due to the length of the narrative. 
The positions of the items representing the plausible locations (e.g. 
the table), the implausible locations (e.g. the lamp), the location of 
the item referred to after the plausible/implausible locations (e.g. the 
bottle), and the distractor locations (e.g. the bookcase) were 
counterbalanced to ensure that the location of each item varied 
across the full set of experimental scenes. In conditions 1 and 2 the 
first sentence always explained why the target item was the only one 
of its kind in the ‘world’ within which the event could unfold. In other 
words, the linguistic constraints of the context implied that the 
introduced item was the only accessible item of its kind. In the 
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second sentence the target item was described as being moved to 
either a plausible, or an implausible location. Like in the previous 
experiments the third and final sentence was the same for both 
conditions (see appendices 13 and 14 for a full list of the 
experimental sentences and images). In addition to the experimental 
trials, 48 sentence-picture pairs were included as fillers (see 
appendix 15 for an example of the filler items).  
 
1. The woman wanted some wine, but she could only find one 
glass. She was desperate for a drink so she put the glass on 
the table. Then, she picked up the bottle, and poured the wine 
carefully into the glass. 
 
(Plausible) 
 
2. The woman wanted some wine, but she could only find one 
glass. She was desperate for a drink so she put the glass on 
the lamp. Then, she picked up the bottle, and poured the wine 
carefully into the glass. 
 
          (Implausible) 
       
                           
Figure 7.9. Example of one of the visual scenes paired with sentences: 1) and 2). 
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Procedure 
The experiment was run on an Eyelink II head-mounted eye-tracker, 
which sampled at 250 Hz from the right eye. The procedure for this 
experiment was the same as in the previous blank screen 
experiments – the visual scenes were presented for five seconds and 
then replaced by a grey screen. The onset of the auditory stimuli 
occurred one second after the scene had been removed and the 
trials ended 19 seconds after the audio onset. As such, each trial 
lasted a total of 25 seconds.  
 
Analysis 
We defined four identically sized regions of interest within each 
scene; one area corresponded to the plausible location of the moved 
glass (the table), another corresponded to the implausible location of 
the moved glass (the lamp), and a third area corresponded to the 
location of the item referred to after the plausible/implausible 
locations (the bottle). Finally, we included a fourth area that 
corresponded to an un-referred and unrelated distractor item (the 
dress). This item was included instead of the target item (the glass) 
since we needed to provide a ‘baseline’ for the proportion of looks to 
an un-named item19. This design allowed us to compare the 
proportion of looks to previously named locations (plausible and 
                                                
19	  In experiment 1 the target item (e.g. the glass) was always depicted in 
the visual scene and the results showed that participants anticipated the 
glass when this was described as having been moved to a plausible 
location (e.g. the table), but not when it was described as having been 
moved to an implausible location (e.g. the lamp). During the final reference 
to the glass participants looked to the event-specific location of the glass 
regardless of plausibility. In experiment 7 we removed the target items from 
the visual scene and the results from this experiment replicated the 
plausibility effect seen in experiment 1. This suggests that the exclusion of 
the target items has no influence on the effect of plausibility observed in 
experiment 1. On the basis of these findings the absence of the target 
items in the current experiment should have no implications when relating 
the pattern of eye movements from the current experiment to that observed 
in experiment 1.   
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implausible) with the proportion of looks to an un-referred item, 
thereby ensuring that participants’ eye movements to the table/lamp 
were not due to levels of chance. Participants’ eye movements were 
examined during certain time points in the spoken sentences with the 
percentage of saccades as the dependent measure. As in the 
previous experiments these critical time points occurred during ‘the 
wine carefully into’ (anticipatory eye movements), and during the final 
noun phrase ‘the glass’.  
     To begin with, we compared the proportion of saccades to the 
region of the table (plausible locations) and the region of the lamp 
(implausible locations). This allowed us to see if the plausibility of 
these locations had any influence on eye movements. Secondly, we 
compared looks to the region of the table/lamp with looks to the 
region of the dress (distractor). This provided information about 
whether the proportion of saccades to the plausible and implausible 
locations was higher than the ‘baseline’ proportion of looks to an 
unnamed distractor item. 
 
7.2.3. Results  
Plausible vs. implausible 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were no more anticipatory looks 
toward the previous location of the table in the plausible condition 
(the woman will move the glass onto the table…) than there were 
looks to the previous location of the lamp in the implausible condition 
(the woman will move the glass onto the lamp…) (t1 (31) < 1) (t2 (23) 
< 1). Similarly, during ‘the glass’ there were no more looks towards 
the previous location of the table in the plausible condition than there 
were looks to the previous location of the lamp in the implausible 
condition (t1 (31) = -1.635, p > .05) (t2 (23) = -1.844, p > .05) (see 
figures 7.10., 7.11., and table 7.3.). This is different to the pattern of 
eye movements observed in experiments 1 and 7, which both 
showed a higher proportion of anticipatory eye movements to the 
plausible locations compared to the implausible locations. 
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Plausible – table vs. dress 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were more anticipatory looks 
toward the previous location of the table in the plausible condition 
than there were looks to the previous location of the dress (un-
referred distractor) (t1 (31) = 2.900, p < .01) (t2 (23) = -2.986, p < 
.01). Similarly, during ‘the glass’ there were more looks towards the 
previous location of the table in the plausible condition than there 
were looks to the previous location of the dress (t1 (31) = 3.566, p < 
.01) (t2 (23) = -4.252, p < .001).  
 
Implausible – lamp vs. dress 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were more anticipatory looks 
toward the previous location of the lamp in the implausible condition 
than there were looks to the previous location of the dress (un-
referred distractor) (t1 (31) = 2.690, p < .05) (t2 (23) = -3.728, p < 
.01). During ‘the glass’ there were more looks towards the previous 
location of the lamp in the implausible condition than there were 
looks to the previous location of the dress (t1 (31) = 2.619, p < .05) 
(t2 (23) = -2.807, p < .05). These differences suggest that the 
proportion of looks to the table and the lamp were not due to levels of 
chance. In other words, during the critical part of the narrative 
participants were more likely to look at the table/lamp than the 
unnamed distractor. 
 
Time table  
(pl.) 
lamp  
(impl.) 
dress  
(pl.) 
dress  
(impl.) 
the wine carefully into 20 20 11 11 
the glass 15 12 6 5 
 
Table 7.3. Percentage of trials with looks to the table, lamp, and dress (distractor) 
during “the wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages calculated from the total 
number of trials. 
 
 
 
 	  
197	  
 
Figure 7.10. Looks to the table (plausible location), lamp (implausible location) and 
the dress (distractor) during “the wine carefully into the glass”.  
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Fig 7.11. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the previous region of the table (plausible 
location), the lam
p (im
plausible location) and the dress (distractor). The percentages show
 the 
proportion of trials on w
hich participants fixated on each region of interest during ‘then, she picked 
up the bottle, and poured the w
ine carefully into the glass. The fixations w
ere calculated every 25 
m
s sequentially from
 the synchronisation point.     
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7.2.4. Discussion  
In the current experiment we linguistically restricted the number of 
affordable items within the context of a blank screen so that it 
matched the constraint provided a concurrent visual scene. This 
design allowed us to explore the extent to which the linguistic 
constraints within a narrative would be able to guide anticipatory eye 
movements to implausible locations within the context of a blank 
screen. The findings showed that during ‘the wine carefully into’ there 
were as many anticipatory eye movements to the previous region of 
the lamp (implausible location) when the glass was described as 
having been moved there, as there were looks to the previous region 
of the table (plausible location) when the glass was described as 
having been moved there. During the final reference to ‘the glass’ 
there was similarly no difference in the proportion of looks to the 
plausible and implausible locations. This is different to the pattern of 
eye movements observed in experiments 1 and 7, which both 
showed a higher proportion of anticipatory eye movements to the 
plausible locations compared to the implausible locations. Together, 
these findings suggest that when the narrative restricts the number of 
affordable items, the linguistic context is able to guide anticipatory 
eye movements to the appropriate, yet implausible location of the 
glass.    
     While the current experiment provided a more constraining 
linguistic context, we also changed the style of the visual images 
(from scenes to quadrant) and this change of design could have lead 
to potential problems. In experiments 1 and 7 participants were 
presented with visual scenes that were subsequently removed before 
the onset of language. In contrast, due to the increased length of the 
narrative in the current experiment we decided to use a quadrant 
design as we hoped that this would increase the proportion of eye 
movements during the latter part of the spoken narrative, thereby 
preventing a floor effect. While the quadrant design did increase the 
proportion of eye movements, it could also appear to be the case that 
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participants anticipated the implausible locations as much as the 
plausible locations simply because the quadrant design made it 
easier to remember the regions of the implausible locations. 
However, going back to experiments 1 and 7 we found that during 
the final reference to ‘the glass’ participants looked as much to the 
region of the lamp as they looked to the region of the table – they just 
didn’t anticipate the region of the lamp. If the plausibility effect was 
due to difficulties with recalling the implausible location we would 
have expected to see fewer looks to the lamp compared to the table 
both during ‘the wine carefully into’ as well as during ‘the glass’.  
     Another potential problem with the quadrant design is that the 
proportion of looks to the plausible and implausible locations could 
have been due to level of chance. In other words, if there were no 
difference in the proportion of looks to the plausible/implausible 
locations and the unnamed distractor this would suggest that 
participants’ eye movements were not related to the spoken 
language and this might explain why there were no more anticipatory 
looks to the plausible locations, compared to the implausible 
locations. However, when comparing the proportion of looks to the 
plausible and implausible locations with looks to the un-named 
distractor we find that during the critical part of the sentence (the 
wine carefully into the glass) there were always significantly more 
looks to both the table and the lamp than there were looks to the 
distractor. This difference suggests that the proportion of looks to the 
table and the lamp were not due to levels of chance. Furthermore, 
going back to experiments 1 and 7 we find that during ‘the wine 
carefully into’ there were more looks to the plausible locations 
compared to the distractors, but no difference in looks to the 
implausible locations and the distractors. In contrast, during the final 
reference to ‘the glass’ there were more looks to both the plausible 
and implausible locations than there were looks to the distractors. 
This shows that when the linguistic context does not explicitly restrict 
the number of affordable items, participants anticipate the plausible 
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locations more than the distractors. However, they do not anticipate 
the implausible locations any more than they anticipate the locations 
of the un-named distractors.  
     In line with previous studies (e.g. Altmann, 1999; Schwanenflugel 
& LaCount, 1988; Vu, Kellas, Petersen & Metcalf, 2003) the data 
from the current experiment demonstrates that in the absence of a 
concurrent visual context we rely on linguistic information in order to 
anticipate upcoming references. The findings from the previous 
studies suggest that there is a quantitative difference in how we 
process and anticipate upcoming discourse depending on whether 
the visual scene is available, or removed before the onset of spoken 
language. During language comprehension our anticipation of 
upcoming references is constrained by the visual context. However, 
in the absence of a visual context these constraints are weakened, 
encouraging us to rely more on real-world knowledge when 
anticipating upcoming references. In the concurrent visual scene the 
glass is the only item that affords ‘pouring into’ and this is why we 
anticipate its location whether it is plausible or not. In the context of a 
blank screen on the other hand, anticipation is no longer strongly 
bound to the visual context and therefore upcoming references are 
much less specific. The current experiment shows that a linguistic 
context, which unambiguously restricts the number of affordable 
items, is able to guide anticipatory eye movements to the 
appropriate, yet implausible location of the glass. In other words, 
when we constrain the context of the narrative so that there is only 
one possible glass we find a similar pattern of eye movements to that 
observed in experiment 2 (concurrent screen) where participants 
anticipated the plausible location of the glass (table), as much as 
they anticipated the implausible location of the glass (lamp). This 
suggests that in the absence of a visual context we require a more 
constraining linguistic context in order to achieve the same weighting 
of constraints provided by a concurrent visual scene. 
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7.2.5. Summary  
In experiment 8 we attempted to encourage an influence of 
plausibility similar to that observed in the context of a blank screen. 
The findings showed that the inclusion of a second (affordable) glass 
did not weaken affordance-based constraints sufficiently to show an 
influence of plausibility. In other words, the addition of an alternative 
glass for ‘pouring the wine into’ did not lead participants to consider 
this option any more when the other glass was in an implausible 
location, compared to when it was in a plausible location.  
     In experiment 9 we attempted to increase the weighting of 
constraint (in the context of a blank screen) by linguistically restricting 
the number of affordable items within the context of the narrative. By 
doing so, we hoped to linguistically create an equal weighting of 
constraint to that provided by a concurrent visual context. The 
findings showed that in contrast to experiments 1 and 7, there were 
no more anticipatory eye movements to the previous region of the 
table (plausible location) than there were looks to the previous region 
of the lamp (implausible location). This shows that when spoken 
language unambiguously restricts the number of affordable items, the 
linguistic context is able to guide anticipatory eye movements to the 
appropriate, yet implausible location of the glass. In other words, 
when we constrain the context of the narrative so that there is only 
one possible glass we find a similar pattern of eye movements to that 
observed in experiment 2 where the visual scene was presented 
alongside spoken language. This suggests that in the absence of a 
visual context we require a more constraining linguistic context in 
order to achieve the same weighting of constraints provided by a 
concurrent visual scene. In the final chapter we provide an overview 
of the experimental findings and discuss the implications of how 
differently weighted constraints are able to influence our anticipation 
of upcoming events.  
 
 
 
11	  
	  	  	   	   	   	  
	  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8  
 
IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1. Background & aims 
In everyday life we regularly use language to refer to items and 
people within our immediate proximity and several studies have 
shown that during language comprehension we very rapidly establish 
reference to objects within our visual environment (e.g. Allopenna et 
al., 1998; Cooper, 1974; Eberhard et al., 1995; Sedivy et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, as language unfolds, spoken information serves to 
constrain the potential number of upcoming referents within the 
visual scene and this makes it easier to anticipate the most plausible 
role-fillers within a described event (e.g. Altmann & Mirkovic, 2009; 
Tanenhaus et al., 1995 Rayner et al., 2004). However, while 
language is often used to refer to items within our visual proximity, 
we may also use language to refer to items, people, and events 
when these are absent from our visual context. When language 
refers to something outside our visual environment the anticipatory 
activation of appropriate representations is no longer bound so 
strongly to the visual context, but is now constrained purely by 
language. When this is the case the nature of the upcoming 
reference is much less specific and in such situations, any number of 
plausible role-fillers may be referred to.  
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     The research presented in this thesis aimed to explore the 
mapping of language onto internal representations of visually 
available scenes, as well as previously viewed scenes. Firstly, we 
were interested in how event-plausibility is able to influence our 
internal representations of described events and secondly, how these 
representations might be modulated by the nature of the visual 
context (as present or absent).  
 
8.2. Summary of experimental findings 
In experiments 1 and 2 participants listened to spoken narratives 
where an item was either moved to a plausible or an implausible 
location within the visual scene (e.g. “the woman will move the glass 
onto the table/lamp. Then she will pick up the bottle, and pour the 
wine carefully into the glass”). In experiment 1 (blank screen) we 
found that during ‘the wine carefully into’ participants only anticipated 
plausible locations. When items had been moved to implausible 
locations there was little or no evidence of anticipatory eye 
movements. However, in the context of a concurrent visual scene 
(experiment 2) participants anticipated both the plausible and 
implausible locations. In both experiments there was no influence of 
plausibility during the final reference to the glass. In other words, 
once the glass was directly referred to participants had no difficulty 
retrieving its location regardless of whether this was plausible or 
implausible. This suggests that the difference in anticipatory eye 
movements between the concurrent and blank screen experiments is 
not specifically related to problems retrieving the implausible 
locations, but rather associated with being able to retrieve the most 
likely candidate (the glass) into which the pouring will take place. As 
such, the effect of plausibility could be a reflection of the weaker 
constraint drawn from a previous visual scene (compared to the 
constraint drawn from a concurrent visual scene), which then allows 
real-world knowledge to exert a greater influence on the probabilistic 
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activation of likely candidates.   
     Experiments 3 (blank screen) and 4 (concurrent screen) explored 
the extent to which this pattern of eye movements could be 
generalised and extended to contextual plausibility. Instead of 
moving objects to different locations we now moved contextually 
plausible (e.g. a cat in a kitchen scene) and implausible items (e.g. a 
penguin in a kitchen scene) to the same location. We found a similar 
pattern of eye movements to that observed in experiments 1 and 2. 
These findings suggest that the influence of plausibility observed in 
experiment 1 was not exclusively related to plausibility of location, 
but may be extended to the contextual plausibility of the referent 
itself.  
     In experiment 5 we attempted to uncover why plausibility only 
affects anticipatory eye movements in the context of a blank screen. 
More specifically, we investigated the extent to which a higher 
proportion of initial eye movements to the plausible locations (in 
experiment 1) could have made these locations more accessible and 
therefore easier to anticipate later in the narrative. The findings 
showed that while the proportion of initial looks made the implausible 
regions more accessible later in the narrative, this was not the case 
for the plausible locations. The data further indicated that participants 
who initially looked to the previous region of the lamp returned as 
much to that location as participants who had initially looked to the 
previous region of the books. Taken together the data suggests that 
the higher proportion of anticipatory eye movements to the plausible 
locations (observed in experiment 1) is not solely dependent on the 
higher proportion of early looks to these locations.  
     In experiments 6 and 7 we explored the implications of introducing 
an item purely through language (for example, the woman will move 
a glass onto the table/lamp). The results showed a similar pattern of 
eye movements to experiment 1 (where the glass was first presented 
in the visual scene, the visual scene was removed, and then the 
glass was referred to by spoken language). In other words, 
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participants anticipated the location of the glass when it had been 
moved to a plausible location, but not when it had been moved to an 
implausible location. Like in experiment 1, there was no influence of 
plausibility during the final reference to the glass. In other words, 
once the glass was directly referred to participants had no difficulty 
retrieving its location regardless of whether this was plausible or 
implausible. These findings suggest that a purely linguistic 
representation of the glass did not increase the proportion of 
anticipatory eye movements to the implausible locations.  
     In chapter 6 we outlined an account explaining why plausibility 
affects anticipatory eye movements in the context of a blank screen, 
but not in the context of a concurrent visual scene. We proposed that 
there is a quantitative difference in how we process and anticipate 
upcoming discourse depending on whether the visual scene is 
available, or removed immediately before the onset of spoken 
language. In other words, the constraint that is drawn from a previous 
visual scene is weaker than the constraint drawn from a concurrent 
visual scene and this allows real-world knowledge to exert a greater 
influence on the probabilistic activation of likely candidates. This 
probabilistic approach means that the underlying mechanism is the 
same, but that quantitative differences in the strength of constraints 
leads to what appear to be qualitative differences in behaviour.   
     During language comprehension we assume that participants in 
an event will be drawn from our visual environment (e.g. Altmann & 
Mirkovic, 2009; Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus et al., 1995). In the visual 
scene the referred target is the only item that affords the described 
action and this is why we anticipate its location regardless of 
plausibility. In other words, if participants assume that the upcoming 
reference will be drawn from within the visual scene and the glass is 
the only item within the scene that can afford ‘pouring into’, the visual 
context constrains them to anticipate the event-specific location of 
the glass, even when this location is implausible. However, in the 
context of a blank screen participants have to rely on a visual 
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memory, or internal representation of the scene. As such, the 
constraints derived from the visual scene are weakened since 
anticipation is no longer so strongly bound by the visual context. 
Rather, in the absence of a visual scene participants were further 
influenced by real-world knowledge and this could have rendered the 
upcoming reference much less specific.  
     The final two experiments explored the extent to which both 
concurrent scene constraints and linguistic constraints are able to 
guide anticipatory eye movements to appropriate (yet implausible) 
locations. In experiment 8 we attempted to decrease the weighting of 
constraints derived from object-affordances (in a concurrent visual 
scene) by providing an alternative option for ‘pouring the wine into’. 
The findings showed that the inclusion of a second (affordable) item 
did not weaken affordance-based constraints sufficiently to show an 
influence of plausibility. In contrast, experiment 9 attempted to 
increase the weighting of constraints (in the context of a blank 
screen) by linguistically restricting the number of affordable items 
within the context of the narrative (e.g. the woman really wanted 
some wine, but she could only find one glass…). By doing so, we 
hoped to linguistically equalise the constraints provided by a 
concurrent and a blank screen context. In contrast to experiments 1 
and 7, there were as many anticipatory eye movements to the 
implausible locations as there were looks to the plausible locations. 
This shows that when spoken language unambiguously restricts the 
number of affordable items, the linguistic context is able to guide 
anticipatory eye movements to the appropriate, yet implausible 
location of the glass.  
     Taken together, the findings suggest that that the 
absence/presence of a visual context provides a quantitative 
difference in how we process and anticipate implausible events. In 
the absence of a visual context we require a more constraining 
linguistic context in order to achieve the same degree of constraints 
provided by a concurrent visual scene. Thus, our memory, or internal 
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representation of a visual scene, is not always an equal substitute for 
the scene itself, since different constraints come into play.  
 
8.3. Theoretical implications  
A number of studies have shown that when language refers to the 
current communicative situation we very rapidly establish reference 
to objects within our visual environment (e.g. Allopenna et al. 1998; 
Altmann, 2011; Cooper, 1974; Eberhard et al., 1995; Salverda & 
Altmann, 2011; Sedivy et al., 1999). During language comprehension 
we often rely on real-world knowledge and experience in order to 
anticipate upcoming events before they unfold within a narrative (e.g. 
Kamide, 2008; Kamide et al., 2003; Matsuki et al., 2011; McRae & 
Matsuki, 2009; Van Berkum et al. 2005) and visual world studies 
have shown that semantic information derived from language allows 
us to anticipate the most appropriate item within a visual context 
before being directly referred to (e.g. Altmann & Kamide, 1999, 
Kamide et al., 2003). In other words, when language unfolds, 
linguistic information (as well as real-world knowledge) serves to 
constrain the potential number of upcoming referents within our 
immediate visual environment. Such ‘visual’ constraints are 
particularly useful during anticipation, since they allow us to integrate 
linguistic information with the features and affordances of the items 
within our current visual context, thus making it easier to correctly 
anticipate the most likely upcoming referent.  
     While language often occurs in conjunction with a visual context, 
modular theories of language comprehension (e.g. Coltheart, 1999; 
Fodor, 1983) assume that early stages of language processing are 
guided solely by syntactic constraints, whereby a single grammatical 
interpretation is selected or ranked on the basis of the features of the 
unfolding linguistic composition (Frazier, 1987; Frazier & Clifton, 
1996).  According to this approach non-linguistic constraints such as 
real-world knowledge and visual information are not employed until 
later stages of processing. Consequently, research subscribing to 
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modular theories of language processing has largely neglected the 
importance of non-linguistic sources and the extent to which visual 
information is able to influence on-line language comprehension.  
     In contrast, constraint-based approaches (e.g. MacDonald, 
Pearlmutter & Seidenberg, 1994; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton & 
Hanna, 2000; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995) assume that people 
continuously evaluate multiple syntactic options, employing a range 
of constraints, which may be derived from both linguistic and non-
linguistic sources of information. According to these accounts, any 
available and relevant information is continuously assimilated in 
order to determine the most suitable interpretation of language as it 
unfolds. In this way constraints derived from both syntactic, as well 
as non-linguistic information, are able to influence language 
comprehension from the earliest stages of processing. However, 
while constraint-based approaches promotes the notion of non-
linguistic constraints, studies have yet to demonstrate how 
information derived from a concurrent visual scene is weighted 
against that from our memory, or internal representation of that same 
scene (but see Altmann & Kamide, 2009, for an initial exploration of 
such issues).  
     Several studies have explored how visual information can 
influence comprehension when language refers to items within a 
concurrent visual context (e.g. Chambers et al., 2002, 2004; 
Knoeferle, Crocker, Scheepers & Pickering, 2005; Magliano, Dijkstra 
& Zwaan, 1996; Tanenhaus et al., 1995). Most notably, Knoeferle 
and Crocker (2006) investigated the influence and interaction of real-
world knowledge and visual information by measuring participants’ 
eye movements as they listened to descriptions of accompanying 
visual scenes. The data showed that when verb-related information 
was stereotypically related to one of the characters (depicted 
performing an unrelated action) and visually related to another non-
stereotypical character (depicted performing the described action) 
participants looked more to the non-stereotypical character when 
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anticipating the upcoming agent. This suggests that participants 
relied more on information associated with the depicted event, than 
knowledge associated with the description of the event. In contrast, 
when neither of the agents were depicted performing the described 
action participants looked more to the stereotypical character, in this 
case relying more on real-world knowledge derived from the 
description of the event. These findings may further be related to the 
notion of ‘concurrent scene constraint’, whereby the visual depiction 
of the characters takes ‘precedence’ over participants’ real-world 
knowledge of the stereotypical actions of the characters. On the 
other hand, when the characters’ actions are not constrained by the 
visual scene, participants draw on real-world knowledge in order to 
anticipate which of the characters language refers to.        
     On the basis of these findings Knoeferle and Crocker (2006) 
proposed an account, which emphasises the coordinated interplay of 
the information derived from the visual scene, linguistic information 
and real-world knowledge during language comprehension. 
According to this account language comprehension occurs in an 
incremental fashion, whereby we interpret and anticipate upcoming 
language gradually as each word unfolds. Thereby, unfolding 
language guides eye movements to named and anticipated items, or 
events within a visual scene, which is then able to influence 
comprehension. According to this account, online comprehension 
relies on multiple sources of available information, which each serves 
to constrain our interpretation of upcoming language. Furthermore, in 
the context of a concurrent visual context this tight temporal 
interaction between different types of information leads us to visually 
inspect named items/events at the earliest possible moment (during 
anticipation before the item is named) and this increases their 
salience leading to a greater reliance on information derived from the 
depicted event, compared to real-world knowledge associated with 
the described event.    
     The experimental data presented in this thesis corresponds well 
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with constraint-based theories, as well as the coordinated interplay 
account of situated language comprehension, showing that we rely 
on multiple sources of information to constrain comprehension. More 
specifically, we have demonstrated how a concurrent visual context 
is able to influence language comprehension by constraining our 
anticipation of upcoming references. This suggests that when 
language refers to the current communicative situation we rely on a 
combination of visual information (and the affordances of items within 
this visual context), linguistic information and real-world knowledge in 
order to most efficiently constrain our interpretation of upcoming 
language. Our findings further suggests that there is a quantitative 
difference in how we process and anticipate implausible events, 
whereby in the absence of a visual context we require a more 
constraining linguistic context in order to achieve the same weighting 
of constraints provided by a concurrent visual scene. This in turn 
provides more detailed information in terms of the weighting of 
constraints provided by a concurrent, or recently encountered visual 
context and the extent to which we rely on visual information to 
constrain our interpretation of upcoming language. 
 
8.4. Implications for reading studies 
The discrepancy between the weighting of constraints in the 
absence/presence of a visual context may also be useful when 
looking at the influence of plausibility on reading. For instance, 
Rayner et al. (2004) found an earlier pattern of disruption in response 
to anomalous sentences compared to implausible sentences, which 
only showed disruption at a later point in time. In contrast, visual 
world studies by Altmann and Kamide (1999) and Kamide et al. 
(2003) have showed early plausibility effects, specifically in terms of 
anticipating upcoming references. Rayner et al. proposed that this 
difference between experiments might be related to the higher 
degree of constraints afforded by the visual context, which made it 
easier for participants to anticipate the most plausible referents within 
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the visual scene. On the other hand, participants in the reading 
experiment were not constrained by a visual context and therefore 
less able to anticipate upcoming referents based on their likelihood.  
     This difference in constraints allows us to speculate that a visual 
world version of the study by Rayner et al. would lead to an earlier 
influence of plausibility, compared to the effect observed during 
reading. For example, if participants listened to the same plausible 
and implausible sentences used in the reading study (e.g. John used 
a knife/an axe to chop the large carrots for dinner) whilst viewing a 
visual scene depicting a man, a knife, an axe, some carrots, we 
would expect the visual constraints of the scene to result in 
anticipatory looks to the carrots (upon hearing the verb ‘chop’) 
regardless of whether John used a knife or an axe to chop them. This 
is similar to the findings by Rayner et al., which showed no difference 
in reading times between the plausible and implausible sentences – 
in this study only anomalous sentences (e.g. John used a pump to 
inflate the large carrots for dinner) lead to an early pattern of 
disruption. However, if we were to include a pile of wood in the visual 
scene we might expect to see an early influence of plausibility 
(similar to that observed by Kamide et al., 2003) with more 
anticipatory looks to the carrots when ‘John used a knife to chop…’ 
and more looks to the pile of wood when ‘John used an axe to 
chop…’, compared to when ‘John used a knife to chop…’. This 
scenario (although hypothetical) illustrates how the constraints 
provided by a concurrent visual context might influence 
comprehension differently compared to when reading about the 
same event in the absence of any visual information. It further 
illustrates how a more complex visual environment (in which several 
affordable items are present) might encourage us to rely more on 
real-world knowledge (just like in the blank screen) in order to 
correctly determine the most likely outcome on an event.    
     In a broader context is it also worth considering how visually 
grounded representations of items within our concurrent visual 
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environment at times have to compete with linguistic representations 
of the same item (see Altmann & Kamide, 2009). In such 
circumstances the constraints from our visual environment may 
interfere with comprehension since we have to keep track of 
separate (visual and linguistic) representations of an item. Often 
during descriptive events the location of the characters may change 
regularly, objects are moved to new locations, different events occur, 
new characters are introduced and so on (Zwaan, Magliano & 
Graesser, 1995b; Zwaan & Madden, 2004) and such changes 
require us to continuously update our mental representations of the 
described situation as it unfolds, in order to gain an up-to-date full 
representation of the described event. When relating a described 
event to a static visual scene we must interpret whether the scene 
corresponds to the beginning, the middle, or the end of that event. 
Using the previous example of ‘moving the glass’, the depicted glass 
on the floor corresponds to the beginning of the described event (e.g. 
the woman will move the glass…). However, once the glass is 
described as having been moved to the table the visual scene no 
longer corresponds to this part of the event. In this subsequent part 
of the narrative the depicted version of the glass (on the floor) 
interferes with our internal representation of the glass (described as 
being on the table) and this discrepancy might make it more difficult 
to update our mental representation of the unfolding event. In 
contrast, during reading there is no interference from a visual context 
and this should make event-representations more dynamic and 
therefore easier to update.     
 
8.5. Conclusions  
The studies presented in this thesis explored the influence of event-
plausibility on internal representations of described events and how 
these representations may be modulated by the nature of the visual 
context. Our findings suggest that the conceptual representations 
activated during language processing in a concurrent visual context 
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are quantitatively different from those activated when the visual 
context to which that language applies is absent; our memory, or 
internal representation of a visual scene is not a surrogate for the 
scene itself since different constraints come into play.  
     While language is often used to refer to items, people, and events 
when these are absent from our visual context, we may also use 
language to refer to items within our visual proximity and the findings 
from our experiments highlight the importance of visual information 
for understanding and interpreting language in those situations where 
language does refer to our immediate visual context. However, in the 
absence of a visual context our anticipation is no longer restricted by 
visual information and in such situations we may require a more 
constraining linguistic context to attain the same degree of constraint 
as that provided by a concurrent visual scene.    
     These findings correspond well with constraint-based theories, as 
well as the coordinated interplay account of situated language 
comprehension, by demonstrating our reliance on multiple sources of 
available information when interpreting unfolding events. Specifically, 
the studies presented in this thesis provide more detailed information 
in terms of the weighting of constraints provided by a concurrent, or 
recently encountered visual context and the extent to which we rely 
on visual information to constrain our interpretation of upcoming 
language.  
 
 
 
	  
215	  
Appendix 1: Experimental sentences – experiments 1 & 2 
 
 
1. 
a. The woman will put the bread onto the plate. Then, she will 
take some butter, and spread it sluggishly onto the bread. 
 
b. The woman decided not to put the bread onto the plate. She 
will take some butter, and spread it sluggishly onto the bread. 
 
c. The woman will put the bread onto the bottle. Then, she will 
take some butter, and spread it sluggishly onto the bread. 
 
2. 
a. The office worker will move the dustbin right in front of the fan. 
Then, he will grab the can, and chuck it violently into the 
dustbin. 
 
b. The office worker has just moved the dustbin away from the 
fan. Now, he will grab the can, and chuck it violently into the 
dustbin. 
 
c. The office worker will move the dustbin onto the printer. Then, 
he will grab the can, and chuck it violently into the dustbin.  
 
3. 
a. The woman will lift the pet carrier onto the table. Then, she will 
take hold of the cat, and put it carefully into the pet carrier. 
 
b. The woman has just lifted the pet carrier down from the table. 
Now, she will take hold of the cat, and put it carefully into the 
pet carrier. 
 
c. The woman will lift the pet carrier onto the flowers. Then, she 
will take hold of the cat, and put it carefully into the pet carrier. 
 
4. 
a. The businessman will put the computer onto the desk. Then, 
he will pick up the disk, and insert it gently into the computer. 
 
b. The businessman was unable to put the computer onto the 
desk. But, he will pick up the disk, and insert it gently into the 
computer. 
 
c. The businessman will put the computer onto the briefcase. 
Then, he will pick up the disk, and insert it gently into the 
computer. 
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5. 
a. The secretary will move the folder right next to the lamp. Then, 
she will look at the documents, and file them efficiently in the 
folder.  
 
b. The secretary has moved the folder away from the lamp. She 
will look at the documents, and file them efficiently in the 
folder.  
 
c. The secretary will move the folder onto the sandwich. Then, 
she will look at the documents, and file them efficiently in the 
folder.  
 
6. 
a. The woman will place the pan on the cooker. Then, she will 
reach for the bowl, and transfer the egg swiftly into the pan.  
 
b. The woman will soon place the pan on the cooker. But first, 
she will reach for the bowl, and transfer the egg swiftly into the 
pan.  
 
c. The woman will place the pan on the pepper mill. Then, she 
will reach for the bowl, and transfer the egg swiftly into the 
pan.  
 
7. 
a. The housewife will move the vase onto the sideboard. Then, 
she will pick up the flowers, and arrange them delicately in the 
vase. 
 
b. The housewife is too tired to move the vase onto the 
sideboard. But, she will pick up the flowers, and arrange them 
delicately in the vase. 
 
c. The housewife will move the vase onto the Hoover. Then, she 
will pick up the flowers, and arrange them delicately in the 
vase. 
 
8. 
a. The chef will place the pan on the cooker. Then, she will 
notice the lid, and place it quickly onto the pan. 
 
b. The chef will check the pan and the cooker. Then, she will 
notice the lid, and place it quickly onto the pan. 
 
c. The chef will place the pan on the potatoes. Then, she will 
notice the lid, and place it quickly onto the pan. 
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9. 
a. The woman will move the jewellery box right next to the 
coffee. Then, she will admire the necklace, and hide it quickly 
inside the jewellery box. 
 
b. The woman will examine the jewellery box as she drinks the 
coffee. Then, she will admire the necklace, and hide it quickly 
inside the jewellery box. 
 
c. The woman will move the jewellery box right onto the 
grapefruit. Then, she will admire the necklace, and hide it 
quickly inside the jewellery box. 
 
10. 
a. The man will shift the box onto the worktop. Then, he will lift 
up the pizza, and put it carefully into the box. 
 
b. The man has just shifted the box off the worktop. Now, he will 
lift up the pizza, and put it carefully into the box. 
 
c. The man will shift the box onto the ice cream. Then, he will lift 
up the pizza, and put it carefully into the box. 
 
11. 
a. The man will put the gramophone onto the sideboard. Then, 
he will clean the record, and place it carefully on the 
gramophone. 
 
b. The man will soon put the gramophone onto the sideboard. 
But first, he will clean the record, and place it carefully on the 
gramophone. 
 
c. The man will put the gramophone onto the candles. Then, he 
will clean the record, and place it carefully on the 
gramophone. 
 
12. 
a. The girl will suspend the hanger on the rail. Then, she will 
reach for the shirt, and hang it cheerfully onto the hanger. 
 
b. The girl has taken the hanger off the rail. Now, she will reach 
for the shirt, and hang it cheerfully onto the hanger. 
 
c. The girl will suspend the hanger on the plant. Then, she will 
reach for the shirt, and hang it cheerfully onto the hanger. 
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13. 
a. The man will move the cup onto the table. Then, he will reach 
for the teapot, and pour the tea slowly into the cup. 
 
b. The man has taken the cup off the table. Now, he will reach 
for the teapot, and pour the tea slowly into the cup. 
 
c. The man will move the cup onto the figurine. Then, he will 
reach for the teapot, and pour the tea slowly into the cup. 
 
14. 
a. The man will move the chair next to the girl. Then, he will lift 
up the teddy bear, and sit it affectionately on the chair.  
 
b. The man will look at the chair and then at the girl. Then, he will 
lift up the teddy bear, and sit it affectionately on the chair.  
 
c. The man will move the chair onto the Christmas tree. Then, he 
will lift up the teddy bear, and sit it affectionately on the chair.  
 
15. 
a. The woman will move the mug onto the trolley. Then, she will 
reach for the bottle, and tip the water quickly into the mug. 
 
b. The woman has taken the mug off the trolley. Now, she will 
reach for the bottle, and tip the water quickly into the mug. 
 
c. The woman will move the mug onto the Wellies. Then, she will 
reach for the bottle, and tip the water quickly into the mug. 
 
16. 
a. The woman will put the glass onto the table. Then, she will 
pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
 
b. The woman is too lazy to put the glass onto the table. Instead, 
she will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the 
glass. 
 
c. The women will put the glass onto the lamp. Then, she will 
pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
 
17. 
a. The boy will put the boat into the pool. Then, he will pick up 
the dummy, and place it cautiously inside the boat.     
 
b. The boy has just taken the boat out of the pool. Now, he will 
pick up the dummy, and place it cautiously inside the boat.     
 
c. The boy will put the boat on the clothesline. Then, he will pick 
up the dummy, and place it cautiously inside the boat.     
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18. 
a. The woman will move the suitcase onto the bed. Then, she 
will take the shoes, and put them hurriedly into the suitcase. 
 
b. The woman cannot be bothered to move the suitcase onto the 
bed. Instead, she will take the shoes, and put them hurriedly 
into the suitcase. 
 
c. The woman will move the suitcase onto the stereo. Then, she 
will take the shoes, and put them hurriedly into the suitcase. 
 
19. 
a. The girl will shortly put the glass onto the tray. Then, she will 
grab the jug, and pour some lemonade attentively into the 
glass. 
 
b. The girl will shortly put the glass onto the tray. But first, she 
will grab the jug, and pour some lemonade attentively into the 
glass. 
 
c. The girl will shortly put the glass onto the mannequin. Then, 
she will grab the jug, and pour some lemonade attentively into 
the glass. 
 
20. 
a. The man will lift the briefcase onto the desk. Then, he will 
reach for the notepad, and place it hesitantly inside the 
briefcase. 
 
b. The man refuses to lift the briefcase onto the desk. Rather, he 
will reach for the notepad, and place it hesitantly inside the 
briefcase. 
 
c. The man will lift the briefcase onto the water cooler. Then, he 
will reach for the notepad, and place it hesitantly inside the 
briefcase. 
 
21. 
a. The girl will fasten the collar on the dog. Then, she will pick up 
the leash, and attach it cheerfully onto the collar. 
 
b. The girl will soon fasten the collar on the dog. But first, she will 
pick up the leash, and attach it cheerfully onto the collar. 
 
c. The girl will fasten the collar on the lamp. Then, she will pick 
up the leash, and attach it cheerfully onto the collar. 
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22. 
a. The man will lift the toolbox onto the shelf. Then, he will pick 
up the hammer, and drop it sloppily into the toolbox. 
 
b. The man doesn’t have time to lift the toolbox onto the shelf. 
Instead, he will pick up the hammer, and drop it sloppily into 
the toolbox. 
 
c. The man will lift the toolbox onto the drill. Then, he will pick up 
the hammer, and drop it sloppily into the toolbox. 
 
23. 
a. The man will put the basket onto the ladder. Then, he will pick 
some apples, and place them gently in the basket. 
 
b. The man is too exhausted to put the basket onto the ladder he 
will pick some apples, and place them gently in the basket. 
 
c. The man will put the basket onto the donkey. Then, he will 
pick some apples, and place them gently in the basket. 
 
24.  
a. The boy will put the jar onto the stool. Then, he will take the 
biscuits, and transfer them attentively into the jar.   
 
b. The boy will soon put the jar onto the stool. But first, he will 
take the biscuits, and transfer them attentively into the jar.   
 
c. The boy will put the jar onto the birdcage. Then, he will take 
the biscuits, and transfer them attentively into the jar.   
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Appendix 2: Example of filler items – experiments 1 & 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. The girl will push the bicycle past the church. And then, she 
will quickly go into the house.   
 
b. The girl will chuck the teddy past the church. And then, she 
will quickly go into the house.   
 
c. The girl will skip past the church. And then, she will quickly go 
into the house.   
 
d. The girl will look into her bag. And then, she will quickly go into 
the house.   
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Appendix 3: Experimental scenes – experiments 1 & 2 
 
               
 01       02 
 
  
03       04  
 
  
05       06                                                 
 
      
07       08     
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09       10     
  
  
11       12          
 
  
13       14      
  
     
15       16 
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17                                                         18  
 
  
19                                                         20 
 
  
21                                                         22 
 
  
23                                                         24 
 
 
 
	  
225	  
Appendix 4: Replicating the plausibility effect  
 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £3. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli 
Twenty-four experimental scenes were matched with two conditions. 
We used the same experimental scenes as in experiment 1, but 
since this design only consisted of two conditions (as opposed to the 
three conditions used in experiment 1) we increased the number of 
filler trials in order to equalise the distribution of implausible to 
plausible trials to that of experiment 1. As such, out of a total of 72 
trials, twelve experimental trials described the target item as being 
moved to an implausible condition and twelve experimental trials 
described the target item as being moved to a plausible location. The 
remaining 48 trials were made up of filler items, which always 
described an item being moved to a plausible location (see appendix 
7 for an example of the filler items).  
 
1. The woman will move the glass onto the table. Then, she will 
pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
 
(Plausible moved) 
 
2. The woman will move the glass onto the lamp. Then, she will 
pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
 
          (Implausible moved) 
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Procedure 
The procedure for this experiment was the same as in experiment 1. 
The scenes were presented for five seconds and then replaced by a 
grey screen. The onset of the audio occurred one second after the 
scene had been removed and the trials finished 11 seconds after the 
audio onset. As such, each trial lasted a total of 17 seconds. The 
total duration of experiment was approximately 45 minutes. The 
experiment was run on an Eyelink II head-mounted eye-tracker, 
which sampled at 250 Hz from the right eye.  
 
Analysis 
We used the same regions of interest as in experiment 1. We 
compared the proportion of saccades to the region of the table 
(plausible locations) and the region of the lamp (implausible 
locations). This allowed us to see if the plausibility of these locations 
had any influence on eye movements.  
 
Results 
Plausible (table) vs. implausible (lamp)  
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were more anticipatory looks 
toward the previous location of the table in the plausible condition 
(the woman will move the glass onto the table), than there were looks 
to the previous location of the lamp in the implausible condition (the 
woman will move the glass onto the lamp) (t1 (31) = -2.642, p < .05) 
(t2 (23) = -2.584, p < .05). However, during ‘the glass’ there were no 
more looks toward the previous location of the table in the plausible 
condition than there were looks to the previous location of the lamp in 
the implausible condition (t1 (31) = -1.845, p > .05) (t2 (23) = -1.443, 
p > .05) (see figures 1., 2., and table 1.). This replicates the pattern 
of eye movements we observed in experiment 1.  
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Time lamp  
(impl.) 
table  
(pl.) 
books  
(impl.) 
books  
(pl.) 
the wine carefully into 9 16 6 7 
the glass 8 9 4 2 
 
Table 1. Percentage of trials with looks to the previous location of the lamp, table 
and books (distractor) during “the wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages 
calculated from the total number of trials. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Looks toward the lamp/table: during ‘the wine carefully into’, and during ‘the 
glass’. 
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Fig 2. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the previous region of the table (plausible 
condition), the lam
p (im
plausible condition) and the books (distractor). The percentages show
 the 
proportion of trials on w
hich participants fixated on each region of interest during ‘the w
om
an w
ill 
put the glass onto the table. Then, she w
ill pick up the bottle, and pour the w
ine carefully into the 
glass. The fixations w
ere calculated every 25 m
s sequentially from
 the synchronisation point.     
 
Percentage of fixations 
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Appendix 5: Experimental sentences – experiments 3 & 4  
 
 
1. 
a. The woman will lift the cat onto the table. Then, she will 
quickly feed the cat. 
 
b. The woman will lift the penguin onto the table. Then, she will 
quickly feed the penguin.  
 
2. 
a. The diver will put the shell into the boat. Then, he will carefully 
open the shell. 
 
b. The diver will put the umbrella into the boat. Then, he will 
carefully open the umbrella. 
 
3. 
a. The student will move the pencil onto the desk. Then, he will 
casually sharpen the pencil. 
 
b. The student will move the axe onto the desk. Then, he will 
casually sharpen the axe. 
 
4. 
a. The woman will place the wine bottle on the table. Then, she 
will hurriedly open the wine bottle.  
 
b. The woman will place the oxygen tank on the table. Then, she 
will hurriedly open the oxygen tank.  
 
5.  
a. The girl will put the dog into the bathtub. Then, she will 
thoroughly wash the dog. 
 
b. The girl will put the pig into the bathtub. Then, she will 
thoroughly wash the pig.  
 
6. 
a. The flight attendant will put the blanket onto the trolley. Then, 
she will cheerfully hand the girl the blanket. 
 
b. The flight attendant will put the rocket onto the trolley. Then, 
she will cheerfully hand the girl the rocket. 
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7. 
a. The lumberjack will put the chainsaw onto the tree stump. 
Then, he will rigorously clean the chainsaw. 
 
b. The lumberjack will put the sewing machine onto the tree 
stump. Then, he will rigorously clean the sewing machine. 
 
8. 
a. The girl will lift the blender onto the table. Then, she will 
merrily turn on the blender. 
 
b. The girl will lift the leaf blower onto the table. Then, she will 
merrily turn on the leaf blower.    
 
9. 
a. The girl will put the teddy onto the blanket. Then, she will 
gleefully photograph the teddy. 
 
b. The girl will put the coffee machine onto the blanket. Then, 
she will gleefully photograph the coffee machine. 
 
10. 
a. The man will move the fish into the canoe. Then, he will swiftly 
clean the fish. 
 
b. The man will move the candelabra into the canoe. Then, he 
will swiftly clean the candelabra. 
 
11.     
a. The boy will drop the mushroom into the basket. Then, he will 
carefully inspect the mushroom. 
 
b. The boy will drop the stapler into the basket. Then, he will 
carefully inspect the stapler. 
 
12. 
a. The woman will move the handbag onto the dressing table. 
Then, she will slowly open the handbag. 
 
b. The woman will move the poison onto the dressing table. 
Then, she will slowly open the poison. 
 
13. 
a. The man will move the watering can right next to the hose. 
Then, he will lazily gaze at the watering can. 
 
b. The man will move the floppy disk right next to the hose. 
Then, he will lazily gaze at the floppy disk. 
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14. 
a. The girl will put the present inside the rucksack. Then, she will 
sneakily look at the present.    
 
b. The girl will put the hand grenade inside the rucksack. Then, 
she will sneakily look at the hand grenade.    
 
15.  
a. The woman will put the candle onto the table. Then, she will 
cautiously light the candle. 
 
b. The woman will put the dynamite onto the table. Then, she will 
cautiously light the dynamite. 
 
16. 
a. The man will place the bottles right in front of the fireplace. 
Then, he will cautiously dust off the bottles. 
 
b. The man will place the robot right in front of the fireplace. 
Then, he will cautiously dust off the robot. 
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Appendix 6: Example of filler items – experiments 3 & 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The guard will pick up the horn. Then, he will skilfully play a tune 
for the girl. 
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Appendix 7: Experimental scenes – experiments 3 & 4     
 
                          
1a       1b 
 
                      
2a       2b  
 
  
3a       3b                                                                                                      
 
       
4a       4b     
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5a       5b     
  
  
6a       6b          
 
  
7a       7b     
  
     
8a       8b 
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9a       9b     
  
  
10a                   10b          
 
  
11a       11b      
  
     
12a       12b 
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13a       13b     
  
 
  
14a       14b          
 
  
15a       15b      
  
     
16a       16b 
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Appendix 8: Example of filler items – experiment 7  
 
 
                
 
 
The diver will put a shell into the boat. Then, he will grab the knife 
and carefully open the shell.  
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Appendix 9: Example of filler items – experiment 8 
 
 
 
 
 
The boy will kick the football into the goal. Then, he will take off his 
jacket, and cheerfully fetch the football. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The boy will lift the present onto the armchair. Then, he will grab the 
scissors, and excitedly unwrap the present. 
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Appendix 10: Experiment 8 (version 1) 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £3. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli 
Twenty-four experimental scenes (see figures 1. and 2.) were 
matched with three conditions. In conditions 1 and 2 we presented 
two affordable target items. For example, one blue glass and one red 
glass were depicted on the floor. In condition 3 we presented one 
affordable item (e.g. one glass on the floor). This design allowed us 
to compare looks to the table in the two glasses plausible condition 
with looks to the lamp in the two glasses implausible condition, as 
well as looks to the red glass (un-referred affordable item) between 
each condition. In addition to the experimental trials, 24 sentence-
picture pairs were included as fillers (see appendix 2 for an example 
of the filler items).  
 
1. The woman will move the blue glass onto the table. Then, she 
will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the 
glass. 
 
(Two glasses plausible) 
 
2. The woman will move the blue glass onto the lamp. Then, she 
will pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the 
glass. 
 
(Two glasses implausible) 
 
3. The woman will move the glass onto the lamp. Then, she will 
pick up the bottle, and pour the wine carefully into the glass. 
 
(Original implausible) 
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Figure 1. Example of one of the visual scenes paired with sentences: 1) and 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of one of the visual scenes paired with sentence: 3). 
 
Procedure 
The procedure for this experiment was the same as in the previous 
concurrent screen experiments – the visual scenes were presented 
for 1000 milliseconds, followed by the onset of the auditory stimuli. 
The trials ended 11 seconds after the audio onset, lasting a total of 
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12 seconds. The experiment was run on an Eyelink II head-mounted 
eye-tracker, which sampled at 250 Hz from the right eye. 
 
Analysis 
We defined four Regions of interest within each scene; one 
corresponding to the plausible location of the moved glass (e.g. the 
table), another corresponding to the implausible location of the 
moved glass (e.g. the lamp), and a third area corresponding to the 
original location of the moved glass (e.g. the blue glass). Finally, we 
included a fourth area that corresponded to the un-referred 
affordable item (e.g. the red glass). As the scenes remained 
onscreen throughout each of the trials, we defined the regions of 
interest according to the outline of each target object. As such, 
participants’ eye movements had to be directed to one of the pixels 
occupied by each object within the scene. Participants’ eye 
movements were examined during certain time points in the spoken 
sentences. As in the previous experiments these critical time points 
occurred during ‘the wine carefully into’ (anticipatory eye 
movements), and during the final noun phrase ‘the glass’. 
     To begin with, we compared the proportion of saccades to the 
table/lamp when either one glass, or two glasses were presented in 
the visual scene. These comparisons allowed us to see if the 
inclusion of a second (un-referred) affordable item would be able to 
decrease the weighting of constraints and thereby influence eye 
movements to the plausible and implausible locations when the first 
glass had been moved there. Secondly, we compared the proportion 
of saccades to the region of the (un-referred) glass when the other 
glass had been moved to the table or the lamp. This allowed us to 
explore whether participants would anticipate and look to the 
alternative (un-referred) glass more when the first glass had been 
moved to an implausible locations, compared to a plausible location.  
 
 
 
 
	  
 
242	  
Results  
Table/lamp – two glasses plausible vs. two glasses implausible 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were no more anticipatory looks 
to the table in the ‘two glasses’ plausible condition than there were 
looks to the lamp in the ‘two glasses’ implausible condition (t1 (47) < 
1) (t2 (23) < 1). Similarly, during the final reference to ‘the glass’ 
there were no more looks to the table in the ‘two glasses’ plausible 
condition than there were looks to the lamp in the ‘two glasses’ 
implausible condition (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) < 1) (see figures 3., 4. and 
table 1.).  
 
Lamp – one glass implausible vs. two glasses implausible 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were no more anticipatory looks 
to the lamp in the ‘one glass’ implausible condition than there were 
looks to the lamp in the ‘two glasses’ implausible condition (t1 (47) = 
-1.123, p > .05) (t2 (23) = 1.606, p > .05). During the final reference 
to ‘the glass’ there were also no more looks to the lamp in the ‘one 
glass’ implausible condition than there were looks to the lamp in the 
‘two glasses’ implausible condition (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) = -1.588, p > 
.05) (see figures 3., 4. and table 1.).  
 
Time table  
(2 glasses) 
lamp  
(2 glasses) 
lamp  
(1 glass) 
the wine carefully into 
 
23 20 23 
the glass 
 
11 12 11 
 
Table 1. Percentage of trials with looks to the table and the lamp during “the wine 
carefully into the glass”. Percentages calculated from the total number of trials. 
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Figure 3. Looks to the table (plausible location) and the lamp (implausible location) 
during “the wine carefully into the glass”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
 
244	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the table and the lam
p in the plausible and 
im
plausible (tw
o glasses) conditions. The percentages show
 the proportion of trials on w
hich 
participants fixated on each region of interest during ‘the w
om
an w
ill put the glass onto the table. 
Then, she w
ill pick up the bottle, and pour the w
ine carefully into the glass. The fixations w
ere 
calculated every 25 m
s sequentially from
 the synchronisation point.     
 
Percentage of fixations 
tim
e (m
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Red glass – two glasses plausible vs. two glasses implausible 
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were no more anticipatory looks 
to the un-referred red glass in the ‘two glasses’ plausible condition 
than there were looks to the un-referred red glass in the ‘two glasses’ 
implausible condition (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) = -1.556, p > .05). 
Similarly, during the final reference to ‘the glass’ there was no 
difference in the proportion of looks to the un-referred red glass 
between these two conditions (t1 (47) < 1) (t2 (23) = -1.099, p > .05) 
(see figures 5., 6., and table 2.). 
   
Time red glass  
(pl.) 
red glass  
(impl.) 
the wine carefully into 
 
23 20 
the glass 
 
11 12 
 
Table 2. Percentage of trials with looks to the un-referred red glass during “the 
wine carefully into the glass”. Percentages calculated from the total number of 
trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Looks to the red glass (un-referred affordable location) during “the wine 
carefully into the glass”.  
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Fig 6. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the un-referred red glass in the plausible and 
im
plausible (tw
o glasses) conditions. The percentages show
 the proportion of trials on w
hich 
participants fixated on each region of interest during ‘the w
om
an w
ill put the glass onto the table. 
Then, she w
ill pick up the bottle, and pour the w
ine carefully into the glass. The fixations w
ere 
calculated every 25 m
s sequentially from
 the synchronisation point.     
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Appendix 11: Experiment 8 (version 2) 
 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two students from the University of York participated in this 
study, receiving either course credit or a payment of £3. All 
participants were native English speakers and had either uncorrected 
vision or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli 
Twenty-four experimental scenes (see figure 1.) were matched with 
two conditions. In both conditions we presented two affordable target 
items. For example, one blue glass and one red glass were depicted 
on the floor. In condition 1 the blue glass was described as being 
moved to the table (plausible location 1) and the red glass was 
described as being moved to the stool (plausible location 2). In this 
condition the first mentioned item was always referred to at the end 
of the narrative. In condition 2 the blue glass was described as being 
moved to the table (plausible location 1) and the red glass was 
described as being moved to the lamp (implausible location). In this 
condition the first mentioned item was subsequently referred to in 
50% of the trials and the second mentioned item was referred to in 
50% of the trials. This design allowed us to compare the proportion of 
anticipatory looks to the lamp in the two glasses implausible 
condition with the proportion of anticipatory looks to the table and the 
stool in the two glasses implausible condition. In addition to the 
experimental trials, 48 sentence-picture pairs were included as fillers 
(see appendix 12 for examples of the filler items). Twelve of the filler 
items referred to the first mentioned item (e.g. blue glass) at the end 
of the narrative and 36 of the filler items referred to the second 
mentioned item (e.g. red glass) at the end of the narrative. As such, 
50% of the trials always referred to the first mentioned items and 
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50% of the trials always referred to the second mentioned item.  
 
1. The woman will move the blue glass onto the table and the 
red glass onto the stool. Then, she will pick up the bottle, and 
pour the wine carefully into the blue glass. 
 
(Plausible) 
 
2. The woman will move the blue glass onto the table and the 
red glass onto the lamp. Then, she will pick up the bottle, and 
pour the wine carefully into the blue/red glass. 
 
(Implausible) 
 
 
                
         
 
Figure 1. Example of one of the visual scenes paired with sentences: 1) and 2). 
 
 
Procedure 
The procedure for this experiment was the same as in the previous 
concurrent screen experiments – the visual scenes were presented 
for 1000 milliseconds, followed by the onset of the auditory stimuli. 
The trials ended 14 seconds after the audio onset, lasting a total of 
15 seconds. The experiment was run on an Eyelink II head-mounted 
eye-tracker, which sampled at 250 Hz from the right eye. 
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Analysis 
We defined five regions of interest within each scene; one 
corresponding to the plausible location of the moved blue glass (e.g. 
the table), another corresponding to the plausible location of the 
moved red glass (e.g. the stool), and a third area corresponding to 
the implausible location of the moved red glass (e.g. the lamp). We 
included a fourth area that corresponded to the original location of 
the blue glass and a fifth area corresponding to the original location 
of the red glass. As the scenes remained onscreen throughout each 
of the trials, we defined the regions of interest according to the 
outline of each target object. As such, participants’ eye movements 
had to be directed to one of the pixels occupied by each object within 
the scene. Participants’ eye movements were examined during 
certain time points in the spoken sentences. As we were solely 
interested in anticipatory eye movements, the critical time points 
occurred during ‘the wine carefully into’.  
     To begin with, we compared the proportion of saccades to the 
table/lamp when the blue glass had been moved there. We also 
compared the proportion of saccades to the stool with the proportion 
of looks to the table/lamp. These comparisons allowed us to explore 
whether participants would anticipate and look to the stool 
(alternative location) more when the red glass had been moved to an 
implausible location, compared to a plausible location.  
 
Results  
Table vs. lamp  
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were no more anticipatory looks 
to the table in the plausible condition than there were looks to the 
lamp in the implausible condition (t1 (31) < 1) (t2 (23) < 1). There 
was also no difference in the proportion of looks to the table in the 
implausible condition and the lamp in the implausible condition (t1 
(31) < 1) (t2 (23) < 1) (see figures 2., 3., and table 1.). 
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Stool vs. lamp/table  
During ‘the wine carefully into’ there were no more anticipatory looks 
to the stool in the plausible condition than there were looks to the 
lamp in the implausible condition (t1 (31) < 1) (t2 (23) = -1.529, p > 
.05). Similarly, there was no difference in the proportion of looks to 
the table in the plausible condition and the stool in the plausible 
condition (t1 (31) = 1.725, p > .05) (t2 (23) = -1.818, p > .05) see 
figures 2., 3., and table 1.). 
 
Time table  
(pl.) 
stool  
(pl.) 
table 
(pl.) 
lamp  
(impl.) 
the wine carefully into 
 
15 9 14 11 
 
Table 1. Percentage of trials with looks to the table, stool and the lamp during “the 
wine carefully into”. Percentages calculated from the total number of trials. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Looks to the table (plausible location 1), the stool (plausible location 2) 
and the lamp (implausible location) during “the wine carefully into”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
 
251	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3. P
ercentage of trials w
ith fixations tow
ard the table, stool and the lam
p in the plausible and 
im
plausible conditions. The percentages show
 the proportion of trials on w
hich participants fixated 
on each region of interest during ‘the w
om
an w
ill put the glass onto the table. Then, she w
ill pick 
up the bottle, and pour the w
ine carefully into the glass. The fixations w
ere calculated every 25 m
s 
sequentially from
 the synchronisation point.     
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Appendix 12: Example of filler items – experiment 8 (version 2) 
 
 
                          
     
  
The farmer will move the small pot over to the shovel and the large 
pot next to the watering can. Then, he will fetch the flower, and place 
it gingerly inside the small pot. 
 
 
 
     
 
The woman will sit the blonde baby in the chair and the brunette 
baby in the playpen. Then, she will get the rattle, and hand it lovingly 
to the brunette baby.   
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Appendix 13: Experimental sentences – experiment 9 
 
 
1. 
a. The woman was very hungry, but she only had one slice of 
bread left.  Quickly, she put it onto the bottle. Then, she 
grabbed the butter, and spread it sluggishly onto the bread. 
 
b. The woman was very hungry, but she only had one slice of 
bread left.  Quickly, she put it onto the plate. Then, she 
grabbed the butter, and spread it sluggishly onto the bread. 
 
2. 
a. The man had been clearing his desk and he had nearly filled 
the only dustbin in the office. He wanted to tidy up so he 
moved the dustbin onto the printer. Then, he grabbed the can, 
and chucked it violently into the dustbin. 
 
b. The man had been clearing his desk and he had nearly filled 
the only dustbin in the office. He wanted to tidy up so he 
moved the dustbin right in front of the fan. Then, he grabbed 
the can, and chucked it violently into the dustbin. 
 
3. 
a. The woman didn’t have a pet carrier, but she had just been to 
borrow one from her friend. She was in a bit of a hurry so she 
lifted the pet carrier onto the flowers. Then, she picked up the 
cat, and put it carefully into the pet carrier. 
 
b. The woman didn’t have a pet carrier, but she had just been to 
borrow one from her friend. She was in a bit of a hurry so she 
lifted the pet carrier onto the table. Then, she picked up the 
cat, and put it carefully into the pet carrier. 
 
4. 
a. The businessman had an important meeting and the only 
computer he had access to was running low on battery. To 
prepare for the meeting, he put the computer on the cactus. 
Then, he picked up the disk, and inserted it quickly into the 
computer. 
 
b. The businessman had an important meeting and the only 
computer he had access to was running low on battery. To 
prepare for the meeting, he put the computer on the desk. 
Then, he picked up the disk, and inserted it quickly into the 
computer. 
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5. 
a. The woman had been instructed to hand over her expense 
claims and she was given a special envelope to put them in. 
She was very annoyed and angrily put the envelope right on 
the sandwich. Then, she reached for the documents, and put 
them hesitantly into the envelope. 
 
b. The woman had been instructed to hand over her expense 
claims and she was given a special envelope to put them in. 
She was very annoyed and angrily put the envelope right next 
to the lamp. Then, she reached for the documents, and put 
them hesitantly into the envelope. 
 
6. 
a. The student had just moved away from home and she had to 
share the only pan in the new house with her housemates. 
She was late for class and quickly put the pan on the pepper 
mill. Then, she reached for the bowl, and transferred the eggs 
swiftly into the pan. 
 
b. The student had just moved away from home and she had to 
share the only pan in the new house with her housemates. 
She was late for class and quickly put the pan on the cooker. 
Then, she reached for the bowl, and transferred the eggs 
swiftly into the pan. 
 
7. 
a. The housewife only had one vase because her husband had 
broken the rest. She was tidying up the living room so she put 
it on the Hoover. Then, she picked up the flowers, and 
arranged them happily in the vase. 
 
b. The housewife only had one vase because her husband had 
broken the rest. She was tidying up the living room so she put 
it on the sideboard. Then, she picked up the flowers, and 
arranged them happily in the vase. 
 
8. 
a. The chef was being filmed for a new cookery show and she 
was only allowed to use one pan. She had 30 minutes to 
prepare a meal so she placed the pan on the potatoes. Then, 
she noticed the lid, and placed it carefully onto the pan. 
 
b. The chef was being filmed for a new cookery show and she 
was only allowed to use one pan. She had 30 minutes to 
prepare a meal so she placed the pan on the cooker. Then, 
she noticed the lid, and placed it carefully onto the pan. 
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9. 
a. The woman only had one jewellery box and she used it to 
store her most precious belongings. She was expecting 
company so she put the jewellery box right on the grapefruit. 
Then, she admired the necklace, and hid it quickly inside the 
jewellery box. 
 
b. The woman only had one jewellery box and she used it to 
store her most precious belongings. She was expecting 
company so she put the jewellery box right next to the coffee. 
Then, she admired the necklace, and hid it quickly inside the 
jewellery box.  
 
10. 
a. The man wanted to cut down some trees, but his only 
chainsaw was running out of petrol. He was trying to finish 
before it got dark so he put the chainsaw onto the axe. Then, 
he picked up the jerry can, and poured some petrol quickly 
into the chainsaw. 
 
b. The man wanted to cut down some trees, but his only 
chainsaw was running out of petrol. He was trying to finish 
before it got dark so he put the chainsaw onto the tree stump. 
Then, he picked up the jerry can, and poured some petrol 
quickly into the chainsaw.  
 
11. 
a. The man wanted to listen to some music, but he only had an 
old gramophone player. He especially liked classical music so 
he put the gramophone on the candles. Then, he cleaned the 
record, and placed it delicately on the gramophone. 
 
b. The man wanted to listen to some music, but he only had an 
old gramophone player. He especially liked classical music so 
he put the gramophone on the sideboard. Then, he cleaned 
the record, and placed it delicately on the gramophone. 
 
12. 
a. The girl had been asked to tidy up her room, but she could 
only find one hanger. She wanted to please her mother so she 
suspended the hanger on the plant. Then, she reached for the 
shirt, and hung it cheerfully onto the hanger. 
 
b. The girl had been asked to tidy up her room, but she could 
only find one hanger. She wanted to please her mother so she 
suspended the hanger on the rail. Then, she reached for the 
shirt, and hung it cheerfully onto the hanger. 
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13. 
a. Even though the businessman had booked a double room he 
could only find one cup. He was very thirsty so he put the cup 
on the figurine. Then, he reached for the teapot, and poured 
the tea slowly into the cup. 
 
b. Even though the businessman had booked a double room he 
could only find one cup. He was very thirsty so he put the cup 
on the table. Then, he reached for the teapot, and poured the 
tea slowly into the cup.  
 
14. 
a. The man had just moved into his new apartment and so far he 
only had one chair. He wanted to relax the atmosphere so he 
put the chair on the Christmas tree. Then, he lifted up the 
teddy bear, and sat it affectionately on the chair. 
 
b. The man had just moved into his new apartment and so far he 
only had one chair. He wanted to relax the atmosphere so he 
put the chair right next to the girl. Then, he lifted up the teddy 
bear, and sat it affectionately on the chair. 
 
15. 
a. After the meeting finished the woman had put all the used 
mugs in the dishwasher except for one. Quickly, she put the 
mug on the Wellies. Then, she reached for the bottle, and 
tipped the water quickly into the mug. 
 
b. After the meeting finished the woman had put all the used 
mugs in the dishwasher except for one. Quickly, she put the 
mug on the trolley. Then, she reached for the bottle, and 
tipped the water quickly into the mug. 
 
16. 
a. The woman wanted some wine, but she could only find one 
glass. She was desperate for a drink so she put the glass on 
the lamp. Then, she picked up the bottle, and poured the wine 
carefully into the glass. 
 
b. The woman wanted some wine, but she could only find one 
glass. She was desperate for a drink so she put the glass on 
the lamp. She was desperate for a drink so she put the glass 
on the table. Then, she picked up the bottle, and poured the 
wine carefully into the glass. 
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17. 
a. The boy wanted to play in the garden, but all he could find was 
a small plastic boat. He inspected it for a while and decided to 
put it on the clothesline. Then, he picked up the dummy, and 
placed it curiously inside the boat. 
 
b. The boy wanted to play in the garden, but all he could find was 
a small plastic boat. He inspected it for a while and decided to 
put it in the pool. Then, he picked up the dummy, and placed it 
curiously inside the boat. 
 
18. 
a. The woman was going on holiday, but she only had one 
suitcase. Her flight was leaving in two hours so she put the 
suitcase on the stereo. Then, she took her shoes, and put 
them quickly into the suitcase. 
 
b. The woman was going on holiday, but she only had one 
suitcase. Her flight was leaving in two hours so she put the 
suitcase on the bed. Then, she took her shoes, and put them 
quickly into the suitcase. 
 
19. 
a. The girl wanted to offer her friend a drink, but she could only 
find one glass. She finished the blouse and put the glass on 
the mannequin. Then, she grabbed the jug, and poured some 
lemonade attentively into the glass. 
 
b. The girl wanted to offer her friend a drink, but she could only 
find one glass. She finished the blouse and put the glass on 
the tray. Then, she grabbed the jug, and poured some 
lemonade attentively into the glass. 
 
20. 
a. The man had just started a fancy new job, but he only had a 
shabby old briefcase. He studied the graph and lifted the 
briefcase onto the water-cooler. Then, he reached for the 
notepad, and placed it hesitantly inside the briefcase. 
 
b. The man had just started a fancy new job, but he only had a 
shabby old briefcase. He studied the graph and lifted the 
briefcase onto the desk. Then, he reached for the notepad, 
and placed it hesitantly inside the briefcase. 
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21. 
a. The girl had just bought a new dog collar because the dog had 
chewed up the old one. She wanted to try it out and decided to 
fasten the collar on the lamp. Then, she picked up the leash, 
and attached it cheerfully on the collar. 
 
b. The girl had just bought a new dog collar because the dog had 
chewed up the old one. She wanted to try it out and decided to 
fasten the collar on the dog. Then, she picked up the leash, 
and attached it cheerfully on the collar. 
 
22. 
a. The handyman had been told to tidy up his equipment, but he 
had only brought a very small toolbox. He was in a rush, so he 
lifted the toolbox onto the drill. Then, he picked up the 
hammer, and dropped it sloppily into the toolbox. 
 
b. The handyman had been told to tidy up his equipment, but he 
had only brought a very small toolbox. He was in a rush, so he 
lifted the toolbox onto the shelf. Then, he picked up the 
hammer, and dropped it sloppily into the toolbox. 
 
23. 
a. The man was out gathering fruit but he had only brought one 
basket. He looked around and decided to put the basket on 
the donkey. Then, he picked some apples, and placed them 
gently inside the basket. 
 
b. The man was out gathering fruit but he had only brought one 
basket. He looked around and decided to put the basket on 
the ladder. Then, he picked some apples, and placed them 
gently inside the basket. 
 
24.  
a. The boy only had one cookie-jar because his brother had 
broken the other one. He was late for school so he put the jar 
on the birdcage. Then, he took the biscuits, and transferred 
them attentively into the jar. 
 
b. The boy only had one cookie-jar because his brother had 
broken the other one. He was late for school so he put the jar 
on the stool. Then, he took the biscuits, and transferred them 
attentively into the jar. 
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Appendix 14: Experimental scenes – experiment 9 
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Appendix 15: Example of filler items – experiment 9  
 
 
                       
  
 
The gardener had imported a very rare orchid from the Amazon. He 
was eager to study it so he put the orchid onto the tray. Then, he 
picked up the watering can, and poured the water liberally over the 
orchid. 
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